Constitution Day 2018

RWPC - Constitution Day 2018

Today was Constitution Day.

On September 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia concluded. 39 of the 55 delegates to the Convention signed the final product, including its primary author, James Madison, and its eldest member, Benjamin Franklin.

The Convention was called by Congress for the specific purpose of “amending the Articles of Confederation.” The specific defects were in the ability of the Congress to collect tax revenue from the states and in its weak authority to regulate commerce among them. But the organizers of the Convention, including James Madison, Edmund Randolph, and Alexander Hamilton had other plans. They intended to scrap the Articles altogether and draft a different form of government altogether, relying somewhat on the Articles of Confederation for guidance. In fact, Madison had already written a draft of that new government prior to the Convention and had asked Randolph, Governor of Virginia and member of one of Virginia’s most prominent families, to present it.

But what Madison had planned (which was a more national type of government; a powerful government of ambitious powers) is not what the majority of delegates could agree on. It would take 4 months of heated discussion and debate to convince Madison that a federal government, a government of limited powers and checks and balances, was the best form of a common government but the only form that the states would ever agree to.

Things didn’t go as smoothly as expected at the convention. Delegates became frustrated over the constant and fruitless bickering and the inability to made any significant progress in amending the federal government. Many left in disgust and many left to go back to their families, becoming frustrated in how long the convention was dragging on.

Benjamin Franklin, ever the optimist ,even at the age of 81, gave a poignant assessment of the Convention in his final speech before the Constitutional Convention:

“I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better Constitution: For when you assemble a Number of Men to have the Advantage of their joint Wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those Men all their Prejudices, their Passions, their Errors of Opinion, their local Interests, and their selfish Views. From such an Assembly can a perfect Production be expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this System approaching so near to Perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our Enemies, who are waiting with Confidence to hear that our Councils are confounded, like those of the Builders of Babel, and that our States are on the Point of Separation, only to meet hereafter for the Purpose of cutting one another’s throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I am not sure that it is not the best.”

To honor Constitution Day, members of the Republican Women of Pitt County and the Eastern NC Tea Party joined with members of the Daughters of the American Revolution to ring bells at 4:00 pm (to mark the time of day the Constitution was signed) on the front steps of the Sheppard Memorial Library in downtown Greenville and then to pass out free pocket constitutions to those inside.

HAPPY CONSTITUTION DAY, EVERYONE !!

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Thomas Jefferson Articulates the Remedy of NULLIFICATION in an Opinion Written to George Washington in 1791

THOMAS JEFFERSON - wire glasses

by Diane Rufino, September 16, 2018

In 1791, Thomas Jefferson wrote an opinion on the constitutionality of a National Bank. It is an important commentary on the meaning and intent of the US Constitution, in particular the two general clauses – the General Welfare Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.

President George Washington’s Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton proposed the creation of a national bank. He advised that a national bank would “give great facility or convenience in the collection of taxes” and would facilitate the government’s assumption of the states’ Revolutionary War debts, thus serving the taxing power of the federal government. Not sure if such a bank was a constitutional exercise of government legislative power, Washington asked Hamilton and Jefferson, his Secretary of State, to articulate their positions.

And so, on Feb. 15, 1791, Jefferson submitted an opinion to Washington against the creation of a National Bank, explaining that it was not authorized by any specific delegation of power nor was it contemplated by any of the general clauses. In specific, he articulated that the “Necessary & Proper” Clause meant that Congress could take action only when it was necessary (and proper) to bring into effect any of the specifically enumerated powers; that is, without those means without which the grant of power would be meaningless. The clause did not mean Congress could pursue action that was merely convenient or helpful.”  Jefferson said that all the functions of which Hamilton was concerned – the collection of taxes, the paying of war debt, etc – could all be carried into execution without a bank. Therefore, as a constitutional matter, he concluded that a bank was not necessary, and consequently not authorized by the “Necessary & Proper” phrase.

Hamilton’s opinion was different. He argued that the Constitution, in Article I, Section 8, created a legislature not only of specific powers but of implied powers as well.

In the end, the House and then the Senate approved a bill establishing a charter for the first National Bank, and President Washington, siding with Hamilton, signed it. The first Bank of the United States was built in Philadelphia.

Chef Justice John Marshall, the man credited with transforming the role of the Supreme Court, later chose to ignore Jefferson’s opinion and commentary when the constitutionality of the national bank came before the Court in 1819 – in McCulloch v. Maryland.  His opinion in that case echoed Hamilton’s view that the federal government is indeed one of express AND implied powers, an issue that was DIRECTLY addressed and dismissed at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and again when states expressed concern in their ratifying conventions.

While this Opinion by Thomas Jefferson shows us how our federal judiciary willingly chooses to ignore four country’s most important and most credible authority on the meaning and intent of the Constitution when it is faced with the chance to assign greater power to the federal government, there is another reason why this opinion is important: It explains the intended checks and balances on the federal legislature, both horizontal and vertical. The Supreme Court would later find the most important check to be unconstitutional. Imagine that.

At the end of his Opinion, Jefferson writes:

“The negative of the President is the shield provided by the Constitution to protect against the invasions of the legislature: 1. The right of the Executive. 2. Of the Judiciary. 3. Of the States and State legislatures. The present is the case of a right remaining exclusively with the States, and consequently one of those intended by the Constitution to be placed under its protection.”

In other words, the rightful checks on the lawmaking power of the US Congress include:

(1)  The President (he can veto or refuse to sign the bill into law; or he can, by Executive Order, explain that certain provisions are unenforceable because they exceed authority)

(2)  The courts  (the federal courts can strike down a law as “unconstitutional”)

(3)  The States and State legislatures (The States can separately find a federal law to be unconstitutional, per their understanding of the Constitution and per their reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment)

Number (3) above is NULLIFICATION and includes INTERPOSITION. These are the rightful remedies reserved to each State, according to Jefferson when the federal government exceeds its delegated authority under the Constitution and specifically, when it attempts to legislate in areas reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment. A law passed without constitutional authority is a law is a nullity; it is unenforceable.  And it SHOULD be.  It is up to the States, as the most important of the Checks and Balances (a vertical check) to make sure that the people, protected by the Constitution as to the lawful bounds of government, are not subject to unconstitutional laws.

Here you have it, from the earliest days of our republic, the clear and simple articulation of the right of Nullification.

Jefferson, of course, would go on to articulate it much more clearly and forcibly, in the Kentucky Resolves of 1799 (a series of resolutions he wrote secretly for the Kentucky state legislature to oppose the highly unconstitutional Alien & Sedition Acts, enacted by the administration of John Adams. In the Kentucky Resolves of 1799, Jefferson wrote:

“If those who administer the general government be permitted to transgress the limits fixed by that compact, by a total disregard to the special delegations of power therein contained, annihilation of the state governments, and the erection upon their ruins, of a general consolidated government, will be the inevitable consequence: That the principle and construction contended for by sundry of the state legislatures, that the general government is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, stop nothing short of despotism; since the discretion of those who administer the government, and not the constitution, would be the measure of their powers: That the several states who formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction; and that a NULLIFICATION, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy: That this commonwealth does upon the most deliberate reconsideration declare, that the said alien and sedition laws, are in their opinion, palpable violations of the said constitution; and however cheerfully it may be disposed to surrender its opinion to a majority of its sister states in matters of ordinary or doubtful policy; yet, in momentous regulations like the present, which so vitally wound the best rights of the citizen, it would consider a silent acquiescence as highly criminal: That although this commonwealth as a party to the federal compact; will bow to the laws of the Union, yet it does at the same time declare, that it will not now, nor ever hereafter, cease to oppose in a constitutional manner, every attempt from what quarter soever offered, to violate that compact.”

Nullification is, and has always been, a rightful remedy by which each State can review the constitutionality of government acts and policy (and even federal court opinions) and if an abuse is found, to protect the citizens in their States from the tyranny that would result from their enforcement.

 

References:

Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, Avalon Project (Yale Law School).  Referenced at:  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bank-tj.asp

Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, February 15, 1791, Opinion on Bill for Establishing a National Bank, from the Works of Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, from the Library of Congress.  Referenced at:  https://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mtj/mtj1/013/013_0984_0990.pdf    [NOTE:  The Library of Congress was formed when Thomas Jefferson donated the contents of his personal library]

The Kentucky Resolves of 1799 (The Constitution Society).  Referenced at:  http://www.constitution.org/cons/kent1799.htm

Government Targeting Political Opponents (an American Story, thanks to Barack Obama)

 

MAXINE WATERS - protesters burn flag outside Waters' Office

by Diane Rufino, July 21, 2018

On Thursday, July 19, supporters of Democratic Congresswoman Maxine Waters showed up at her Los Angeles office and put on a very troubling and unpatriotic display. I suppose their conduct was either in line with their diminished intelligence, their natural tendency to thug-like, violent behavior, or the indoctrination of the Thug Queen herself, Maxine Waters. At one point in the video taken of that protest, one lady not only parroted the vile hatred that Waters has been spewing but she also sounded exactly like her. It was disturbingly unsettling.

Waters and her ilk are the lowest of the low, and should have no place in the kind of country that was established for close-knit communities predicated on the mutual respect for our country’s ideals, our collective desire to get along, and our intelligent duty to conduct ourselves as decent members of society and to support the Rule of Law.

Last week, the constitutionally conservative group known as Oath Keepers called on members to show up outside the controversial Congresswoman’s South Los Angeles office for a “protest against Maxine Waters’ incitement of terrorism, and a stand FOR ICE and the Border Patrol.”  Supporters of Waters (ie, the demonstrators) showed up with the intent of countering that protest, but police at the protest site told the Los Angeles Times that the group had notified authorities that it no longer planned to hold the demonstration, in order to keep the peace.

Rather than go back home, the Pro-Waters crowd, which numbered a few dozen and included union workers, church leaders, South Los Angeles residents and members of activist groups, many holding signs that read “Resist!,” proceeded to demonstrate and display the hatred that Rep. Waters so often uses her platform to encourage and incite. At one point, a pick-up truck drove by, and believing it to belong to a member of the Oath Keepers, the demonstrators gathered around it, opened the doors and terrorized the driver, and then snatched his American flag from the truck bed.  No doubt, they were offended by a real American, a conservative. They proceeded to stomp on the flag and then set it on fire. They chanted “Black Power” and shouted “America was never great” A few even yelled: “This is not the American flag, this is their flag.”

…….  Not exactly the kind-of crowd you look forward to enjoying a 4th of July picnic with.
MAXINE WATERS - protesters stopping pick up truck and stealing man's flag outside Waters' Office

Ever since the election of Donald Trump, an election he won fair and square, and against an avalanche of behind-the-scenes crooked dealings, alliances, pay-offs, abuses of power, government-DNC collusion, and a phony Russian scandal, Democrats and others on the left have become unhinged and have shown their opposition in ways that exceed those allowed by the First Amendment, that offend all rules of common decency, that frustrate the traditional university goals of robust intelligent debate, and that violate our civil and criminal laws.  We see the rhetoric of hate, we see threats of violence against conservatives and against Republican members of Congress and members of Trump’s administration, we see Republican state and federal leaders and members of Trump’s administration (and their families) being shouted and threatened out of restaurants, movie theaters, and ball games, we see violence against conservative speech by Antifa and hooded thugs on campuses, we’ve witnessed the intentional shooting of Republican Congressmen (last year’s Congressional softball game), we’ve learned of the arrest of at least one Antifa member who amassed a cache of bomb-making materials and guns and who had a Manifesto outlining his mission to kill conservatives, we hear the most vile of rants and name-calling from members of the Entertainment Industry against Trump and against conservatives, we hear talk-show hosts and actors call for the rape and sodomization of members of Trump’s family and administration, we watch in disbelief as Democratic leaders in Congress become increasingly unhinged and unpatriotic in their messages and in their conduct, and we see Black Lives Matter protestors, including the likes of Al Sharpton and other race-baitors and poverty pimps, calling for the slaughter of members of law enforcement.

We see a common thread….   All of these groups, all of these so-called people belonging to the Democratic Party.

What should happen ideally is that all of these types of people, including hoards of illegal immigrants and Middle-Eastern refugees, be moved into the communities and neighborhoods of Democratic legislators, Democratic politicians, Democratic Party leaders, activist judges, Hollywood actors and actresses, liberal talk-show hosts, and editors, producers, columnists, reporters, and commentators of the mainstream media. If these people want to empower such anti-social, violent, psychotic, unpatriotic, dis-believing, dependent, entitled, abhorrent, crazed, unstable, mentally-imbalanced, irresponsible, law-breaking, terrorist individuals, then at least they should know what it’s like to have them living among them.

Anyway, I digress from my main point which is that Obama targeted political opponents, using the full force of the federal government –  a government absolutely prohibited, under the Bill of Rights, from enacting any law or policy that infringes on one’s freedom of speech, freedom to the press (including every blogger and writer who “publishes” in any way information and commentary), right to own and bear firearms (“Shall Not Be Infringed!”), freedom of conscience, right of assembly, and freedom to be safe from unreasonable government searches and seizures (to be safe and secure in one’s home and in one’s private affairs; “to be king of one’s castle”).

Right after Barack Obama took office as president, in early April 2009, he had Attorney General Janet Napolitano and the Department of Homeland Security re-draft guidelines as to who the “real threat” to America is.  This was done without anyone paying any particular attention to it and was done while the country was still shielding their eyes, as if they were looking at the face of the new “messiah.”  According to President Obama, his advisors, and his administration in general, it was no longer radical Islam that posed the greatest threat to our country, but rather, the very people he made fun of in one of his appearances in Pennsylvania — those who “cling to their religion and their guns.”  The DHS document outlining this threat was titled “RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment,” and it was issued by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (within DHS).  You can read the entire document yourself at:  https//fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf.  In it, the Department of Homeland Security explains that people like Tea Party groups, white conservatives. Veterans, Christians, Second-amendment supporters, and the like pose a serious threat to the country (and, as mentioned, to Obama’s administration — as he is a black man). These “rightwing extremists,” the report says, are those who will produce white supremacists, will oppose Obama’s policies, will present opposition to his policies on immigration, and in general, will try to organize against him. Because they support the second amendment, the Obama administration labeled them as dangerous, likely to organize and use violence, and put them on the DHS watch list.

Can you even wrap your mind around the sanity of the federal government in deeming God-fearing, law-abiding, Constitution-loving, patriotic conservative Americans to be dangerous to the country, moreso than the likes of those who slaughtered 3000 innocent Americans on 9/11, who have kidnapped and beheaded several of our journalists and contractors, and who have planned and carried out the many attacks on our military personnel and citizens both here and abroad ???   I certainly can’t. A government that can even think of doing so is simply evil and unconstitutionally ambitious.

In embracing Obama’s policy and attempting to sell it to state and local law enforcement and to the country in general, Secretary Janet Napolitano issued the following press release on April 15, 2009, which was posted on the Department of Homeland Security website: “The primary mission of this department is to prevent terrorist attacks on our nation. The document on Right-Wing Extremism sent last week by this department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis is one in an ongoing series of assessments to provide situational awareness to state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies on the phenomenon and trends of violent radicalization in the United States. I was briefed on the general topic, which is one that struck a nerve as someone personally involved in the Timothy McVeigh prosecution.”  Turning the government against its law-abiding citizens is the very definition of tyranny.

We associate governments targeting, harassing, drumming up false charges, imprisoning, and killing political opponents with the likes of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party, with Josef Stalin and the Communist Party, with Pol Pot (Cambodia) and the Communist Khmer Rouge Party, with Pinochet in Chile, with Mao Zedong in China, with Mehmet Talat Pasa in Armenia, with Idi Ami in Uganda, and with the leadership in countries like Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur.  We all know that the government rounded up Japanese-Americans and put them in internment camps after the attack on Pearl Harbor. With intimate knowledge of and sensitive information about Pearl Harbor having been obtained by Japanese spy, Takeo Yoshikawa, and transmitted ultimately to Admiral Yamamoto in Japan to finalize plans of the attack, the government could not trust Japanese-Americans to be loyal to the United States over Japan. The camps were dismantled after Japan’s defeat.  We also all know of the McCarthy era and the political movement to weed out Communists and Communist spies from positions of power and access to sensitive information, but that was arguably for reasons of true national security. The relationship between the United States and Russia has become adversarial and competitive for control and influence in the world….  It was an era of intense geopolitics. Every move by Russia (the Soviet Union) became a matter of freedom and tyranny… a matter of individuals being able to live freely or to be controlled by a regime of fear and violence. The two countries emerged as the worlds’ two greatest superpowers, with the ability of annihilating millions of people with their nuclear capability (Russia obtaining the technology thru its espionage activities in the US) and each viewed the other as the enemy and an absolute threat to national security.

No one would ever associate modern day United States with political persecution, yet that’s exactly what happened under the Obama administration. Barack Obama deemed anyone whose views were contrary to his and his administration or whose views and background, and potential, posed a risk to his political agenda as “security threats” to the United States, posing a likely threat of acts of domestic terrorism. Is this not mind-blowing or what??  Paranoid kings of England acted in this manner, paranoid emperors of Rome acted in this manner, Stalin and Hitler acted in this manner, and the list goes on…..  those who think differently pose a threat to those in power. Yes, conservatives think the right to have and bear arms is a right meant to be essentially free from government control (except for mental illness and a violent history). Conservatives believe government control of firearms and ammunition, and talk of confiscation are the hallmarks of a tyrant (like King James II and King George III of England),.  Yes, conservatives believe that a sovereign nation without border control, ie, control over immigration, is not sovereign but merely a temporary state ultimately doomed to mob control. Yes, conservatives believe in the vitality and importance of our very first amendment – the rights to religious liberty, speech, press, assembly, and petition. They believe that a person is endowed with the right to think freely and to think as dictated by his or her religious values, his degree of intelligence and understanding, and as his heart and gut instruct (the “right of conscience”) and that government has no place to coerce thought, speech, and conduct that violates that right of conscience.  Yes, conservatives believe that a woman may have freedom over her body and her fertility (her ability to bring forth new life), but they certainly don’t believe the right is absolute and  includes the right to kill a fully-developed, living child that for the unfortunate reason that nature dictates (not yet been born), it hasn’t yet been able to take its first breath outside the mother’s womb.  Yes, conservatives believe in a limited government. They believe in the government created by the Constitution, which by its terms and provisions is certainly one meant to be limited. They believe a free country means that its citizens are able to freely exercise their God-given rights without over-regulation and intrusion by the government.  They believe in the rights of the individual and not the collective, a distinction made very clear when our country and our government system were established. They believe that a government that forcibly takes from some in order to benefit others, and then relies on those “dependents” as a crucial voting block, is an unconstitutional government – one well on its way to being a socialist government. Yes, conservatives believe in personal responsibility, lower taxes, free markets, and unburdened property rights.  And yes, conservatives believe that federal court judges and Supreme Court justices are limited in their roles on the bench; they are limited by the words, meaning, intent, and historical context of the Constitution and by the plain meaning and legislative intent of federal laws. In other words, they must be strict constructionists, textualists, and originalists, for the Constitution is a statement of the people’s intention for their government, permanently documented and ratified by state conventions specifically organized for that purpose. The only way to change the terms of government and to “evolve” with times is to take advantage of the amendment process outlined in Article V.  Conservatives  are strongly opposed to the notion of a “living, breathing, document” which gives judges and justices full reign to mold and transform the Constitution as they see fit and which allows them to by-pass the democratic process where the people dictate how fast society “progresses.”

Democrats, and especially Obama, believe in the complete opposite. The difference between Obama and other Democratic presidents is that he deceptively, secretly, covertly put programs and policies in place to subdue the opposition (conservatives) and as we are learning now, to deprive them the office of the presidency, in order to move full speed on his progressive, liberal (un-American) policies.  Besides his blatant abuse of the IRS to target conservatives, his interference in investigation and potential prosecution of Hillary Clinton for her intentional abuse of national security procedures by using a personal unsecured email server for official emails, and his creation of a “fake” dossier and his illegal abuse of the FISA warrant policy to spy on the Trump campaign, Judicial Watch has just uncovered documents that show that President Obama attempted to institute gun control stealthily by going after ammunition instead of guns. (It has just filed suit in the district court in DC to compel the ATF to produce its records on the matter).  The first shots of the American Revolution, as most of are unaware, were fired not because of taxation but because King George instructed his man in Massachusetts, General Gage, to locate and destroy all the colonists’ ammunition. And as most are unaware, it was this despotic act that prompted one of my favorite founding fathers, Patrick Henry, to exclaim to the Virginia Convention that famous night on March 23, 1775 at St. John’s Church in Richmond:

They tell us, sir, that we are weak; unable to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it be the next week, or the next year?  Will it be when we are totally disarmed, and when a British guard shall be stationed in every house?  Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction? Shall we acquire the means of effectual resistance by lying supinely on our backs and hugging the delusive phantom of hope, until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot?  Sir, we are not weak if we make a proper use of those means which the God of nature hath placed in our power. The millions of people, armed in the holy cause of liberty, and in such a country as that which we possess, are invincible by any force which our enemy can send against us. Besides, sir, we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us.  There is no retreat but in submission and slavery!  Our chains are forged!  Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston!  The war is inevitable–and let it come! I repeat it, sir, let it come.

Gentlemen may cry, Peace, Peace.. But there is no peace. The war is actually begun!  The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms!  Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here idle?  Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?  Forbid it, Almighty God!  I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!

With that speech, he defended the resolutions he had submitted for Virginia to build and train its militia (one in every county), to be ready to fight the British.

It is one thing to think differently, politically, for that is how citizens advance their issues and concerns in government, but it is another thing to use the government against the people because they think differently. And it is also one thing to think compromise is necessary and always a good thing, when sometimes it’s the very way we erode important foundations.  As Richard Dawkins once said:  “When two opposite points of view are expressed with equal intensity, the truth does not necessarily lie exactly halfway between them. It is possible for one side to be simply wrong.”  If the colonists had accepted Britain’s treatment of them, if they had engaged in endless compromise with its leaders, then America would never have pushed for, and fought for, its independence. Compromise breeds complacency.

If we look back on how President Obama insidiously targeted conservatives, we should take note of how he identified certain traditional “American” values and views and tried to explain them away as being dangerous to the country.  Hitler and Goebbels would have been proud.

The assessment, “RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment,” is prefaced by the following “Key Findings” by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS):

Key Findings:

(U//LES)  The DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has no specific information that domestic rightwing* terrorists are currently planning acts of violence, but rightwing extremists may be gaining new recruits by playing on their fears about several emergent issues.  The economic downturn and the election of the first African American president present unique drivers for rightwing radicalization and recruitment.

— (U//LES)  Threats from white supremacist and violent antigovernment groups during 2009 have been largely rhetorical and have not indicated plans to carry out violent acts.  Nevertheless, the consequences of a prolonged economic downturn—including real estate foreclosures, unemployment, and an inability to obtain credit—could create a fertile recruiting environment for rightwing extremists and even result in confrontations between such groups and government authorities similar to those in the past.

— (U//LES)  Rightwing extremists have capitalized on the election of the first African American president, and are focusing their efforts to recruit new members, mobilize existing supporters, and broaden their scope and appeal through propaganda, but they have not yet turned to attack planning.

(U//FOUO)  The current economic and political climate has some similarities to the 1990s when rightwing extremism experienced a resurgence fueled largely by an economic recession, criticism about the outsourcing of jobs, and the perceived threat to U.S. power and sovereignty by other foreign powers.

— (U//FOUO)  During the 1990s, these issues contributed to the growth in the number of domestic rightwing terrorist and extremist groups and an increase in violent acts targeting government facilities, law enforcement officers, banks, and infrastructure sectors.

— (U//FOUO)  Growth of these groups subsided in reaction to increased government scrutiny as a result of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and disrupted plots, improvements in the economy, and the continued U.S. standing as the preeminent world power.

(U//FOUO)  The possible passage of new restrictions on firearms and the return of military veterans facing significant challenges reintegrating into their communities could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks.

It then explains:

(U)  Current Economic and Political Climate

(U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that a number of economic and political factors are driving a resurgence in rightwing extremist recruitment and radicalization activity.  Despite similarities to the climate of the 1990s, the threat posed by lone wolves and small terrorist cells is more pronounced than in past years.  In addition, the historical election of an African American president and the prospect of policy changes are proving to be a driving force for rightwing extremist recruitment and radicalization.

— (U)  A recent example of the potential violence associated with a rise in rightwing extremism may be found in the shooting deaths of three police officers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 4 April 2009.  The alleged gunman’s reaction reportedly was influenced by his racist ideology and belief in antigovernment conspiracy theories related to gun confiscations, citizen detention camps, and a Jewish-controlled “one world government.”

(U)  Exploiting Economic Downturn

(U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremist chatter on the Internet continues to focus on the economy, the perceived loss of U.S. jobs in the manufacturing and construction sectors, and home foreclosures.  Anti-Semitic extremists attribute these losses to a deliberate conspiracy conducted by a cabal of Jewish “financial elites.”  These “accusatory” tactics are employed to draw new recruits into rightwing extremist groups and further radicalize those already subscribing to extremist beliefs.  DHS/I&A assesses this trend is likely to accelerate if the economy is perceived to worsen.

(U)  Historical Presidential Election

(U//LES)  Rightwing extremists are harnessing this historical election as a recruitment tool.  Many rightwing extremists are antagonistic toward the new presidential administration and its perceived stance on a range of issues, including immigration and citizenship, the expansion of social programs to minorities, and restrictions on firearms ownership and use.  Rightwing extremists are increasingly galvanized by these concerns and leverage them as drivers for recruitment.  From the 2008 election timeframe to the present, rightwing extremists have capitalized on related racial and political prejudices in expanded propaganda campaigns, thereby reaching out to a wider audience of potential sympathizers.

 — (U//LES)  Most statements by rightwing extremists have been rhetorical, expressing concerns about the election of the first African American president, but stopping short of calls for violent action.  In two instances in the run-up to the election, extremists appeared to be in the early planning stages of some threatening activity targeting the Democratic nominee, but law enforcement interceded.

(U)  Revisiting the 1990s

 (U//FOUO)  Paralleling the current national climate, rightwing extremists during the 1990s exploited a variety of social issues and political themes to increase group visibility and recruit new members.  Prominent among these themes were the militia movement’s opposition to gun control efforts, criticism of free trade agreements (particularly those with Mexico), and highlighting perceived government infringement on civil liberties as well as white supremacists’ longstanding exploitation of social issues such as abortion, inter-racial crimes, and same-sex marriage.  During the 1990s, these issues contributed to the growth in the number of domestic rightwing terrorist and extremist groups and an increase in violent acts targeting government facilities, law enforcement officers, banks, and infrastructure sector.

(U)  Illegal Immigration

(U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremists were concerned during the 1990s with the perception that illegal immigrants were taking away American jobs through their willingness to work at significantly lower wages.  They also opposed free trade agreements, arguing that these arrangements resulted in Americans losing jobs to countries such as Mexico.

(U//FOUO)  Over the past five years, various rightwing extremists, including militias and white supremacists, have adopted the immigration issue as a call to action, rallying point, and recruiting tool.  Debates over appropriate immigration levels and enforcement policy generally fall within the realm of protected political speech under the First Amendment, but in some cases, anti-immigration or strident pro-enforcement fervor has been directed against specific groups and has the potential to turn violent.

(U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that rightwing extremist groups’ frustration over a perceived lack of government action on illegal immigration has the potential to incite individuals or small groups toward violence.  If such violence were to occur, it likely would be isolated, small-scale, and directed at specific immigration-related targets.

— (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A notes that prominent civil rights organizations have observed an increase in anti-Hispanic crimes over the past five years.

(U)  Legislative and Judicial Drivers

(U//FOUO)  Many rightwing extremist groups perceive recent gun control legislation as a threat to their right to bear arms and in response have increased weapons and ammunition stockpiling, as well as renewed participation in paramilitary training exercises.  Such activity, combined with a heightened level of extremist paranoia, has the potential to facilitate criminal activity and violence.

— (U//FOUO)  During the 1990s, rightwing extremist hostility toward government was fueled by the implementation of restrictive gun laws—such as the Brady Law that established a 5-day waiting period prior to purchasing a handgun and the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act that limited the sale of various types of assault rifles—and federal law enforcement’s handling of the confrontations at Waco, Texas and Ruby Ridge, Idaho.

The assessment also informs: “The information is provided to federal, state, local, and tribal counterterrorism and law enforcement officials so they may effectively deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.  Federal efforts to influence domestic public opinion must be conducted in an overt and transparent manner, clearly identifying United States Government sponsorship.”

Through the DHS and its directive (“Rightwing Extremism…..”), the Obama administration was almost “deputizing state and local law enforcement” to do the government’s bidding.  We truly weren’t a “free country” during those years.

Clearly, the “assessment” by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS) was meant to identify the threat to OBAMA and to his administration and his agenda, rather than to the United States and to its security and its citizens.  The identification of Rightwing groups and individuals as potential “domestic terrorists” is predicated wholly and improperly on a difference of political opinion and political viewpoint. It is as clear a violation of the First Amendment’s guarantee of Free Speech and Freedom of Conscience as it gets.

Anyone who can connect dots can see that Obama used the full forces of the federal government to target, harass, discriminate against, and to neutralize Tea Party groups and other conservatives. It is why he used the IRS to block Tea Party groups from organizing (they were denied, exclusively, the ability to organize as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt groups for political purposes), to go out and harass and excessively audit them, and why he had Dinesh D’Souza thrown in jail.  With this in mind, it’s not hard to see why he did everything possible to divide the country into groups violently opposed to conservatives and then to use government agencies to work silently to make sure Hillary Clinton won the 2016 election and to make sure Trump did not. It’s why they are still fighting Trump (and the conservatives in general). It’s become violent.

So far, President Trump reversed that policy and put the focus back on radical Islamists. He has not turned the tables on Democrats and their venomous, vile, and violent ilk and put them under the microscope by Homeland Security. But maybe he should.  Democrats have become a dangerous and obstructive force in our country – spewing and inciting hatred, division, and violence. They care little for political discourse so it isn’t about free speech; rather, it’s about getting Donald Trump out of office in any conceivable way possible, even if it has to be by creating a false and fictitious charge or by bombarding the American audience with a false narrative. It’s strictly a power ploy, designed to make useful idiots out of useless ones (Democrat voters) for the purpose of denying political power to the legitimate party, the Republican Party (duly elected by the people, thru the Electoral System; a government “by the people”) and transferring it, by a political coup, to the Democratic Party elite.

Trump is far too honorable and responsible of a president to ever consider turning the government against its citizens because unlike Obama, who supposedly taught Constitutional Law and an “expert on the Constitution,” Trump has an uncanny understanding of it and a deep respect for it.  He also understands and respects that the government belongs to the people, through their collective judgement and their action at the ballot box, and not to the puppet masters of a Political Party.

Here is another example of an approach where compromise cannot be sought. One approach is clearly wrong.

We must never again allow an administration to forcibly, or even tacitly, silence the voice of political opposition.  We must ever remain vigilant.

“Once a government is committed to the principle of silencing the voice of opposition, it has only one way to go, and that is down the path of increasingly repressive measures, until it becomes a source of terror to all its citizens and creates a country where everyone lives in fear.” President Harry Truman spoke these words on August 8, 1950 in a special message to Congress on the Internal Security of the US.

Liberty, and the US Constitution, must always be those gems worth fighting for.  Both belong to the people; both are the birthright of every American.

 

References:

“Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment,” (An Assessment), Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), April 7, 2009 –  https://fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf

Paulina Dedaj, “Maxine Waters Supporters Burn American Flag Outside California Rep’s Office,” FOX News, July 20, 2018.  Referenced at:  http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/07/19/counterprotesters-burn-american-flag-outside-office-maxine-waters.html

Carlos Granda, “Oath Keepers Calls Off Protest Outside Maxine Waters’ Los Angeles Office,” ABC7 News, July 20, 2018.  Referenced at:  http://abc7.com/politics/oath-keepers-calls-off-protest-at-maxine-waters-office/3789197/

“Statement by U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on the Threat of Right-Wing Extremism,” Department of Homeland Security, April 15, 2009.  Referenced at:  https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/04/15/secretary-napolitanos-statement-right-wing-extremism-threat

The Right of Secession, as Reserved by the States in Their Ratification of the US Constitution

SECESSION - We Did it Once Let's Do it Twice

by Diane Rufino, June 1, 2018

Louisiana voted to secede from the Union on January 26, 1861. Shortly thereafter, her senators, Judah P. Benjamin and John Slidell, resigned their positions in the US Senate. In his FAREWELL ADDRESS to the Senate, on February 5, 1861, Senator Benjamin expressed perhaps the strongest argument for the Right of Secession. He said:

“The rights of Louisiana as a sovereign state are those of Virginia – no more, no less. Let those who deny her [Louisiana’s] right to resume delegated powers try to successfully refuse the claim of Virginia to the same right, in spite of her [Virginia’s] expressed reservation made and notified to her sister states when she consented to enter the Union. And sir, permit me to say that, of all the causes which justify the action of the Southern States, I know none of greater gravity and more alarming magnitude than that now developed of the denial of the right of secession. A pretension so monstrous as that which perverts a restricted agency [federal government], constituted by sovereign states for common purposes, into the unlimited despotism of the majority, and denies all legitimate escape from such despotism, when powers not delegated are usurped, converts the whole constitutional fabric into the secure abode of lawless tyranny, and degrades sovereign states into provincial dependencies.”

To deny the Right of Secession, as President Abraham Lincoln did (although only AFTER he became president), as powerful orator Senator Daniel Webster did (although only AFTER he realized the financial ruin that secession would reap on northern states), and as too many liberal elites and too many Americans (because of indoctrination in our public school system and at our liberal universities) believe today is to condemn Americans ultimately to tyranny, to subjugation, to an existence far different from the one that the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights had once promised, to the loss of liberty, to the control by political parties (not political movements, which are good and are true expressions of democracy), and to the rule by political elites. In other words, we would have to acknowledge that we are not a free nation anymore, that we are not a free people. We as a country and as a people wear the veneer of freedom and liberty.  The experiment started by those far wiser than any alive today, which established for us in America, and indeed for the rest of the world, the right of self-determination and the right of self-government, and which was predicated on the grand notion – the very revolutionary notion – that those rights were far more important than the right of any government to seek to cement its existence, would be dead. If we give up on our right to secede, then we have lost that precious system and that noble ideal. That noble ideal is what guarantees our freedom and our liberty. If we abandon that right to secede, we are no different from the system we initially separated from, Great Britain, where government was – and still is – superior to the people.

To be clear, the fundamental principle guiding our independence was the right of a people to secede from a political body, exercising the right of self-determination and the right of a people to establish their own government – one that serves their interests and concerns best. We cannot allow the proclamations of one leader, Abraham Lincoln, who did so for purely political purposes (explained historically, accurately, and in great detail in Gene Kizer Jr’s book, SLAVERY WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES, as well as in Albert Taylor Bledsoe’s book, IS JEFFERSON DAVIS A TRAITOR?; references to both provided below) to destroy this great principle of independence and freedom.

It is important to understand that secession was a right implicit with every sovereign body politic and a right expressly and explicitly reserved to the States under the terms of the ratification of the Constitution:

First of all, let’s look at these two very powerful arguments:  [Taken from Mr. Kizer’s article “The Right of Secession,” Referenced at:  http://www.bonniebluepublishing.com/The%20Right%20of%20Secession.htm ]

(1).  There had to be a specific constitutional prohibition on secession for it to be illegal. Conversely, there did not have to be a specific constitutional affirmation of the right of secession for it to be legal. Why? Because of the 10th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  This amendment states nothing new, but is merely a restatement, as the Preamble to the Bill of Rights explains. It is a restatement of the fact that the federal government can govern ONLY as to the express (and that is made clear also in the Preamble) powers granted/delegated to it by the Constitution, Articles I-III, and States are prohibited from doing certain things ONLY if it states so expressly therein. The power to prevent secession is NOT granted to the federal government and the right to secede is NOT prohibited to the States under our Constitution.

Aside from the fact that there was (and is) no constitution prohibition on secession, there was (and is) also NO constitutional sanctioning of any kind of federal coercion to force a State to obey a federal law when to do so would act to perpetrate an act of war on the offending state by the other states. After all, the federal government was established as a common agent for all States, tasked with serving the interests of each equally.

While we are talking out what the federal government can and cannot do, there is also NO constitutional provision, nor any moral foundation, for the federal government to coerce one or more States to invade or otherwise inflict armed conflict against any other State or States. Again, each State is an equal beneficiary of the agency provided by the federal government.

(2).  The arguments for the right of secession are indeed unequivocal. There is the constitutional right based on the Compact Theory, and the revolutionary right based on the idea that a free people have the right to change their government anytime they see fit. Compact Theory is based on Natural Law – that people, in deciding to live together in communities, decide for themselves the form of government to establish laws for their mutual safety, security, and peace. They decide for themselves the government that will best establish laws for their ordered existence. Compacts are the vehicle by which the people form that government and delegate powers to it. It is a form of Contract. The Compact Theory views the Constitution as a legal agreement between the states – a compact – and if any one state violates the compact, then the entire agreement becomes null and void. Northern states unquestionably violated the Constitution on a number of grounds including unconstitutional Personal Liberty Laws on their books, as well as by deliberately harboring fugitives from justice by protecting the sons of John Brown who were wanted by Virginia for murder at Harpers Ferry. Northern states also made a mockery of the Constitution’s Preamble, which states clearly that the Constitution was established to “insure domestic Tranquility” and “promote the general Welfare.” Certain prominent Northern leaders with the acquiescence of states like Massachusetts were utterly at war with the South and doing everything they could to destroy the domestic tranquility of Southern states by encouraging slaves to murder white people, poison wells, destroy property and commit other acts of rapine. John Brown himself had been encouraged and financed in the North.

The revolutionary right of secession is based on the Declaration of Independence and the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson and John Locke, “that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of the ends for which it was established, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, ….. ”

These words come directly from the Declaration of Independence. This passage was also used, verbatim, in South Carolina’s Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union. A similar sentiment was expressed by Abraham Lincoln in 1847 on the floor of the United States House of Representatives:

“Any people, anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a most sacred right, a right which we hope and believe is to liberate the world.”

And now let’s look at the strongest piece of evidence, of which Senator Judah P. Benjamin referenced in his farewell speech above (“Virginia’s express reservation”):

Three of the original thirteen states were particularly skeptical of the government that the newly-drafted Constitution created and so they ratified it only conditionally. These three states were Virginia and New York, the great powerhouses of the New World, and Rhode Island (tiny, but very liberty-minded). In their ratification documents, adopted at their Ratification Conventions, they specifically and carefully reserved the right of secession. These are referred to as the “Resumption Clauses” or “Resumptive Clauses,” and they are exceedingly important to understand this topic. I attached Virginia’s ratification document at the end of this article. You will see that Virginia conditioned her ratification on several things, including the Right to Secede and on the addition of a Bill of Rights (for which she made a number of suggestions).

Since the other states, which had unconditionally ratified the Constitution, consented to Virginia’s conditional ratification, they “ostensibly assented to the principle that Virginia permissibly retained the right to secede.”  This is an essential element of contract law, of which compact theory follows. All negotiations, all conditions, all limitations, all reservations, etc become part of the compact agreement which affects all parties, as long as those negotiations, conditions, limitations, reservations, etc are not rejected by any of the other signing parties. With the additional acceptance of New York’s and Rhode Island’s conditions (their Resumption Clauses; their right to secede), the existing states of the Union clearly, albeit tacitly, accepted the doctrine of secession. Again, this is a matter of contract law, the most firmly-entrenched area of law. Furthermore, according to the Constitution, all States that joined the Union after the first thirteen also had the right of secession since new states entered on an equal footing with the exact same rights as the existing states.

Virginia was the first state to state explicitly that she would only ratify the Constitution as long as she reserved the right to leave the Union so created by it.  If Virginia didn’t ratify the Constitution, it was very likely that New York, Rhode Island, and certainly North Carolina also would not. The plan for “a more perfect Union” would be defeated. In her “Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia; June 26, 1788,” the state of Virginia included this express provision:  “Do in the name and in behalf of the People of Virginia declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution being derived from the People of the United States may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression and that every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will.

To reinforce how strongly Virginia valued that Clause one simply has to look at her Ordinance of Secession from the Union (April 17, 1861). She used the exact wording of her conditional ratification of the US to sever her political bonds with the federal government and to resume all her sovereign powers and rights to determine a new and more favorable government for her people.

A month later, on July 26, 1788, New York conditionally ratified the Constitution. In the ratification declaration adopted at her Convention, New York wrote:

“That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the People, whensoever it shall become necessary to their Happiness; that every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People of the several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they may have granted the same; And that those Clauses in the said Constitution, which declare, that Congress shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any Powers not given by the said Constitution; but such Clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified Powers, or as inserted merely for greater Caution.”

And then finally, almost two years later, on May 29, 1790, Rhode Island asserted her own conditional ratification:

“That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness:- That the rights of the States respectively, to nominate and appoint all State Officers, and every other power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the departments of government thereof, remain to the people of the several states, or their respective State Governments to whom they may have granted the same; and that those clauses in the said constitution which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply, that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said constitution, but such clauses are to be construed as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.”

Historian Dave Benner explains in his article “Can States Secede from the United States?” (IntellectualTakeOut.org, March 7, 2017):

       During the ratification debates, many figures firmly challenged the suggestion that coercive force could be used to obligate a state’s membership in the union. Melancton Smith of New York suggested that such coercion would be an anathema to the cause of liberty: “Can it, I say, be imagined, that in such a case, they would make war on a sister state?”

       He ridiculed the notion, declaring that “the idea is preposterous and chimerical.” George Mason, known today as the “Father of the Bill of Rights,” also rejected the assumption that war would befall a seceding state. Answering an inquiry regarding whether the government could “use military force to compel the observance of a social compact,” Mason scoffed at such a prospect, declaring that it would be “destructive to the rights of the people.”

Respected professor, author, and speaker (and founder of the Abbeville Institute), Donald W. Livingston noted, in his article “The Secession Tradition in America,” the conclusion offered by famed historian and political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville, who spent several years in America studying its political system and societies and who studied the US Constitution on the right of secession. De Tocqueville wrote: “The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the States; and, in uniting together, they have not forfeited their nationality, nor have they been reduced to the condition of one and the same people. If one of the States chose to withdraw its name from the contract, it would be difficult to disprove its right of doing so; and the Federal Government would have no means of maintaining its claims directly, either by force or by right.”

Abraham Lincoln intentionally re-characterized the Constitution in order to force the Southern States back into the Union, where its money could continue to fund the federal government and could continue to enrich the Northern states. He also sought to force the Southern States back into the Union because under the Confederate Constitution, protective tariffs (the lifeblood of northern industry) were prohibited and it would interact with other countries on a policy of Free Trade. Free trade would have signed the death of the Union because then only people in the North would have purchased its products and its industry and indeed its economy would have crashed. To that end, Lincoln denied the right of secession and characterized the Constitution as creating a “perpetual union,” which was just plain hogwash. Every compact, just like every contract, can be broken. He said the Southern States were “in rebellion against the United States” even though they made it exceedingly clear that they merely wanted a peaceful separation, and to remain on good terms with their former government. In order to prevent other States (the so-called “border States” and others that were clearly more pro-South than pro-North) from leaving the Union and joining the Confederacy, he sent in the Army of the United States to put them under martial law. Politicians sympathetic to the Confederate States were forcibly removed from office (and many jailed) and their state governments fundamentally changed to force them to be loyal to Lincoln. This was in violation of Section 4 of Article IV of the Constitution (The Guarantee Clause), which states:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and [the United States] shall protect each of them [the States] against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”

By removing duly-elected members of State legislatures and altering the governing bodies by force, Lincoln violated the Constitution (just another of the many times he violated the Constitution) and denied the border States the guarantee that the federal government who assure them a republican (the will of the people) form of government. Furthermore, as to all the States, including the border States, the western States (like Kentucky and Missouri), and the Southern States, the Constitution guaranteed them protection AGAINST invasion and was not a license for Lincoln to be the invader.

 

References:

Gene Kizer Jr, “The Right of Secession,” Referenced at:  http://www.bonniebluepublishing.com/The%20Right%20of%20Secession.htm

Gene Kizer Jr, Slavery Was Not the Cause of the War Between the States, Charleston Athenaeum Press, 2014.  [Chapter: “An Annotated Chronology of the Secession Debate in the South”; pp. 171-72)]  Available as a book, which was the resource I used) and also online at:  http://www.bonniebluepublishing.com/index.htm

Albert Taylor Bledsoe, Is Jefferson Davis a Traitor? (1865).  Reprinted by Forgotten Books (2012).  https://www.amazon.com/Davis-Traitor-Secession-Constitutional-Previous/dp/B008TYU1E4

Dave Benner, “Can States Secede from the United States?”, IntellectualTakeOut.org, March 7, 2017. Referenced at: http://www.intellectualtakeout.org/blog/can-states-secede-united-states),

Donald W. Livingston, “The Secession Tradition in America,” 1998.  Referenced at: http://www.ditext.com/livingston/tradition.html

“Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia; June 26, 1788,” The Avalon Project (Yale Law School) – http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratva.asp

 

- 2018 (BEST, gray sweatshirt, Wake Up Call trip)

 

ADDENDUM: 

Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia; June 26, 1788.

Virginia to wit

We the Delegates of the People of Virginia duly elected in pursuance of a recommendation from the General Assembly and now met in Convention having fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the Federal Convention and being prepared as well as the most mature deliberation hath enabled us to decide thereon Do in the name and in behalf of the People of Virginia declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution being derived from the People of the United States may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression and that every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will: that therefore no right of any denomination can be cancelled abridged restrained or modified by the Congress by the Senate or House of Representatives acting in any Capacity by the President or any Department or Officer of the United States except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes: & that among other essential rights the liberty of Conscience and of the Press cannot be cancelled abridged restrained or modified by any authority of the United States. With these impressions with a solemn appeal to the Searcher of hearts for the purity of our intentions and under the conviction that whatsoever imperfections may exist in the Constitution ought rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein than to bring the Union into danger by a delay with a hope of obtaining Amendments previous to the Ratification, We the said Delegates in the name and in behalf of the People of Virginia do by these presents assent to and ratify the Constitution recommended on the seventeenth day of September one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven by the Federal Convention for the Government of the United States hereby announcing to all those whom it may concern that the said Constitution is binding upon the said People according to an authentic Copy hereto annexed in the Words following; .

Done in Convention this twenty Sixth day of June one thousand seven hundred and eighty eight

By Order of the Convention

EDMUND PENDLETON, President  [SEAL.]

Virginia towit:

Subsequent Amendments agreed to in Convention as necessary to the proposed Constitution of Government for the United States, recommended to the consideration of the Congress which shall first assemble under the said Constitution to be acted upon according to the mode prescribed in the fifth article thereof:

That there be a Declaration or Bill of Rights asserting and securing from encroachment the essential and unalienable Rights of the People in some such manner as the following;

First, That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

Second. That all power is naturally vested in and consequently derived from the people; that Magistrates, therefore, are their trustees and agents and at all times amenable to them.

Third, That Government ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the People; and that the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.

Fourth, That no man or set of Men are entitled to exclusive or separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in Consideration of public services; which not being descendible, neither ought the offices of Magistrate, Legislator or Judge, or any other public office to be hereditary.

Fifth, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers of Government should be separate and distinct, and that the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression by feeling and participating the public burthens, they should, at fixed periods be reduced to a private station, return into the mass of the people; and the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elections; in which all or any part of the former members to be eligible or ineligible, as the rules of the Constitution of Government, and the laws shall direct.

Sixth, That elections of representatives in the legislature ought to be free and frequent, and all men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with and attachment to the Community ought to have the right of suffrage: and no aid, charge, tax or fee can be set, rated, or levied upon the people without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor can they be bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented for the public good.

Seventh, That all power of suspending laws or the execution of laws by any authority, without the consent of the representatives of the people in the legislature is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.

Eighth, That in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence and be allowed counsel in his favor, and to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial Jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, (except in the government of the land and naval forces) nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself.

Ninth. That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, privileges or franchises, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the law of the land.

Tenth. That every freeman restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy to enquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the same, if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be denied nor delayed.

Eleventh. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by Jury is one of the greatest Securities to the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.

Twelfth. That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by recourse to the laws for all injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that all establishments or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive and unjust.

Thirteenth, That excessive Bail ought not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Fourteenth, That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers and his property; all warrants, therefore, to search suspected places, or seize any freeman, his papers or property, without information upon Oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive; and all general Warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person, without specially naming or describing the place or person, are dangerous and ought not to be granted.

Fifteenth, That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common good, or to instruct their Representatives; and that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to the legislature for redress of grievances.

Sixteenth, That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their Sentiments; but the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty and ought not to be violated.

Seventeenth, That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated Militia composed of the body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free State. That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the Community will admit; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by the Civil power.

Eighteenth, That no Soldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in time of war in such manner only as the laws direct.

Nineteenth, That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.

Twentieth, That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by Law in preference to others.

 

AMENDMENTS TO THE BODY OF THE CONSTITUTION

First, That each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this Constitution delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the departments of the Federal Government.

Second, That there shall be one representative for every thirty thousand, according to the Enumeration or Census mentioned in the Constitution, until the whole number of representatives amounts to two hundred; after which that number shall be continued or increased as the Congress shall direct, upon the principles fixed by the Constitution by apportioning the Representatives of each State to some greater number of people from time to time as population increases.

Third, When Congress shall lay direct taxes or excises, they shall immediately inform the Executive power of each State of the quota of such state according to the Census herein directed, which is proposed to be thereby raised; And if the Legislature of any State shall pass a law which shall be effectual for raising such quota at the time required by Congress, the taxes and excises laid by Congress shall not be collected, in such State.

Fourth, That the members of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding, any civil office under the authority of the United States, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected.

Fifth, That the Journals of the proceedings of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be published at least once in every year, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances or military operations, as in their judgment require secrecy.

Sixth, That a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published at least once in every year.

Seventh, That no commercial treaty shall be ratified without the concurrence of two thirds of the whole number of the members of the Senate; and no Treaty ceding, contracting, restraining or suspending the territorial rights or claims of the United States, or any of them or their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in the American seas, or navigating the American rivers shall be but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty be ratified without the concurrence of three fourths of the whole number of the members of both houses respectively.

Eighth, That no navigation law, or law regulating Commerce shall be passed without the consent of two thirds of the Members present in both houses.

Ninth, That no standing army or regular troops shall be raised or kept up in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of the members present in both houses.

Tenth, That no soldier shall be enlisted for any longer term than four years, except in time of war, and then for no longer term than the continuance of the war.

Eleventh, That each State respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining it’s own Militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same. That the Militia shall not be subject to Martial law, except when in actual service in time of war, invasion, or rebellion; and when not in the actual service of the United States, shall be subject only to such fines, penalties and punishments as shall be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own State.

Twelfth That the exclusive power of legislation given to Congress over the Federal Town and its adjacent District and other places purchased or to be purchased by Congress of any of the States shall extend only to such regulations as respect the police and good government thereof.

Thirteenth, That no person shall be capable of being President of the United States for more than eight years in any term of sixteen years.

Fourteenth That the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such courts of Admiralty as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish in any of the different States: The Judicial power shall extend to all cases in Law and Equity arising under treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States; to all cases affecting ambassadors other foreign ministers and consuls; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or States, and between parties claiming lands under the grants of different States. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction; in all other cases before mentioned the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to matters of law only: except in cases of equity, and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, in which the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. But the judicial power of the United States shall extend to no case where the cause of action shall have originated before the ratification of this Constitution; except in disputes between States about their Territory, disputes between persons claiming lands under the grants of different States, and suits for debts due to the United States.

Fifteenth, That in criminal prosecutions no man shall be restrained in the exercise of the usual and accustomed right of challenging or excepting to the Jury.

Sixteenth, That Congress shall not alter, modify or interfere in the times, places, or manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives or either of them, except when the legislature of any State shall neglect, refuse or be disabled by invasion or rebellion to prescribe the same.

Seventeenth, That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to extend the powers of Congress. But that they may be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the case, or otherwise as inserted merely for greater caution.

Eighteenth, That the laws ascertaining the compensation to Senators and Representatives for their services be postponed in their operation, until after the election of Representatives immediately succeeding the passing thereof; that excepted, which shall first be passed on the Subject.

Nineteenth, That some Tribunal other than the Senate be provided for trying impeachments of Senators.

Twentieth, That the Salary of a Judge shall not be increased or diminished during his continuance in Office, otherwise than by general regulations of Salary which may take place on a revision of the subject at stated periods of not less than seven years to commence from the time such Salaries shall be first ascertained by Congress. And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the People of this Commonwealth enjoin it upon their Representatives in Congress to exert all their influence and use all reasonable and legal methods to obtain a Ratification of the foregoing alterations and provisions in the manner provided by the fifth article of the said Constitution; and in all Congressional laws to be passed in the mean time, to conform to the spirit of those Amendments as far as the said Constitution will admit.

Done in Convention this twenty seventh day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty eight.

By order of the Convention.

EDMD PENDLETON President  [SEAL.]

Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894), pp. 145, 146, 160, 377-385

Duty, Honor, Country: A Life Devoted to his Country

Douglas MacArthur

(Photo Credit:  LIFE magazine)

by Diane Rufino, May 24, 2018

Cleaning out Dad’s apartment, I took notice, probably for the first time, of an excerpt of a speech that he had displayed in his room. The remarks were from a speech given by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur on May 12, 1962 to the cadets at West Point. It is now considered one of the top ten speeches of all time – and rightly so.

On that day, General MacArthur accepted the Sylvanus Thayer Award – an award presented to an outstanding citizen of the United States whose service and accomplishments in the national interest exemplify personal devotion to the ideals expressed in the West Point motto, “Duty, Honor, Country.” In accepting that prestigious award, he delivered the following speech:

General Westmoreland, General Grove, distinguished guests, and gentlemen of the Corps….

As I was leaving the hotel this morning, a doorman asked me, “Where are you bound for, General?” And when I replied, “West Point,” he remarked, “Beautiful place. Have you ever been there before?”

No human being could fail to be deeply moved by such a tribute as this [Thayer Award]. Coming from a profession I have served so long, and a people I have loved so well, it fills me with an emotion I cannot express. But this award is not intended primarily to honor a personality, but to symbolize a great moral code — the code of conduct and chivalry of those who guard this beloved land of culture and ancient descent. That is the animation of this medallion. For all eyes and for all time, it is an expression of the ethics of the American soldier. That I should be integrated in this way with so noble an ideal arouses a sense of pride and yet of humility which will be with me always.

Duty, Honor, Country: Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying points: to build courage when courage seems to fail; to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith; to create hope when hope becomes forlorn.

Unhappily, I possess neither that eloquence of diction, that poetry of imagination, nor that brilliance of metaphor to tell you all that they mean.

The unbelievers will say they are but words, but a slogan, but a flamboyant phrase. Every pedant, every demagogue, every cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and I am sorry to say, some others of an entirely different character, will try to downgrade them even to the extent of mockery and ridicule.

But these are some of the things they do: They build your basic character. They mold you for your future roles as the custodians of the nation’s defense. They make you strong enough to know when you are weak, and brave enough to face yourself when you are afraid. They teach you to be proud and unbending in honest failure, but humble and gentle in success; not to substitute words for actions, not to seek the path of comfort, but to face the stress and spur of difficulty and challenge; to learn to stand up in the storm but to have compassion on those who fall; to master yourself before you seek to master others; to have a heart that is clean, a goal that is high; to learn to laugh, yet never forget how to weep; to reach into the future yet never neglect the past; to be serious yet never to take yourself too seriously; to be modest so that you will remember the simplicity of true greatness, the open mind of true wisdom, the meekness of true strength. They give you a temper of the will, a quality of the imagination, a vigor of the emotions, a freshness of the deep springs of life, a temperamental predominance of courage over timidity, of an appetite for adventure over love of ease. They create in your heart the sense of wonder, the unfailing hope of what next, and the joy and inspiration of life. They teach you in this way to be an officer and a gentleman.

And what sort of soldiers are those you are to lead? Are they reliable? Are they brave? Are they capable of victory? Their story is known to all of you. It is the story of the American man-at-arms. My estimate of him was formed on the battlefield many, many years ago, and has never changed. I regarded him then as I regard him now — as one of the world’s noblest figures, not only as one of the finest military characters, but also as one of the most stainless. His name and fame are the birthright of every American citizen. In his youth and strength, his love and loyalty, he gave all that mortality can give.

He needs no eulogy from me or from any other man. He has written his own history and written it in red on his enemy’s breast. But when I think of his patience under adversity, of his courage under fire, and of his modesty in victory, I am filled with an emotion of admiration I cannot put into words. He belongs to history as furnishing one of the greatest examples of successful patriotism. He belongs to posterity as the instructor of future generations in the principles of liberty and freedom. He belongs to the present, to us, by his virtues and by his achievements. In 20 campaigns, on a hundred battlefields, around a thousand campfires, I have witnessed that enduring fortitude, that patriotic self-abnegation, and that invincible determination which have carved his statue in the hearts of his people. From one end of the world to the other he has drained deep the chalice of courage.

As I listened to those songs [of the glee club], in memory’s eye I could see those staggering columns of the First World War, bending under soggy packs, on many a weary march from dripping dusk to drizzling dawn, slogging ankle-deep through the mire of shell-shocked roads, to form grimly for the attack, blue-lipped, covered with sludge and mud, chilled by the wind and rain, driving home to their objective, and for many, to the judgment seat of God.

I do not know the dignity of their birth, but I do know the glory of their death. They died unquestioning, uncomplaining, with faith in their hearts, and on their lips the hope that we would go on to victory. Always, for them: Duty, Honor, Country; always their blood and sweat and tears, as we sought the way and the light and the truth.

And 20 years after, on the other side of the globe, again the filth of murky foxholes, the stench of ghostly trenches, the slime of dripping dugouts; those boiling suns of relentless heat, those torrential rains of devastating storms; the loneliness and utter desolation of jungle trails; the bitterness of long separation from those they loved and cherished; the deadly pestilence of tropical disease; the horror of stricken areas of war; their resolute and determined defense, their swift and sure attack, their indomitable purpose, their complete and decisive victory — always victory. Always through the bloody haze of their last reverberating shot, the vision of gaunt, ghastly men reverently following your password of: Duty, Honor, Country.

The code which those words perpetuate embraces the highest moral laws and will stand the test of any ethics or philosophies ever promulgated for the uplift of mankind. Its requirements are for the things that are right, and its restraints are from the things that are wrong.

The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training — sacrifice.

In battle and in the face of danger and death, he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when he created man in his own image. No physical courage and no brute instinct can take the place of the Divine help which alone can sustain him.

However horrible the incidents of war may be, the soldier who is called upon to offer and to give his life for his country is the noblest development of mankind.

You now face a new world — a world of change. The thrust into outer space of the satellite, spheres, and missiles mark the beginning of another epoch in the long story of mankind. In the five or more billions of years the scientists tell us it has taken to form the earth, in the three or more billion years of development of the human race, there has never been a more abrupt or staggering evolution. We deal now not with things of this world alone, but with the illimitable distances and as yet unfathomed mysteries of the universe. We are reaching out for a new and boundless frontier.

We speak in strange terms: of harnessing the cosmic energy; of making winds and tides work for us; of creating unheard synthetic materials to supplement or even replace our old standard basics; to purify sea water for our drink; of mining ocean floors for new fields of wealth and food; of disease preventatives to expand life into the hundreds of years; of controlling the weather for a more equitable distribution of heat and cold, of rain and shine; of space ships to the moon; of the primary target in war, no longer limited to the armed forces of an enemy, but instead to include his civil populations; of ultimate conflict between a united human race and the sinister forces of some other planetary galaxy; of such dreams and fantasies as to make life the most exciting of all time.

And through all this welter of change and development, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable: it is to win our wars.

Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purposes, all other public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for their accomplishment. But you are the ones who are trained to fight. Yours is the profession of arms,  the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory; that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed; that the very obsession of your public service must be: Duty, Honor, Country.

Others will debate the controversial issues, national and international, which divide men’s minds; but serene, calm, aloof, you stand as the Nation’s war-guardian, as its lifeguard from the raging tides of international conflict, as its gladiator in the arena of battle. For a century and a half you have defended, guarded, and protected its hallowed traditions of liberty and freedom, of right and justice.

Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of government; whether our strength is being sapped by deficit financing, indulged in too long, by federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be. These great national problems are not for your professional participation or military solution. Your guidepost stands out like a ten-fold beacon in the night: Duty, Honor, Country.

You are the leaven which binds together the entire fabric of our national system of defense. From your ranks come the great captains who hold the nation’s destiny in their hands the moment the war tocsin sounds. The Long Gray Line has never failed us. Were you to do so, a million ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, in blue and gray, would rise from their white crosses thundering those magic words: Duty, Honor, Country.

This does not mean that you are war mongers.

On the contrary, the soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war.

But always in our ears ring the ominous words of Plato, that wisest of all philosophers: “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”

The shadows are lengthening for me. The twilight is here. My days of old have vanished, tone and tint. They have gone glimmering through the dreams of things that were. Their memory is one of wondrous beauty, watered by tears, and coaxed and caressed by the smiles of yesterday. I listen vainly, but with thirsty ears, for the witching melody of faint bugles blowing reveille, of far drums beating the long roll. In my dreams I hear again the crash of guns, the rattle of musketry, the strange, mournful mutter of the battlefield.

But in the evening of my memory, always I come back to West Point.

Always there echoes and re-echoes: Duty, Honor, Country.

Today marks my final roll call with you, but I want you to know that when I cross the river my last conscious thoughts will be of The Corps, and The Corps, and The Corps.

I bid you farewell.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

My father had the last portion of the speech displayed in his apartment.

Dad was very patriotic; he loved this country. He loved his time in the service and would have gladly volunteered again to defend her. Duty. He felt an obligation to this country – the country that opened its arms to his father and mother; he felt an obligation to continue the tradition begun by his father, and that was to enlist and serve. It’s one of his most defining qualities and one that I can remember even from childhood.

And you should have seen his reverence for the American flag. He respected each flag as if it had draped the casket of a fallen soldier. He folded and stored each one with care.

This is the generation we are losing.

Their children (people like myself) grew up in a world saved by the guardians of freedom, but who quickly watched the evil forces within destroy the foundations that made her what she was. We tell our tales and share our experiences and warn of what the country will look like if we remain on this path, but our generation too is fading.

To the millennials, who are actively destroying this country – a country they will have to raise their families in and try to enjoy their lives in – I implore you to STOP with your identity politics, stop with the endless charges of racism, and with your utter reluctance to listen to and learn the truth. Trust me, the truth will not kill you and it won’t even hurt you. It will make you stronger, bolder, more intelligent, and armed with the proper tools you’ll need to meet the challenges of your time.

The Constitution is NOT a thing of wax to be molded into a document that suits your purpose; it is a document to keep government off your backs, out of your pocketbook, off your property, and away from your essential rights as a human being. Once you cloud the true meaning of one part of the Constitution, you cloud the entire document, imperiling and weakening its purpose as a shield against a heavy-handed government. You will, in fact, transform it into a sword with which to harm you.

If you seek societal change, please proceed the correct way, the constitutional way, which is the amendment process outlined in Article V. Please reject the improper way, the unconstitutional way, which is by using the federal courts to do an end-run around the legislature (and the democratic process) and the Constitution itself, and by embracing the legal fiction that the Constitution is a “living, breathing document.” The only thing that is living and breathing is life. And unlike the imagery generated – fabricated – by the term “living, breathing document,” life is actually defined strictly, according to laws that are fixed in nature and never changing. The “living, breathing document” approach is just the insidious creation of activist judges who wanted to give the courts the power to circumvent the Article V process, which in their minds takes too long and which also assumes that judges are smarter and know better than the states and the people themselves. Simply put, it is a invention to transform the Constitution and to transform US society faster than the body politic in general is ready to accomplish properly, legally, constitutionally.

My father and the men (and even the women) of his age lived their lives by a certain code of honor. They acknowledged the blessing bestowed on this country – to be spared the nightmare that befell Europe with Hitler in their backyard. And they acknowledged their role, their supreme sacrifice, in liberating the world of his menace, as well as defeating the evil ambitions of Imperial Japan. The comfort and solace they took in the role they played, for the most part, remained as a quiet and unspoken part of their lives. But the pride they felt in what they did and what they stood for, as well as their pride in country, was the foundation of the honor they displayed throughout their lives. The word “duty” and “honor” meant something very real to my Dad, and to other veterans of his era. In the movie A FEW GOOD MEN, Colonel Jessup (Jack Nicholson) said: “We use words like “honor,” “code,” “loyalty.” We use these words as the backbone of a life spent defending something.” To my father, it meant respecting and honoring a country that secured freedom and offered him a home where he could have opportunities that he could never have enjoyed in other countries. Jessup’s next line – “You use them as a punch line” – seems to describe very well today’s millennials. They make a mockery of the very ideals our country once stood for. They are seeking to tear down the vestiges of the hallmarks that made this country what it used to be – including the right of free speech and the right to be able to defend oneself.

Who, from my father’s generation and my generation, can forget learning that Japan’s Admiral Yamamoto had reservations about invading the US mainland because of all the guns that citizens had for their protection. In a letter he penned in 1942, he wrote: “to invade the United States would prove most difficult because behind every blade of grass is an American with a rifle.”

To the millennials, please reflect on this: What makes the United States a “free” country is not the luxury of being spared words and commentary, even actual history, that hurts one’s feelings. It is not the hope (and the delusion) that banning guns will stop violent crime and mass shootings. It is not the right to determine when a developing human being must be evicting from your womb and killed, and it is not the right to entitlements, healthcare, or a free education. It is not the right to deny others their ability to live their lives according to their deeply-held peaceful religious beliefs just because it offends you or doesn’t fully embrace your lifestyle. It isn’t the right to re-define science and demand gender fluidity or to prevent every instance of discrimination (discrimination will always exist in the hearts and minds of humans as long as there is even one feature that makes us different). And it isn’t the right of other nationals (immigrants) to have unfettered access to this country and its resources and opportunities.

What makes us a “free” country is the right to “be left alone” by government, the right to the fruits of one’s labor, the right to an honest opportunity to the American Dream, the right to speak freely and without self-censorship for fear of hurting someone’s feelings or government retaliation, the right to assemble peacefully without fear that the police will stand down to allow violent opposition, the right to have and bear arms for self-protection (whatever the individual believes is necessary in his or her situation for self-protection), the right to privacy, the right not to have the government spy on citizens or to collect data (for possible future use), the right to one’s property without the government seizing it for its own purposes (or for a better purpose), the right to challenge one’s loss of life, liberty, or property (due process), the rights protecting a person should he or she be accused of a crime, the right to confront one’s accuser and to a trial (a speedy trial) by jury, and the right to be free of any cruel or unusual punishment. What makes us free is adhering to the divinely-inspired principles articulated in the Declaration of Independence –  (1) that “All Men are created equal” and have inherent worth and dignity and endowed with the same rights; (2) that we are “endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable rights including Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, which means that they are part of our human fabric (not given to us by a benevolent government, and therefore not subject to forfeiture by said government); (3) that government is instituted for the primary purpose of securing our inalienable rights, and that no other purpose comes before that (certainly not for “taking care of us” cradle to grave, redistributing wealth, providing healthcare, ensuring entitlement programs, spearheading social change, etc); and (4) that government exists only as long as it serves its legitimate purpose, which first and foremost is to secure the individual (not collective) rights of man.

What helps ensure that we remain a free country is the role of the States against the federal government, as articulated in the Tenth Amendment, and NOT the right of the government to demand that each State blindly comply with the government, its court decisions, or to mandate that each conform to a “one-size-fits-all” model.

Again, I implore you, oh rebellious millennials, to read, study, and learn the truth. Don’t seek to change this country..  it is basically good and decent and generous and responsible. Respect it and preserve it. Make your mark, but do so intelligently, responsibly, legally, and most of all, respectfully. Generations have sacrificed more than you will ever know to allow you the privilege of calling yourself an “American” and to afford you the luxury to freely exercise the rights you do even as you seek to use them to deny rights to others and even to abolish them for yourself in the future.

Please hold this country in your care, as you would a child, ignoring what is best for you personally and putting the interests of your child first. Selfishness and the millennial “Me First” mentality (the “Politics of Me”) are what is dividing and killing this country.  The beauty about America is not that we are a mix of different peoples but that we truly form “one people.”  Politics is a nasty game that is, at its core, an aggressive adversarial system, pitting one side against the other, fighting for power and control. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the interests of the average citizen. You must understand that. Our country is more important than the outcome of some nasty, counter-productive, divisive political game…. It MUST be more important than that. Only we the people can make it so. In the coming years, it will be you, as you transition to the workforce and to parenthood, who will take the lead.

Please act responsibly. Please make this country admirable enough that, like my father and those of his age and era, her citizens would be willing to die for her.

DAD - Navy pic

(My Dad, age 18, in the Navy)

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES: The Scathing Dissent by Chief Justice John Roberts Explains Why the Majority Opinion Was an Abuse of Judicial Power Under the US Constitution

 

GAY MARRIAGE - Mitch and Cam (2)

by Diane Rufino, March 16, 2018

“If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.”  — Chief Justice John Roberts, dissenting opinion, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

I’ve been writing articles for years, mostly to help enlighten and educate others who may not have the time or opportunity to read as much as I have. The Tea Party movement – whether you choose to believe it to be a physical grassroots movement to help return our country to its intended constitutional design or a intangible gut reaction by the American people in response to years of destructive progressive policies that have resulted in our large, bloated, ineffective, wasteful, overly-imposing, over-regulating, aggressive, elitist, condescending, above-the-law, and unconstitutional government and in too much intrusion in their lives, too many conditions on their rights, and too much control over their decisions and their property – has awakened a new era of patriotism. It has resulted in a return to education on our founding documents and founding values, it has resulted in a good chunk of the American people wanting to understand how our government got so oft-kilter and how such disastrous policies resulted from it, it has resulted in a good chunk of the American people devoting their spare time to “watchdog” activities in which they watch and research actions by their local, state, and federal officials, it has resulted in a good chunk of the American people keeping informed and updated on the issues, and it has resulted in a good chunk of the American people (true conservatives) taking an active role in politics and committing themselves to finding and supporting conservative, fiscally-responsible, constitutionally-minded individuals for office. The Tea Party movement, again, whether a physical grassroots movement or simply the gut reaction of individuals to reaffirm America’s ideals, has spurred a new “revolutionary” spirit in this county, determined to reel back the disastrous policies of the past half of a century or more, determined to bring back the absolute protections of our founding generation for the rights and declarations recognized in the Bill of Rights, including religious liberties, the right to have and bear arms, free speech, and the reserved powers of the individual (free) states.

And so, most of what I write seeks to educate on what our Founding Fathers sought to establish with this union of states that we call the United States and then what they, in fact, did establish. I spend a lot of time writing about history and the using history to explain the meaning and intent of our founding documents, including the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and Bill of Rights. I also spend a lot of time writing about the different remedies to address the various violations by the three branches of government. The hope in all my writings is to help Americans adopt the proper mindset necessary to recognize abuses by the federal government (and why they are abuses) and to then seek the proper remedies in order to stem the obvious slide into government tyranny that we have been witnessing over the past many years (but which is now in overdrive). The proper mindset is the key. The hope is, through education and a re-acquaintance with our founding principles (and the compelling history behind them), to spark a fire in them which reminds them of the American revolutionary spirit: “We don’t have to take it!”  To take the abuse that government unconstitutionally exercises is to give up on the American dream of our founding generation, to give up on the notion that individual liberty is worth defending, and to willfully give up the awesome responsibility we have as Americans to preserve what was handed to us by our forefathers to subsequent generations.

The first step, of course, is to recognize the violations committed by the branches of the federal government –  all three of them. And then, most importantly, to seek to do something about them.

We’ve heard of abuses of power by the federal legislative branch and by the executive branch. The Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), as written, intended, and passed by Congress on March 23,2010, was an unconstitutional piece of legislation (the Supreme Court admitted so, exceeding the limits of the Commerce Clause, upon which the government attempted to support its authority) and portions of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) are as well [the annual military budget continues, from the 2012 NDAA, to include a provision which allows for the indefinite detention of American citizens without a right to trial, undermining essential guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth and Fifth (Due Process) amendments, and as well as the guarantees provided to an “accused”]. The mass surveillance and collection of ordinary citizen’s phone data is an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, as well as other federal grant-related legislation, which seek to do an end-run around the Constitution by funding state projects with federal conditions and strings attached, are probably unconstitutional as being without a proper grant of authority under Article I, Section 8 (“to provide for the General Welfare” is not in and of itself a separate grant of power and hence also not legitimate under the taxing and spending power). The Reconstruction Acts were unconstitutional and the Depression-era programs created by Congress during FDR’s administration were unconstitutional. Any proposed gun control law raising the age to 21 for the purchase of handguns would be unconstitutional. President Obama’s executive department weaponized the IRS to target Tea Party and other conservative groups only and prevent them from organizing and thus minimizing their effect in the 2012 election. His Justice Department weaponized the FISA program to go after the Trump campaign in an attempt to effect the outcome of the 2016 presidential election and then (when Hillary didn’t win), to fabricate a false claim of collusion with the Russians to poison his presidency.

In all these instances, the legislative and executive branches have exceeded or are exceeding the power to govern delegated to them by the States in the US Constitution.

But what no one talks about is the abuses by the third brand of government, and perhaps the most powerful one – the judicial branch. Everyone assumes that its opinions are legitimate exercises of judicial power. We so often hear the line: “Well there’s nothing we can do about it now. The Supreme Court has spoken.” The men and women in black robes who sit on the federal benches have immense power. And all too often, they abuse it.  We’ve all heard of judicial activism – the making of law from the bench, which is unconstitutional as violating the Separation of Powers doctrine, or the ruling on “political matters” which is unconstitutional under the Political Question doctrine, or the ruling on matters not addressed in the Constitution which is unconstitutional since the courts only have legal jurisdiction on the interpretation of the Constitution and laws made in furtherance of its legitimate powers. The problem is that no one can do anything about it.  Or they just aren’t willing to.

Some Supreme Court cases which are likely unconstitutional are as follows:  Flemming v. Nestor (1960, in which the Court substituted its judgement for the Congress and recharacterized Social Security deductions, declaring that amounts taken out of an employee’s paycheck for the Social Security program are no longer personal property but property of the federal government so that Congress can have flexibility to use the money as it believes is necessary), Everson v. Board of Education (1947, in which the Court erected the “Wall of Separation” between Church and government to set a boundary on the Establishment Clause; the “wall of separation” is a legal fiction and has no basis in law or commentary on the meaning or intent of the Constitution), Roe v. Wade (1973, in which the Court not only usurped a rightful reserved power of the individual States, in violation of the tenth amendment, to regulate on abortion, but also found a fundamental right to an abortion on demand in the Constitution, thus denying the right to life to an unborn even up to the very moment prior to its delivery), Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971, in which the Court not only made law from the bench but also usurped a rightful reserved power of the individual States, in violation of the tenth amendment, to regulate on education; there is NO constitutional basis to force states to bus its children arbitrarily to schools out of their residential area to meet racial quotas), Miranda v. Arizona (1966, in which the Court ruled, without any basis to do so, that special guarantees – in the form of the Miranda Warning – are needed to protect the constitutional rights in the 5th, 6th, and 7th amendments of a criminally-accused; again the Court established constitutional policy and guidelines for law based on a legal fiction), National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012, the “Obamacare” decision, in which the Court substituted its judgement for the Congress re-characterizing the mandate from a “penalty,” as Congress intended, to a “tax,” and in doing so saving the law from being struck down as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause to being supported by the Taxing power; note that the recharacterization was still an unconstitutional use of the taxing power because the mandate still “acts” like a penalty or punishment, which is an improper, and unconstitutional use of the taxing power), and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015, in which the Court usurped the legitimate reserved power of the individual States to regulate on marriage).  With respect to Circuit Court decisions, those striking down President Trump’s travel bans are unconstitutional (the president has the express and unlimited power to regulate on which persons or groups of persons can come into the country) and the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in 2016 (NC State Conference of the NAACP v. Pat McCrory) striking down the NC Voter ID law (not only substituting its judgement – an offensive and defamatory judgement by the way – for that of the state legislature and also ignoring the Supreme Court’s holding in Shelby v. Holder, in 2013, striking down the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but blatantly usurping the legitimate reserved power of the State of North Carolina under the tenth amendment to regulate its elections and violating Article IV, Section 4 of the US Constitution which assures that the federal government will guarantee each State a democratic form of government) is unconstitutional.

Addressing an audience at a Pew Forum Conference (themed: “A Call for Reckoning”), Justice Antonin Scalia spoke these words: “My difficulty with Roe v. Wade is a legal rather than a moral one. I do not believe – and no one believed for 200 years – that the Constitution contains a right to abortion. The Constitution gives the federal government and, hence, me, as a justice of the Supreme Court, no power over the matter.”  He continued: “The Constitution contains no right to abortion. It is not to be found in the longstanding traditions of our society, nor can it be logically deduced from the text of the Constitution – not, that is, without volunteering a judicial answer to the nonjusticiable question of when human life begins. Leaving this matter to the political process is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically so. That alone – and not lawyerly dissection of federal judicial precedents – can produce compromises satisfying a sufficient mass of the electorate. The Court should end its disruptive intrusion into this field as soon as possible.”

The Supreme Court may have given itself the final word on the meaning and intent of the Constitution and the laws made in furtherance of it (Marbury v. Madison, 1803; see below), but it was the ambitions of the progressive movement at the end of the 19th century which led to an even more expansive, and dangerous, view  of the judiciary. In this progressive expansive view, federal courts create policy that couldn’t pass the legislative branch or, if it did, would generate voter backlash. Since federal judges and justices are appointed for life, they can do what they like from the bench without voter backlash, including ignoring the legal meaning of the Constitution.

“What secret knowledge, one must wonder, is breathed into lawyers when they become Justices of this Court, wrote Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in the case Wabaunsee County, KS v. Umbehr (1996), ”that enables them to discern that a practice which the text of the Constitution does not clearly proscribe, and which our people have regarded as constitutional for 200 years, is in fact unconstitutional?”

The judiciary is truly an untouchable branch.

Again, the problem is that no one can, or is willing, to do anything about the abuse of constitutional powers with respect to the Supreme Court or lower federal court opinions that are final decisions. Yet there are rightful remedies that I have written about, including nullification and interposition.

 

THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

SUPREME COURT (2017)

The facts of the case are simple enough.  In the last days of President John Adams’ presidency, he nominated a number of people to serve as justices of the peace for the District of Columbia. The Senate confirmed the nominations, and the commissions were prepared. President Adams’ Secretary of State, John Marshall, did not deliver all of the commissions before President Thomas Jefferson took office on March 4 (because he was also acting as the newly-appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, being sworn in on Jan. 31). President Jefferson then ordered his Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the commissions. The plaintiffs, men who were appointed but whose commissions were not delivered, sued Madison in the Supreme Court and argued that, in refusing to deliver the commissions, the Secretary of State was neglecting his Constitutional duty. The important detail is that they sought relief in the Supreme Court, under its original jurisdiction (court of first review, not as an appeal), which was a remedy specifically provided in the Judiciary Act of 1789. They could have sought their commissions through other avenues but the particular remedy they pursued was through the Judiciary Act.

The Court, with Marshall as its new chief justice, dissected the case into three questions: (1) Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions?  (2) Can they sue for their commissions in court?  (3) Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their commissions?  The importance of the case is not in the answers to these questions but in the opportunity that Marshall used to articulate a critical role for the Supreme Court and in doing so, securing it as an omnipotent branch of the government.

In its answers to the above questions, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution grants the president the power to appoint and commission officers of the United States. Because the only evidence of the appointment is the commission, the two actions are tied together. Without the commission, the appointment is not complete, and so the president’s signature on the commission and its delivery are the final steps in the appointment process.  However, the Court held, once an appointment is made, the officers have acquired rights to their positions under the law. If those rights are denied, then they may seek redress in the courts. But the fatal decision that Marbury made, and the others as well, was to seek an original action for their commissions in the Supreme Court. As Marshall noted, the congressional act, the Judiciary Act of 1789, conferring that authority to the Court conflicts with Article III Section 2 of the Constitution. The judicial power in the United States extends to all cases under the Constitution and the Supreme Court is bound to decide cases according to the Constitution rather than the law when the two conflict. So, if a law is found to be in conflict with the Constitution, then the law is invalid (= “judicial review”).  In this case, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act ran counter to the Constitution and is therefore void. Thus, lacking authority, the Supreme Court canceled Marbury’s claim.

In other words, although Marbury was entitled to his commission, the Supreme Court was unable to grant it because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, assigning that power to the Court, conflicted with Article III Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and was therefore null and void. Marshall articulated that this analysis (judicial review) was the process by which to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. He was not the first to articulate or apply judicial review; the state courts were already applying such analysis for their own constitutions. But, he reasoned, one court must be responsible for interpreting the Constitution and saying what the law is and that court MUST be the US Supreme Court (ie, the federal courts). “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”  Marshall advanced a position not assigned in the Constitution nor articulated in the essays explaining the Constitution and its provisions, as well as the anticipated operation of the federal government.

The next assault on the design of the federal government, at the hands of the Supreme Court, came in 1819 with the case of McCulloch v. Maryland. In that case, Chief Justice Marshall considered the question of how to construe the government’s powers in Article I, Section 8 – namely thru the “Necessary & Proper” Clause (a common legal clause included in contracts to give force to the responsibilities listed in the contract; in Article 8, it gave force (but strict limits) to all the powers enumerated before it). In considering that question, he reviewed advice given to President George Washington by both Thomas Jefferson, his Secretary of State and a man devoted to a small government of limited powers, and Alexander Hamilton, his Treasury Secretary and a proponent of a large government of concentrated powers, as to whether his administration had the power to establish a national bank, as Hamilton requested. Jefferson, naturally, advised that the government’s powers in the Constitution must be construed exactly as written, and thus construed narrowly, while Hamilton advised that they need to be construed broadly. Washington sided with Hamilton. And so did Marshall. Writing for the Court in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the “Necessary & Proper” Clause (government can do whatever is “necessary and proper” to carry out its functions) to mean that the government can do anything it feels is “convenient” and makes it easier to carry out federal power. He articulated that Congress possesses unenumerated – or “implied” – powers not explicitly outlined in the Constitution, and thus, the government is one essentially of unlimited powers.

John Marshall, the fourth Chief Justice of the United States, appointed by President John Adams, presided over the Supreme Court longer than any other occupant of that chair – for 34 years (1801–1835). Because the Court was a relatively insignificant legal forum when he arrived but became the most powerful court in the land by the time he died, Marshall, for bad or good, is justly the most celebrated judge in our history.  The federal courts were a particular area of interest for outgoing President Adams in the wake of the presidential election of 1800. With the Federalists soundly defeated and about to lose both the executive and legislative branches to Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans, Adams and the lame duck Congress passed what came to be known as the Midnight Judges Act, which made sweeping changes to the federal judiciary, including a reduction in the number of Justices on the Supreme Court from six to five (upon the next vacancy in the court) so as to deny Jefferson an appointment until two vacancies occurred. As the incumbent Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth was in poor health, Adams wanted to replace him with a younger justice before he left office. He first offered the seat to ex-Chief Justice John Jay (one of the authors of the Federalist Papers essays), who declined on the grounds that the Court lacked “energy, weight, and dignity.” But because there was precious little time left, Adams nominated Marshall, then aged 45, who just happened to be his Secretary of State at the time. Marshall was confirmed by the Senate on January 27, 1801, and received his commission on January 31. While Marshall officially took office on February 4, he continued to also serve as Secretary of State until Adams’ term expired on March 4. President John Adam, who died a few hours after Thomas Jefferson on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1826, had this to say about his appointment of Marshall: “My gift of John Marshall to the people of the United States was the proudest act of my life.”

John Marshall’s legal training comprised three months of attending the law lectures of George Wythe at the College of William and Mary. In fact, these three months were his only formal education since grammar school. Nevertheless, he was admitted to the practice of law immediately after those lectures, in 1780.

Marshall’s legacy is indeed an enlargement of the powers of the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary in general.  (It should be noted that at the time, the Supreme Court met for only three months out of the year and during the other months would “ride circuit,” which meant they would serve on the lower federal courts, the federal courts of appeal or district courts, filling in wherever they could).

Ironically, it was Chief Justice John Marshall, the man who wrote: “We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs” who, in fact, forgot that it was a constitution he was expounding, intended to endure for ages to come.

So Jefferson was right about the potential of the Supreme Court after all. In a letter to his friend Edward Livingston in 1825, he lamented over what the judiciary had already become: “This member of the Government was at first considered as the most harmless and helpless of all its organs. But it has proved that the power of declaring what the law is, ad libitum, by sapping and mining slyly and without alarm the foundations of the Constitution, can do what open force would not dare to attempt.”

In 1821, Jefferson wrote to his friend Charles Hammond: “It has long been my opinion, and I have never shrunk from its expression,… that the germ of dissolution of our Federal Government is in the constitution of the Federal Judiciary–an irresponsible body (for impeachment is scarcely a scare-crow), working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief over the field of jurisdiction until all shall be usurped from the States and the government be consolidated into one. To this I am opposed…..  When all government, domestic and foreign, in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another, and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated.”

In 1820, he wrote to William Jarvis: “To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions [is] a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men and not more so. They have with others the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. Their maxim is boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem [good justice is broad jurisdiction], and their power the more dangerous as they are in office for life and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves … . When the legislative or executive functionaries act unconstitutionally, they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity. The exemption of the judges from that is quite dangerous enough. I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society, but the people themselves.”

Also in 1820, he wrote to Thomas Ritchie: “The judiciary of the United States is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric. They are construing our Constitution from a co-ordination of a general and special government to a general and supreme one alone.’”

James Madison also warned of the dangers of a powerful federal judiciary.

In a letter James Madison wrote on October 15, 1788 to a former roommate of his, John Brown (of Kentucky), he wrote: “Refusing or not refusing to execute a law to stamp it with its final character . . . makes the Judiciary department paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can never be proper.” In his famous Report of 1800 (aka, “Committee Report on the Alien & Sedition Acts”), Madison warned: “On any other hypothesis, the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of this department with the others in usurped powers, might subvert forever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve.”

A limited and reserved judiciary was anticipated at the time the union was established, in 1788.

To convince the States of the limited nature of the federal government created by the new Constitution of 1787, and hence encourage them to ratify it in their conventions, Alexander Hamilton outlined exactly the position that the federal judiciary would occupy in the new government scheme in his Federalist Papers essays. Its role would be simply to offer an “opinion” on constitutional questions to the other branches and to the States. In his essay No. 78 (dated June 14, 1788), in which he articulated the role of the federal judiciary under the US Constitution, Alexander Hamilton articulated: “The Judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will.”  Further in that essay, he wrote: “And it proves, in the last place, that liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments.”  In his essay No. 81 (dated June 25, 1788), also addressing the federal judiciary, Hamilton wrote: “In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts of every State.”

The States relied on the commentary and explanations in the Federalist Papers in ratifying the Constitution, and also on the promise that a Bill of Rights would be added to further limit the power of the common government. They would not have agreed to leave all decisions as to the extend and scope of federal power completely and exclusively to the federal government itself.

The Supreme Court, and federal courts in general, are the most threatening branch of the federal government because they have the power to alter and re-interpret the Constitution, in effect, to “re-write” it without the legal requirement of going thru the Article V amendment process. The other branches merely ignore the Constitution or are ignorant to the authority it grants and the limitations it requires. They are also the most threatening branch to our democratic process because they can circumvent the democratic process on social issues without any repercussions at the ballot box.

In a speech he delivered to the class at Catholic University, Columbus School of Law, he said: “Robert F. Kennedy used to say, ‘Some men see things as they are and ask why. Others dream things that never were and ask why not?’  That outlook has become a far too common and destructive approach to interpreting the law.”

Before he passed, Justice Antonin Scalia was quoted from an interview he did with Bloomberg magazine: “It is difficult to maintain the illusion that we are interpreting a Constitution, rather than inventing one, when we amend its provisions so breezily.”

On February 24, 2002, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee member, let it slip on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that she would oppose appeals court nominee Charles Pickering because he had ‘right-wing views, both politically and personally.’

At least she admitted what we all knew – that judges to the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, are selected based on their political views.

In his article “The Judiciary: The Strongest and Most Dangerous Branch?”, Tom Jipping wrote: “Ask yourself this question: why are political or personal views a qualification to be a judge rather than, say, politician? What is it that Senator Feinstein thinks judges do that makes their political and personal views important?”

This is, at the core, why we have such a problem with the federal courts. This is why each president ambitiously appoints judges to the federal courts. This is what the debate over the power and appointment of judges is all about. Political and personal views should NEVER determine fitness to serve in the judiciary.

Jipping continued: “A judicial nominee’s political or personal views are relevant for only one reason; because one thinks those views determine judicial rulings. That is, judges are free to make decisions based not on the law, but on their own personal views. Stating that view is enough to expose its danger to our liberty. Government decisions based on political or personal views are political decisions, made by those we elect to make our laws and over whom we have electoral control. Judicial decisions must be based on law, not on political or personal views. Our liberty depends on them separating law from politics.  You are no doubt familiar with the phrase “a government of laws, and not of men.” But how many know where it comes from? It appears at the end of Article 487 of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. Article 487 says that “the judicial [branch] shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.”

If judges base their decisions on their political or personal views, they are not interpreting. They are making law or transforming the Constitution or the law they are reviewing. They are bending or conforming the Constitution or law to their political or personal views. This is what is meant by a government of men and not a government of laws.  We have no security for our liberty with a government of men.

Justice Scalia confirmed the sake in his remarks before the Philadelphia Bar Association on April 29, 2004: “As long as judges tinker with the Constitution to ‘do what the people want,’ instead of what the document actually commands, politicians who pick and confirm new federal judges will naturally want only those who agree with them politically.”

Our current Supreme Court has a split nature. Four of the justices base their decisions on political and/or personal views; these are the liberal justices. The Constitution has no firm meaning to them. Another four justices strictly construe the Constitution, just as they would a contract, believing the document means what it says and continues to mean the same thing until properly amended; these are the conservative justices. So, apparently we have a hybrid government – partly a government of men and partly a government of laws. It is the ninth justice, the swing-voter, who has the last word on the matter.

Law Professor Robert E. Riggs wrote, in his 1993 Hofstra Law Review article “When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the Supreme Court, 1900-1990”:

“The word of the Supreme Court is the law of the land. From the decision of its nine appointed Justices there is no appeal and, for most disappointed suitors, no legal redress at all. The losers in a case of wide public interest might hope someday to seek a legislative remedy, but the process of legislative redress is slow, cumbersome, and uncertain. When the issue turns on the meaning and application of the US Constitution, the decision is truly final, subject to modification only by constitutional amendment or by a subsequent Supreme Court. The exercise of such awesome lawmaking power by so few nonelected public servants is a paradox in a democratic society, and the paradox is heightened when the issue is close. In a nine-member court, five votes are sufficient to determine the outcome, even if four strongly dissent. In the early decades of this century, when 5-4 decisions were few and unanimity was the rule, critics of the Court often suggested that decisions by a single vote – especially when voiding a statute – were somehow illegitimate. Today, Supreme Court decisions still give rise to criticism and protest and, in extreme cases, public agitation to overturn them. Criticisms of such decisions are primarily substantive, however, and the procedure that gives the same legal weight to a 5-4 as to a 9-0 decision is seldom challenged.

The 5-4 decisions of the United States Supreme Court highlight the essentially political nature of the body. The ideal of nine jurists collectively resolving disputes according to the dictates of the law and the Constitution is superseded by an image of nine Justices voting individual preferences in situations where substantive rules seem to provide little guidance. Both the ideal and the image are caricatures-the unanimous decisions tending toward one extreme and the 5-4 decisions toward the other-but each reflects elements of the complex underlying reality of Supreme Court decision-making. Until well into this century, unanimity was the dominant image. Published dissent was limited to a small fraction of decided cases, with 5-4 decisions still less frequent. This frequency does not necessarily portray a Court governed more by principle than by personal preference.”

The inability for 9 justices to be able to see eye-to-eye on the meaning and intent of the Constitution, including all its provisions limitations, should be exceedingly troublesome to every American, especially when there is ample commentary, explanations, warnings, discussions, debates on the merits, and direct instructions by the drafter himself (James Madison), the delegates who – through robust debate and discussion – worked together to put it in its final form, the men who wrote the Federalist Papers (the greatest authority as to the meaning and intent of the Constitution; written by Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay), the Founding Fathers who helped guide its ratification in the State conventions, and the Congressional record.  No Supreme Court opinion should ever include any interpretation of the Constitution or its provisions/limitations that differs in any way, shape, or form from any of the authorities just mentioned. Yet we see it all the time, especially after the turn of the century (post 1900).  5-4 opinions, which account for about 30% or more of the total opinions of the more recent Supreme Court, should call into question the ability of the Court to be able to effectively, objectively, and responsibly maintain the integrity of our great document. And if the highest court of the land cannot do so, then it should cease to be the final arbiter on constitutional matters. Otherwise, our Constitution is in grave danger and our constitutional republic is as well.  There is no confidence in a court decision that is 5-4.  Because there is no consensus by court members in such a split opinion, there is no comfort among the people that the Constitution was faithfully, diligently, ethically, and dutifully interpreted. They know that the Court is a highly politicized tribunal. It’s nature has become political. They know that one half of the Court truly understands what the Constitution says and requires and the other side intentionally rejects that position. The approval or disapproval of the opinion rests with the vote of the swing voter. The 5-4 decisions of the United States Supreme Court highlight the essentially political nature of the body.

There are many federal court opinions which represent an abuse of judicial power – a political opinion rather than a constitutional one. Some are clear abuses and some are subtle. I have mentioned a few of the more blatant ones above.

To the trained constitutionalist – again, this being the goal of my writings – each and every violation is – and would be – apparent. One simply needs to be well-educated or well-versed on the Constitution and its history.

 

THE DISSENTING OPINION IN THE OBERGEFELL OPINION

SUPREME COURT - conservative members (2017) - minus Kennedy

In some cases, the dissenting justices accuse the majority of reaching an unconstitutional opinion, and often explain why. One such case is the Obergefell case. The Obergefell opinion is clearly an unconstitutional decision – one of obvious over-reach, motivated by a desire to advance a social agenda. The opinion was a 5-4 decision in which the liberal justices (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan) were joined by the swing voter Anthony Kennedy, to outnumber the opinion of the conservative justices (Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Samuel Alito). But the conservative justices refused to remain quiet regarding the majority opinion. Each wrote a separate dissenting opinion accusing the majority of ignoring their role as a member of the federal bench, of twisting the meaning of the Constitution, of enlarging the meaning of the term “Due Process” (blatantly ignoring the Supreme Court’s own definition and precedent), of ignoring the Tenth Amendment, of committing judicial activism, etc etc.

I want to emphasis the point I am trying to make in this article – which is that the federal courts are guilty, perhaps even more than the other branches, of unconstitutional abuses – by focusing on the Obergefell case and examining the dissenting opinions. I have highlighted key excerpts from the dissenting opinions by Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito, which are all very strong, but have included the entire dissenting opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts.

A.  JUSTICE SCALIA

SCALIA (#7)

The late Justice Antonin Scalia wrote:

I join The Chief Justice’s opinion in full. I write separately to call attention to this Court’s threat to American democracy.

The substance of today’s decree is not of immense personal importance to me. The law can recognize as marriage whatever sexual attachments and living arrangements it wishes, and can accord them favorable civil consequences, from tax treatment to rights of inheritance. Those civil consequences—and the public approval that conferring the name of marriage evidences—can perhaps have adverse social effects, but no more adverse than the effects of many other controversial laws. So it is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage. It is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me. Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is the furthest extension in fact—and the furthest extension one can even imagine—of the Court’s claimed power to create “liberties” that the Constitution and its Amendments neglect to mention. This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.

Until the courts put a stop to it, public debate over same-sex marriage displayed American democracy at its best. Individuals on both sides of the issue passionately, but respectfully, attempted to persuade their fellow citizens to accept their views. Americans considered the arguments and put the question to a vote. The electorates of 11 States, either directly or through their representatives, chose to expand the traditional definition of marriage. Many more decided not to. Win or lose, advocates for both sides continued pressing their cases, secure in the knowledge that an electoral loss can be negated by a later electoral win. That is exactly how our system of government is supposed to work.

The Constitution places some constraints on self-rule—constraints adopted by the People themselves when they ratified the Constitution and its Amendments. Forbidden are laws “impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” denying “Full Faith and Credit” to the “public Acts” of other States, prohibiting the free exercise of religion, abridging the freedom of speech, infringing the right to keep and bear arms, authorizing unreasonable searches and seizures, and so forth. Aside from these limitations, those powers “reserved to the States respectively, or to the people” can be exercised as the States or the People desire. These cases ask us to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment contains a limitation that requires the States to license and recognize marriages between two people of the same sex. Does it remove that issue from the political process?

Of course not. It would be surprising to find a prescription regarding marriage in the Federal Constitution since, as the author of today’s opinion reminded us only two years ago (in an opinion joined by the same Justices who join him today):

“Regulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”

“The Federal Government, through our history, has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations.”

But we need not speculate. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these cases. When it comes to determining the meaning of a vague constitutional provision—such as “due process of law” or “equal protection of the laws” — it is unquestionable that the People who ratified that provision did not understand it to prohibit a practice that remained both universal and uncontroversial in the years after ratification. We have no basis for striking down a practice that is not expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, and that bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use dating back to the Amendment’s ratification. Since there is no doubt whatever that the People never decided to prohibit the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples, the public debate over same-sex marriage must be allowed to continue.

But the Court ends this debate, in an opinion lacking even a thin veneer of law. Buried beneath the mummeries and straining-to-be-memorable passages of the opinion is a candid and startling assertion: No matter what it was the People ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment protects those rights that the Judiciary, in its “reasoned judgment,” thinks the Fourteenth Amendment ought to protect. That is so because “the generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions . . . . ”One would think that sentence would continue: “. . . and therefore they provided for a means by which the People could amend the Constitution,” or perhaps “. . . and therefore they left the creation of additional liberties, such as the freedom to marry someone of the same sex, to the People, through the never-ending process of legislation.” But no. What logically follows, in the majority’s judge-empowering estimation, is: “and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.” The “we,” needless to say, is the nine of us. “History and tradition guide and discipline [our] inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.” Thus, rather than focusing on the People’s understanding of “liberty”—at the time of ratification or even today—the majority focuses on four “principles and traditions” that, in the majority’s view, prohibit States from defining marriage as an institution consisting of one man and one woman.

This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government. Except as limited by a constitutional prohibition agreed to by the People, the States are free to adopt whatever laws they like, even those that offend the esteemed Justices’ “reasoned judgment.” A system of government that makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy.

Judges are selected precisely for their skill as lawyers; whether they reflect the policy views of a particular constituency is not (or should not be) relevant. Not surprisingly then, the Federal Judiciary is hardly a cross-section of America. Take, for example, this Court, which consists of only nine men and women, all of them successful lawyers who studied at Harvard or Yale Law School. Four of the nine are natives of New York City. Eight of them grew up in east- and west-coast States. Only one hails from the vast expanse in-between. Not a single Southwesterner or even, to tell the truth, a genuine Westerner (California does not count). Not a single evangelical Christian (a group that comprises about one quarter of Americans[19]), or even a Protestant of any denomination. The strikingly unrepresentative character of the body voting on today’s social upheaval would be irrelevant if they were functioning as judges, answering the legal question whether the American people had ever ratified a constitutional provision that was understood to proscribe the traditional definition of marriage. But of course the Justices in today’s majority are not voting on that basis; they say they are not. And to allow the policy question of same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social transformation without representation.

But what really astounds is the hubris reflected in today’s judicial Putsch. The five Justices who compose today’s majority are entirely comfortable concluding that every State violated the Constitution for all of the 135 years between the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification and Massachusetts’ permitting of same-sex marriages in 2003. They have discovered in the Fourteenth Amendment a “fundamental right” overlooked by every person alive at the time of ratification, and almost everyone else in the time since. They see what lesser legal minds—minds like Thomas Cooley, John Marshall Harlan, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Learned Hand, Louis Brandeis, William Howard Taft, Benjamin Cardozo, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, and Henry Friendly—could not. They are certain that the People ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to bestow on them the power to remove questions from the democratic process when that is called for by their “reasoned judgment.” These Justices know that limiting marriage to one man and one woman is contrary to reason; they know that an institution as old as government itself, and accepted by every nation in history until 15 years ago, cannot possibly be supported by anything other than ignorance or bigotry. And they are willing to say that any citizen who does not agree with that, who adheres to what was, until 15 years ago, the unanimous judgment of all generations and all societies, stands against the Constitution.

The opinion is couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic. It is one thing for separate concurring or dissenting opinions to contain extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and expression; it is something else for the official opinion of the Court to do so. Of course the opinion’s showy profundities are often profoundly incoherent. “The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.” (Really? Who ever thought that intimacy and spirituality [whatever that means] were freedoms? And if intimacy is, one would think Freedom of Intimacy is abridged rather than expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest hippie. Expression, sure enough, is a freedom, but anyone in a long-lasting marriage will attest that that happy state constricts, rather than expands, what one can prudently say.) Rights, we are told, can “rise . . . from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” (Huh? How can a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives [whatever that means] define [whatever that means] an urgent liberty [never mind], give birth to a right?) And we are told that, “in any particular case,” either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause “may be thought to capture the essence of[a right in a more accurate and comprehensive way,” than the other, “even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.” (What say? What possible “essence” does substantive due process “capture” in an “accurate and comprehensive way”? It stands for nothing whatever, except those freedoms and entitlements that this Court really likes. And the Equal Protection Clause, as employed today, identifies nothing except a difference in treatment that this Court really dislikes. Hardly a distillation of essence. If the opinion is correct that the two clauses “converge in the identification and definition of [a] right,” that is only because the majority’s likes and dislikes are predictably compatible.) I could go on. The world does not expect logic and precision in poetry or inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them in the law. The stuff contained in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis.

*  *  *

Hubris is sometimes defined as o’erweening pride; and pride, we know, goeth before a fall. The Judiciary is the “least dangerous” of the federal branches because it has “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm” and the States, “even for the efficacy of its judgments.”[26] With each decision of ours that takes from the People a question properly left to them—with each decision that is unabashedly based not on law, but on the “reasoned judgment” of a bare majority of this Court—we move one step closer to being reminded of our impotence.

 

B.  JUSTICE THOMAS

JUSTICE THOMAS

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote:

The Court’s decision today is at odds not only with the Constitution, but with the principles upon which our Nation was built. Since well before 1787, liberty has been understood as freedom from government action, not entitlement to government benefits. The Framers created our Constitution to preserve that understanding of liberty. Yet the majority invokes our Constitution in the name of a “liberty” that the Framers would not have recognized, to the detriment of the liberty they sought to protect. Along the way, it rejects the idea—captured in our Declaration of Independence—that human dignity is innate and suggests instead that it comes from the Government. This distortion of our Constitution not only ignores the text, it inverts the relationship between the individual and the state in our Republic. I cannot agree with it.

The majority’s decision today will require States to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize same-sex marriages entered in other States largely based on a constitutional provision guaranteeing “due process” before a person is deprived of his “life, liberty, or property.” I have elsewhere explained the dangerous fiction of treating the Due Process Clause as a font of substantive rights. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 –812 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It distorts the constitutional text, which guarantees only whatever “process” is “due” before a person is deprived of life, liberty, and property. Worse, it invites judges to do exactly what the majority has done here – “roam at large in the constitutional field guided only by their personal views as to what fundamental rights are protected by that document”. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 953, 965 (1992) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)).

By straying from the text of the Constitution, substantive due process exalts judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their authority. Petitioners argue that by enshrining the traditional definition of marriage in their State Constitutions through voter-approved amendments, the States have put the issue “beyond the reach of the normal democratic process.” But the result petitioners seek is far less democratic. They ask nine judges on this Court to enshrine their definition of marriage in the Federal Constitution and thus put it beyond the reach of the normal democratic process for the entire Nation. That a “bare majority” of this Court is able to grant this wish, wiping out with a stroke of the keyboard the results of the political process in over 30 States, based on a provision that guarantees only “due process” is but further evidence of the danger of substantive due process.

Even if the doctrine of substantive due process were somehow defensible—it is not—petitioners still would not have a claim. To invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause at all—whether under a theory of “substantive” or “procedural” due process—a party must first identify a deprivation of “life, liberty, or property.” The majority claims these state laws deprive petitioners of “liberty,” but the concept of “liberty” it conjures up bears no resemblance to any plausible meaning of that word as it is used in the Due Process Clauses….

The majority’s inversion of the original meaning of liberty will likely cause collateral damage to other aspects of our constitutional order that protect liberty……

Justice Thomas then went on to explain the history behind the Due Process Clause, including its roots in the Magna Carta, in Blackstone’s Commentaries, and in the government philosophy of John Locke.

In yet another part of his dissent, Justice Thomas wrote: “Aside from undermining the political processes that protect our liberty, the majority’s decision threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect,” and then went on to explain the history of our religious liberty.

Finally, he concluded:

Perhaps recognizing that these cases do not actually involve liberty as it has been understood, the majority goes to great lengths to assert that its decision will advance the “dignity” of same-sex couples. The flaw in that reasoning, of course, is that the Constitution contains no “dignity” Clause, and even if it did, the government would be incapable of bestowing dignity.

Human dignity has long been understood in this country to be innate. When the Framers proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal” and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” they referred to a vision of mankind in which all humans are created in the image of God and therefore of inherent worth. That vision is the foundation upon which this Nation was built.

The corollary of that principle is that human dignity cannot be taken away by the government. Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their humanity) because the government allowed them to be enslaved. Those held in internment camps did not lose their dignity because the government confined them. And those denied governmental benefits certainly do not lose their dignity because the government denies them those benefits. The government cannot bestow dignity, and it cannot take it away.

The majority’s musings are thus deeply misguided, but at least those musings can have no effect on the dignity of the persons the majority demeans. Its mischaracterization of the arguments presented by the States and their amici can have no effect on the dignity of those litigants. Its rejection of laws preserving the traditional definition of marriage can have no effect on the dignity of the people who voted for them. Its invalidation of those laws can have no effect on the dignity of the people who continue to adhere to the traditional definition of marriage. And its disdain for the understandings of liberty and dignity upon which this Nation was founded can have no effect on the dignity of Americans who continue to believe in them.

Our Constitution—like the Declaration of Independence before it—was predicated on a simple truth: One’s liberty, not to mention one’s dignity, was something to be shielded from—not provided by—the State. Today’s decision casts that truth aside. In its haste to reach a desired result, the majority misapplies a clause focused on “due process” to afford substantive rights, disregards the most plausible understanding of the “liberty” protected by that clause, and distorts the principles on which this Nation was founded. Its decision will have inestimable consequences for our Constitution and our society. I respectfully dissent.

 

C.  JUSTICE ALITO

JUSTICE ALITO

Justice Samuel Alito wrote:

Until the federal courts intervened, the American people were engaged in a debate about whether their States should recognize same-sex marriage. The question in these cases, however, is not what States should do about same-sex marriage but whether the Constitution answers that question for them. It does not. The Constitution leaves that question to be decided by the people of each State.

The Constitution says nothing about a right to same-sex marriage, but the Court holds that the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses this right. Our Nation was founded upon the principle that every person has the unalienable right to liberty, but liberty is a term of many meanings. For classical liberals, it may include economic rights now limited by government regulation. For social democrats, it may include the right to a variety of government benefits. For today’s majority, it has a distinctively postmodern meaning.

To prevent five unelected Justices from imposing their personal vision of liberty upon the American people, the Court has held that “liberty” under the Due Process Clause should be understood to protect only those rights that are “ ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 701 –721 (1997). And it is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not among those rights. See United States v. Windsor (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). Indeed: “In this country, no State permitted same-sex marriage until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in 2003 that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the State Constitution. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941. Nor is the right to same-sex marriage deeply rooted in the traditions of other nations. No country allowed same-sex couples to marry until the Netherlands did so in 2000.

“What [those arguing in favor of a constitutional right to same sex marriage] seek, therefore, is not the protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new right, and they seek this innovation not from a legislative body elected by the people, but from unelected judges. Faced with such a request, judges have cause for both caution and humility.” Id.

For today’s majority, it does not matter that the right to same-sex marriage lacks deep roots or even that it is contrary to long-established tradition. The Justices in the majority claim the authority to confer constitutional protection upon that right simply because they believe that it is fundamental.

Attempting to circumvent the problem presented by the newness of the right found in these cases, the majority claims that the issue is the right to equal treatment. Noting that marriage is a fundamental right, the majority argues that a State has no valid reason for denying that right to same-sex couples. This reasoning is dependent upon a particular understanding of the purpose of civil marriage. Although the Court expresses the point in loftier terms, its argument is that the fundamental purpose of marriage is to promote the well-being of those who choose to marry. Marriage provides emotional fulfillment and the promise of support in times of need. And by benefiting persons who choose to wed, marriage indirectly benefits society because persons who live in stable, fulfilling, and supportive relationships make better citizens. It is for these reasons, the argument goes, that States encourage and formalize marriage, confer special benefits on married persons, and also impose some special obligations. This understanding of the States’ reasons for recognizing marriage enables the majority to argue that same-sex marriage serves the States’ objectives in the same way as opposite-sex marriage.

This understanding of marriage, which focuses almost entirely on the happiness of persons who choose to marry, is shared by many people today, but it is not the traditional one. For millennia, marriage was inextricably linked to the one thing that only an opposite-sex couple can do: procreate.

Adherents to different schools of philosophy use different terms to explain why society should formalize marriage and attach special benefits and obligations to persons who marry. Here, the States defending their adherence to the traditional understanding of marriage have explained their position using the pragmatic vocabulary that characterizes most American political discourse. Their basic argument is that States formalize and promote marriage, unlike other fulfilling human relationships, in order to encourage potentially procreative conduct to take place within a lasting unit that has long been thought to provide the best atmosphere for raising children. They thus argue that there are reasonable secular grounds for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.

If this traditional understanding of the purpose of marriage does not ring true to all ears today, that is probably because the tie between marriage and procreation has frayed. Today, for instance, more than 40% of all children in this country are born to unmarried women. This development undoubtedly is both a cause and a result of changes in our society’s understanding of marriage.

While, for many, the attributes of marriage in 21st-century America have changed, those States that do not want to recognize same-sex marriage have not yet given up on the traditional understanding. They worry that by officially abandoning the older understanding, they may contribute to marriage’s further decay. It is far beyond the outer reaches of this Court’s authority to say that a State may not adhere to the understanding of marriage that has long prevailed, not just in this country and others with similar cultural roots, but also in a great variety of countries and cultures all around the globe.

If the Constitution contained a provision guaranteeing the right to marry a person of the same sex, it would be our duty to enforce that right. But the Constitution simply does not speak to the issue of same-sex marriage. In our system of government, ultimate sovereignty rests with the people, and the people have the right to control their own destiny. Any change on a question so fundamental should be made by the people through their elected officials.”

Today’s decision usurps the constitutional right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional understanding of marriage. The decision will also have other important consequences.

It will be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy. In the course of its opinion, the majority compares traditional marriage laws to laws that denied equal treatment for African-Americans and women. The implications of this analogy will be exploited by those who are determined to stamp out every vestige of dissent.

Perhaps recognizing how its reasoning may be used, the majority attempts, toward the end of its opinion, to reassure those who oppose same-sex marriage that their rights of conscience will be protected. Ante, at 26–27. We will soon see whether this proves to be true. I assume that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.

The system of federalism established by our Constitution provides a way for people with different beliefs to live together in a single nation. If the issue of same-sex marriage had been left to the people of the States, it is likely that some States would recognize same-sex marriage and others would not. It is also possible that some States would tie recognition to protection for conscience rights. The majority today makes that impossible. By imposing its own views on the entire country, the majority facilitates the marginalization of the many Americans who have traditional ideas. Recalling the harsh treatment of gays and lesbians in the past, some may think that turnabout is fair play. But if that sentiment prevails, the Nation will experience bitter and lasting wounds.

Today’s decision will also have a fundamental effect on this Court and its ability to uphold the rule of law. If a bare majority of Justices can invent a new right and impose that right on the rest of the country, the only real limit on what future majorities will be able to do is their own sense of what those with political power and cultural influence are willing to tolerate. Even enthusiastic supporters of same-sex marriage should worry about the scope of the power that today’s majority claims.

Today’s decision shows that decades of attempts to restrain this Court’s abuse of its authority have failed. A lesson that some will take from today’s decision is that preaching about the proper method of interpreting the Constitution or the virtues of judicial self-restraint and humility cannot compete with the temptation to achieve what is viewed as a noble end by any practicable means. I do not doubt that my colleagues in the majority sincerely see in the Constitution a vision of liberty that happens to coincide with their own. But this sincerity is cause for concern, not comfort. What it evidences is the deep and perhaps irremediable corruption of our legal culture’s conception of constitutional interpretation.

Most Americans—understandably—will cheer or lament today’s decision because of their views on the issue of same-sex marriage. But all Americans, whatever their thinking on that issue, should worry about what the majority’s claim of power portends.

 

D.  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS

 JUSTICE ROBERTS

JAMES OBERGEFELL, et al., PETITIONERS

14–556v.

RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.;

Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.

Petitioners make strong arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of fairness. They contend that same-sex couples should be allowed to affirm their love and commitment through marriage, just like opposite-sex couples. That position has undeniable appeal; over the past six years, voters and legislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia have revised their laws to allow marriage between two people of the same sex.

But this Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be. The people who ratified the Constitution authorized courts to exercise “neither force nor will but merely judgment.” The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)

Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition.

Today, however, the Court takes the extraordinary step of ordering every State to license and recognize same-sex marriage. Many people will rejoice at this decision, and I begrudge none their celebration. But for those who believe in a government of laws, not of men, the majority’s approach is deeply disheartening. Supporters of same-sex marriage have achieved considerable success persuading their fellow citizens—through the democratic process—to adopt their view. That ends today. Five lawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law. Stealing this issue from the people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept.

The majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment. The right it announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent. The majority expressly disclaims judicial “caution” and omits even a pretense of humility, openly relying on its desire to remake society according to its own “new insight” into the “nature of injustice.” Ante, at 11, 23. As a result, the Court invalidates the marriage laws of more than half the States and orders the transformation of a social institution that has formed the basis of human society for millennia, for the Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who do we think we are?

It can be tempting for judges to confuse our own preferences with the requirements of the law. But as this Court has been reminded throughout our history, the Constitution “is made for people of fundamentally differing views.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Accordingly, “courts are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation.” Id., at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority today neglects that restrained conception of the judicial role. It seizes for itself a question the Constitution leaves to the people, at a time when the people are engaged in a vibrant debate on that question. And it answers that question based not on neutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own “understanding of what freedom is and must become.” (majority opinion, at 19). I have no choice but to dissent.

Understand well what this dissent is about: It is not about whether, in my judgment, the institution of marriage should be changed to include same-sex couples. It is instead about whether, in our democratic republic, that decision should rest with the people acting through their elected representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold commissions authorizing them to resolve legal disputes according to law. The Constitution leaves no doubt about the answer.

I

Petitioners and their amici base their arguments on the “right to marry” and the imperative of “marriage equality.” There is no serious dispute that, under our precedents, the Constitution protects a right to marry and requires States to apply their marriage laws equally. The real question in these cases is what constitutes “marriage,” or—more precisely—who decides what constitutes “marriage”?

The majority largely ignores these questions, relegating ages of human experience with marriage to a paragraph or two. Even if history and precedent are not “the end” of these cases, ante, at 4, I would not “sweep away what has so long been settled” without showing greater respect for all that preceded us. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 2013.

A.

As the majority acknowledges, marriage “has existed for millennia and across civilizations.” (majority opinion, at 3). For all those millennia, across all those civilizations, “marriage” referred to only one relationship: the union of a man and a woman. Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, p. 12 (petitioners conceding that they are not aware of any society that permitted same-sex marriage before 2001). As the Court explained two Terms ago, “until recent years, . . . marriage between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and function throughout the history of civilization.” United States v. Windsor, 2013.

This universal definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman is no historical coincidence. Marriage did not come about as a result of a political movement, discovery, disease, war, religious doctrine, or any other moving force of world history—and certainly not as a result of a prehistoric decision to exclude gays and lesbians. It arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need: ensuring that children are conceived by a mother and father committed to raising them in the stable conditions of a lifelong relationship. See G. Quale, A History of Marriage Systems 2 (1988) (“For since the reproductive instinct is by nature’s gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common.”).

The premises supporting this concept of marriage are so fundamental that they rarely require articulation. The human race must procreate to survive. Procreation occurs through sexual relations between a man and a woman. When sexual relations result in the conception of a child, that child’s prospects are generally better if the mother and father stay together rather than going their separate ways. Therefore, for the good of children and society, sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occur only between a man and a woman committed to a lasting bond.

Society has recognized that bond as marriage. And by bestowing a respected status and material benefits on married couples, society encourages men and women to conduct sexual relations within marriage rather than without. As one prominent scholar put it, “Marriage is a socially arranged solution for the problem of getting people to stay together and care for children that the mere desire for children, and the sex that makes children possible, does not solve.” J. Q. Wilson, The Marriage Problem 41 (2002).

This singular understanding of marriage has prevailed in the United States throughout our history. The majority accepts that at “the time of the Nation’s founding [marriage] was understood to be a voluntary contract between a man and a woman.” Ante, at 6. Early Americans drew heavily on legal scholars like William Blackstone, who regarded marriage between “husband and wife” as one of the “great relations in private life,” and philosophers like John Locke, who described marriage as “a voluntary compact between man and woman” centered on “its chief end, procreation” and the “nourishment and support” of children. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *410; J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government §§78–79, p. 39 (J. Gough ed. 1947). To those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, this conception of marriage and family “was a given: its structure, its stability, roles, and values accepted by all.” Forte, The Framers’ Idea of Marriage and Family, in The Meaning of Marriage 100, 102 (R. George & J. Elshtain eds. 2006).

The Constitution itself says nothing about marriage, and the Framers thereby entrusted the States with “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife.” Windsor, (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586 –594 (1890)). There is no dispute that every State at the founding—and every State throughout our history until a dozen years ago—defined marriage in the traditional, biologically rooted way. The four States in these cases are typical. Their laws, before and after statehood, have treated marriage as the union of a man and a woman. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388, 396–399 (CA6 2014). Even when state laws did not specify this definition expressly, no one doubted what they meant. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S. W. 2d 588, 589 (Ky. App. 1973). The meaning of “marriage” went without saying.

Of course, many did say it. In his first American dictionary, Noah Webster defined marriage as “the legal union of a man and woman for life,” which served the purposes of “preventing the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, . . . promoting domestic felicity, and . . . securing the maintenance and education of children.” 1 An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). An influential 19th-century treatise defined marriage as “a civil status, existing in one man and one woman legally united for life for those civil and social purposes which are based in the distinction of sex.” J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce 25 (1852). The first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defined marriage as “the civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life.” Black’s Law Dictionary 756 (1891) (emphasis deleted). The dictionary maintained essentially that same definition for the next century.

This Court’s precedents have repeatedly described marriage in ways that are consistent only with its traditional meaning. Early cases on the subject referred to marriage as “the union for life of one man and one woman,” Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15, 45 (1885) , which forms “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress,” Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211 (1888) . We later described marriage as “fundamental to our very existence and survival,” an understanding that necessarily implies a procreative component. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) ; see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942) . More recent cases have directly connected the right to marry with the “right to procreate.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386 (1978) .

As the majority notes, some aspects of marriage have changed over time. Arranged marriages have largely given way to pairings based on romantic love. States have replaced coverture, the doctrine by which a married man and woman became a single legal entity, with laws that respect each participant’s separate status. Racial restrictions on marriage, which “arose as an incident to slavery” to promote “White Supremacy,” were repealed by many States and ultimately struck down by this Court. Loving, 388 U. S., at 6–7.

The majority observes that these developments “were not mere superficial changes” in marriage, but rather “worked deep transformations in its structure.” (majority opinion, at 6–7). They did not, however, work any transformation in the core structure of marriage as the union between a man and a woman. If you had asked a person on the street how marriage was defined, no one would ever have said, “Marriage is the union of a man and a woman, where the woman is subject to coverture.” The majority may be right that the “history of marriage is one of both continuity and change,” but the core meaning of marriage has endured. Ante, at 6.

B

Shortly after this Court struck down racial restrictions on marriage in Loving, a gay couple in Minnesota sought a marriage license. They argued that the Constitution required States to allow marriage between people of the same sex for the same reasons that it requires States to allow marriage between people of different races. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected their analogy to Loving, and this Court summarily dismissed an appeal. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972) .

In the decades after Baker, greater numbers of gays and lesbians began living openly, and many expressed a desire to have their relationships recognized as marriages. Over time, more people came to see marriage in a way that could be extended to such couples. Until recently, this new view of marriage remained a minority position. After the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 interpreted its State Constitution to require recognition of same-sex marriage, many States—including the four at issue here—enacted constitutional amendments formally adopting the longstanding definition of marriage.

Over the last few years, public opinion on marriage has shifted rapidly. In 2009, the legislatures of Vermont, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia became the first in the Nation to enact laws that revised the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples, while also providing accommodations for religious believers. In 2011, the New York Legislature enacted a similar law. In 2012, voters in Maine did the same, reversing the result of a referendum just three years earlier in which they had upheld the traditional definition of marriage.

In all, voters and legislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia have changed their definitions of marriage to include same-sex couples. The highest courts of five States have decreed that same result under their own Constitutions. The remainder of the States retain the traditional definition of marriage.

Petitioners brought lawsuits contending that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment compel their States to license and recognize marriages between same-sex couples. In a carefully reasoned decision, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the democratic “momentum” in favor of “expanding the definition of marriage to include gay couples,” but concluded that petitioners had not made “the case for constitutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the founding: in the hands of state voters.” 772 F. 3d, at 396, 403. That decision interpreted the Constitution correctly, and I would affirm.

II

Petitioners first contend that the marriage laws of their States violate the Due Process Clause. The Solicitor General of the United States, appearing in support of petitioners, expressly disowned that position before this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 38–39. The majority nevertheless resolves these cases for petitioners based almost entirely on the Due Process Clause.

The majority purports to identify four “principles and traditions” in this Court’s due process precedents that support a fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry. (majority opinion, at 12). In reality, however, the majority’s approach has no basis in principle or tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 . Stripped of its shiny rhetorical gloss, the majority’s argument is that the Due Process Clause gives same-sex couples a fundamental right to marry because it will be good for them and for society. If I were a legislator, I would certainly consider that view as a matter of social policy. But as a judge, I find the majority’s position indefensible as a matter of constitutional law.

A

Petitioners’ “fundamental right” claim falls into the most sensitive category of constitutional adjudication. Petitioners do not contend that their States’ marriage laws violate an enumerated constitutional right, such as the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. There is, after all, no “Companionship and Understanding” or “Nobility and Dignity” Clause in the Constitution. (See majority opinion, at 3, 14). They argue instead that the laws violate a right implied by the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that “liberty” may not be deprived without “due process of law.”

This Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to include a “substantive” component that protects certain liberty interests against state deprivation “no matter what process is provided.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302 (1993) . The theory is that some liberties are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” and therefore cannot be deprived without compelling justification. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).

Allowing unelected federal judges to select which unenumerated rights rank as “fundamental”—and to strike down state laws on the basis of that determination—raises obvious concerns about the judicial role. Our precedents have accordingly insisted that judges “exercise the utmost care” in identifying implied fundamental rights, “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Kennedy, Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of Judicial Restraint 13 (1986) (Address at Stanford) (“One can conclude that certain essential, or fundamental, rights should exist in any just society. It does not follow that each of those essential rights is one that we as judges can enforce under the written Constitution. The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.”).

The need for restraint in administering the strong medicine of substantive due process is a lesson this Court has learned the hard way. The Court first applied substantive due process to strike down a statute in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). There the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise on the ground that legislation restricting the institution of slavery violated the implied rights of slaveholders. The Court relied on its own conception of liberty and property in doing so. It asserted that “an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States . . . could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.” Id., at 450. In a dissent that has outlasted the majority opinion, Justice Curtis explained that when the “fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws [are] abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control” the Constitution’s meaning, “we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to mean.” Id., at 621.

Dred Scott’s holding was overruled on the battlefields of the Civil War and by constitutional amendment after Appomattox, but its approach to the Due Process Clause reappeared. In a series of early 20th-century cases, most prominently Lochner v. New York, this Court invalidated state statutes that presented “meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual,” and “undue interference with liberty of person and freedom of contract.” 198 U. S., at 60, 61. In Lochner itself, the Court struck down a New York law setting maximum hours for bakery employees, because there was “in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law.” Id., at 58.

The dissenting Justices in Lochner explained that the New York law could be viewed as a reasonable response to legislative concern about the health of bakery employees, an issue on which there was at least “room for debate and for an honest difference of opinion.” Id., at 72 (opinion of Harlan, J.). The majority’s contrary conclusion required adopting as constitutional law “an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.” Id., at 75 (opinion of Holmes, J.). As Justice Holmes memorably put it, “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” a leading work on the philosophy of Social Darwinism. Ibid. The Constitution “is not intended to embody a particular economic theory . . . . It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution.” Id., at 75–76.

In the decades after Lochner, the Court struck down nearly 200 laws as violations of individual liberty, often over strong dissents contending that “[t]he criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good.” Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525, 570 (1923) (opinion of Holmes, J.). By empowering judges to elevate their own policy judgments to the status of constitutionally protected “liberty,” the Lochner line of cases left “no alternative to regarding the court as a . . . legislative chamber.” L. Hand, The Bill of Rights 42 (1958).

Eventually, the Court recognized its error and vowed not to repeat it. “The doctrine that . . . due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely,” we later explained, “has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730 (1963) ; see Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952) (“we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation”). Thus, it has become an accepted rule that the Court will not hold laws unconstitutional simply because we find them “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955) .

Rejecting Lochner does not require disavowing the doctrine of implied fundamental rights, and this Court has not done so. But to avoid repeating Lochner’s error of converting personal preferences into constitutional mandates, our modern substantive due process cases have stressed the need for “judicial self-restraint.” Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992) . Our precedents have required that implied fundamental rights be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 720–721 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the Court articulated the importance of history and tradition to the fundamental rights inquiry most precisely in Glucksberg, many other cases both before and after have adopted the same approach. See, e.g., District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52, 72 (2009) ; Flores, 507 U. S., at 303; United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 751 (1987); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also id., at 544 (White, J., dissenting) (“The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U. S. 57 –101 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (consulting “ ‘our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices’ ” and concluding that “we owe it to the Nation’s domestic relations legal structure . . . to proceed with caution” (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721)).

Proper reliance on history and tradition of course requires looking beyond the individual law being challenged, so that every restriction on liberty does not supply its own constitutional justification. The Court is right about that. Ante, at 18. But given the few “guideposts for responsible decision-making in this unchartered area,” Collins, 503 U. S., at 125, “an approach grounded in history imposes limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based on an abstract formula,” Moore, 431 U. S., at 504, n. 12 (plurality opinion). Expanding a right suddenly and dramatically is likely to require tearing it up from its roots. Even a sincere profession of “discipline” in identifying fundamental rights, (majority opinion, at 10–11), does not provide a meaningful constraint on a judge, for “what he is really likely to be ‘discovering,’ whether or not he is fully aware of it, are his own values,” J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 44 (1980). The only way to ensure restraint in this delicate enterprise is “continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles [of] the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).

B

The majority acknowledges none of this doctrinal background, and it is easy to see why: Its aggressive application of substantive due process breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner.

1

The majority’s driving themes are that marriage is desirable and petitioners desire it. The opinion describes the “transcendent importance” of marriage and repeatedly insists that petitioners do not seek to “demean,” “devalue,” “denigrate,” or “disrespect” the institution. (majority opinion, at 3, 4, 6, 28). Nobody disputes those points.

Indeed, the compelling personal accounts of petitioners and others like them are likely a primary reason why many Americans have changed their minds about whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry. As a matter of constitutional law, however, the sincerity of petitioners’ wishes is not relevant.

When the majority turns to the law, it relies primarily on precedents discussing the fundamental “right to marry.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987) ; Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 383; see Loving, 388 U. S., at 12. These cases do not hold, of course, that anyone who wants to get married has a constitutional right to do so. They instead require a State to justify barriers to marriage as that institution has always been understood. In Loving, the Court held that racial restrictions on the right to marry lacked a compelling justification. In Zablocki, restrictions based on child support debts did not suffice. In Turner, restrictions based on status as a prisoner were deemed impermissible.

None of the laws at issue in those cases purported to change the core definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman. The laws challenged in Zablocki and Turner did not define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman, where neither party owes child support or is in prison.” Nor did the interracial marriage ban at issue in Loving define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman of the same race.” See Tragen, Comment, Statutory Prohibitions Against Interracial Marriage, 32 Cal. L. Rev. 269 (1944) (“at common law there was no ban on interracial marriage”); (see Justice Thomas’ dissent, at 11–12). Removing racial barriers to marriage therefore did not change what a marriage was any more than integrating schools changed what a school was. As the majority admits, the institution of “marriage” discussed in every one of these cases “presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners.” (majority opinion, at 11).

In short, the “right to marry” cases stand for the important but limited proposition that particular restrictions on access to marriage as traditionally defined violate due process. These precedents say nothing at all about a right to make a State change its definition of marriage, which is the right petitioners actually seek here. See Windsor, (Alito, J., dissenting) (“What Windsor and the United States seek . . . is not the protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new right.”). Neither petitioners nor the majority cites a single case or other legal source providing any basis for such a constitutional right. None exists, and that is enough to foreclose their claim.

2

The majority suggests that “there are other, more instructive precedents” informing the right to marry. Ante, at 12. Although not entirely clear, this reference seems to correspond to a line of cases discussing an implied fundamental “right of privacy.” Griswold, 381 U. S., at 486. In the first of those cases, the Court invalidated a criminal law that banned the use of contraceptives. Id., at 485–486. The Court stressed the invasive nature of the ban, which threatened the intrusion of “the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.” Id., at 485. In the Court’s view, such laws infringed the right to privacy in its most basic sense: the “right to be let alone.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 –454, n. 10 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted); citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

The Court also invoked the right to privacy in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) , which struck down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy. Lawrence relied on the position that criminal sodomy laws, like bans on contraceptives, invaded privacy by inviting “unwarranted government intrusions” that “touch upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior . . . in the most private of places, the home.” Id., at 562, 567.

Neither Lawrence nor any other precedent in the privacy line of cases supports the right that petitioners assert here. Unlike criminal laws banning contraceptives and sodomy, the marriage laws at issue here involve no government intrusion. They create no crime and impose no punishment. Same-sex couples remain free to live together, to engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their families as they see fit. No one is “condemned to live in loneliness” by the laws challenged in these cases—no one. (majority opinion, at 28). At the same time, the laws in no way interfere with the “right to be let alone.”

The majority also relies on Justice Harlan’s influential dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961) . As the majority recounts, that opinion states that “due process has not been reduced to any formula.” Id., at 542. But far from conferring the broad interpretive discretion that the majority discerns, Justice Harlan’s opinion makes clear that courts implying fundamental rights are not “free to roam where unguided speculation might take them.” Ibid. They must instead have “regard to what history teaches” and exercise not only “judgment” but “restraint.” Ibid. Of particular relevance, Justice Harlan explained that “laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up . . . form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.” Id., at 546.

In sum, the privacy cases provide no support for the majority’s position, because petitioners do not seek privacy. Quite the opposite, they seek public recognition of their relationships, along with corresponding government benefits. Our cases have consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements from the State. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189, 196 (1989) ; San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 –37 (1973); (See Justice Thomas’ dissent, at 9-13). Thus, although the right to privacy recognized by our precedents certainly plays a role in protecting the intimate conduct of same-sex couples, it provides no affirmative right to redefine marriage and no basis for striking down the laws at issue here.

3

Perhaps recognizing how little support it can derive from precedent, the majority goes out of its way to jettison the “careful” approach to implied fundamental rights taken by this Court in Glucksberg. (majority opinion, at 18) (quoting 521 U. S., at 721). It is revealing that the majority’s position requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of substantive due process. At least this part of the majority opinion has the virtue of candor. Nobody could rightly accuse the majority of taking a careful approach.

Ultimately, only one precedent offers any support for the majority’s methodology: Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 . The majority opens its opinion by announcing petitioners’ right to “define and express their identity.” (majority opinion, at 1–2). The majority later explains that “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.” (majority opinion, at 12). This freewheeling notion of individual autonomy echoes nothing so much as “the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.” Lochner, 198 U. S., at 58 (emphasis added).

To be fair, the majority does not suggest that its individual autonomy right is entirely unconstrained. The constraints it sets are precisely those that accord with its own “reasoned judgment,” informed by its “new insight” into the “nature of injustice,” which was invisible to all who came before but has become clear “as we learn [the] meaning” of liberty. (majority opinion, at 10, 11). The truth is that today’s decision rests on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that “it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.” Ante, at 19. Whatever force that belief may have as a matter of moral philosophy, it has no more basis in the Constitution than did the naked policy preferences adopted in Lochner. See 198 U. S., at 61 (“We do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this law,” which “is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals . . . to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best”).

The majority recognizes that today’s cases do not mark “the first time the Court has been asked to adopt a cautious approach to recognizing and protecting fundamental rights.” (majority opinion, at 25). On that much, we agree. The Court was “asked”—and it agreed—to “adopt a cautious approach” to implying fundamental rights after the debacle of the Lochner era. Today, the majority casts caution aside and revives the grave errors of that period.

One immediate question invited by the majority’s position is whether States may retain the definition of marriage as a union of two people. Cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (Utah 2013), appeal pending, No. 14-4117 (CA10). Although the majority randomly inserts the adjective “two” in various places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core definition of marriage may be preserved while the man-woman element may not. Indeed, from the standpoint of history and tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in some cultures around the world. If the majority is willing to take the big leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the shorter one.

It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental right to plural marriage. If “there is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices,” (majority opinion, at 13), why would there be any less dignity in the bond between three people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to make the profound choice to marry? If a same-sex couple has the constitutional right to marry because their children would otherwise “suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser,” (majority opinion, at 15), why wouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three or more persons raising children? If not having the opportunity to marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay and lesbian couples, why wouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” (majority opinion, at 22), serve to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous relationships? See Bennett, Polyamory: The Next Sexual Revolution? Newsweek, July 28, 2009 (estimating 500,000 polyamorous families in the United States); Li, Married Lesbian “Throuple” Expecting First Child, N. Y. Post, Apr. 23, 2014; Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 Emory L. J. 1977 (2015).

I do not mean to equate marriage between same-sex couples with plural marriages in all respects. There may well be relevant differences that compel different legal analysis. But if there are, petitioners have not pointed to any. When asked about a plural marital union at oral argument, petitioners asserted that a State “doesn’t have such an institution.” Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 2, p. 6. But that is exactly the point: the States at issue here do not have an institution of same-sex marriage, either.

4

Near the end of its opinion, the majority offers perhaps the clearest insight into its decision. Expanding marriage to include same-sex couples, the majority insists, would “pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.” (majority opinion, at 27). This argument again echoes Lochner, which relied on its assessment that “we think that a law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act.” 198 U. S., at 57.

Then and now, this assertion of the “harm principle” sounds more in philosophy than law. The elevation of the fullest individual self-realization over the constraints that society has expressed in law may or may not be attractive moral philosophy. But a Justice’s commission does not confer any special moral, philosophical, or social insight sufficient to justify imposing those perceptions on fellow citizens under the pretense of “due process.” There is indeed a process due the people on issues of this sort—the democratic process. Respecting that understanding requires the Court to be guided by law, not any particular school of social thought. As Judge Henry Friendly once put it, echoing Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner, the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty any more than it enacts Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics. See Randolph, Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft Abortion Opinion, 29 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1035, 1036–1037, 1058 (2006). And it certainly does not enact any one concept of marriage.

The majority’s understanding of due process lays out a tantalizing vision of the future for Members of this Court: If an unvarying social institution enduring over all of recorded history cannot inhibit judicial policymaking, what can? But this approach is dangerous for the rule of law. The purpose of insisting that implied fundamental rights have roots in the history and tradition of our people is to ensure that when unelected judges strike down democratically enacted laws, they do so based on something more than their own beliefs. The Court today not only overlooks our country’s entire history and tradition but actively repudiates it, preferring to live only in the heady days of the here and now. I agree with the majority that the “nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.” (majority opinion, at 11). As petitioners put it, “times can blind.” Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 9, 10. But to blind yourself to history is both prideful and unwise. “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” W. Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun 92 (1951).

III

In addition to their due process argument, petitioners contend that the Equal Protection Clause requires their States to license and recognize same-sex marriages. The majority does not seriously engage with this claim. Its discussion is, quite frankly, difficult to follow. The central point seems to be that there is a “synergy between” the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, and that some precedents relying on one Clause have also relied on the other. (majority opinion, at 20). Absent from this portion of the opinion, however, is anything resembling our usual framework for deciding equal protection cases. It is casebook doctrine that the “modern Supreme Court’s treatment of equal protection claims has used a means-ends methodology in which judges ask whether the classification the government is using is sufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing.” G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein, M. Tushnet, & P. Karlan, Constitutional Law 453 (7th ed. 2013). The majority’s approach today is different:

“Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.” (majority opinion, at 19).

The majority goes on to assert in conclusory fashion that the Equal Protection Clause provides an alternative basis for its holding. (majority opinion, at 22). Yet the majority fails to provide even a single sentence explaining how the Equal Protection Clause supplies independent weight for its position, nor does it attempt to justify its gratuitous violation of the canon against unnecessarily resolving constitutional questions. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 197 (2009) . In any event, the marriage laws at issue here do not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-sex couples is rationally related to the States’ “legitimate state interest” in “preserving the traditional institution of marriage.” Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

It is important to note with precision which laws petitioners have challenged. Although they discuss some of the ancillary legal benefits that accompany marriage, such as hospital visitation rights and recognition of spousal status on official documents, petitioners’ lawsuits target the laws defining marriage generally rather than those allocating benefits specifically. The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. Of course, those more selective claims will not arise now that the Court has taken the drastic step of requiring every State to license and recognize marriages between same-sex couples.

IV

The legitimacy of this Court ultimately rests “upon the respect accorded to its judgments.” Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U. S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). That respect flows from the perception—and reality—that we exercise humility and restraint in deciding cases according to the Constitution and law. The role of the Court envisioned by the majority today, however, is anything but humble or restrained. Over and over, the majority exalts the role of the judiciary in delivering social change. In the majority’s telling, it is the courts, not the people, who are responsible for making “new dimensions of freedom . . . apparent to new generations,” for providing “formal discourse” on social issues, and for ensuring “neutral discussions, without scornful or disparaging commentary.” (majority opinion, at 7-9).

Nowhere is the majority’s extravagant conception of judicial supremacy more evident than in its description—and dismissal—of the public debate regarding same-sex marriage. Yes, the majority concedes, on one side are thousands of years of human history in every society known to have populated the planet. But on the other side, there has been “extensive litigation,” “many thoughtful District Court decisions,” “countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings,” and “more than 100” amicus briefs in these cases alone. (majority opinion, at 9, 10, 23). What would be the point of allowing the democratic process to go on? It is high time for the Court to decide the meaning of marriage, based on five lawyers’ “better informed understanding” of “a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” (majority opinion, at 19). The answer is surely there in one of those amicus briefs or studies.

Those who founded our country would not recognize the majority’s conception of the judicial role. They after all risked their lives and fortunes for the precious right to govern themselves. They would never have imagined yielding that right on a question of social policy to unaccountable and unelected judges. And they certainly would not have been satisfied by a system empowering judges to override policy judgments so long as they do so after “a quite extensive discussion.” (majority opinion, at 8). In our democracy, debate about the content of the law is not an exhaustion requirement to be checked off before courts can impose their will. “Surely the Constitution does not put either the legislative branch or the executive branch in the position of a television quiz show contestant so that when a given period of time has elapsed and a problem remains unresolved by them, the federal judiciary may press a buzzer and take its turn at fashioning a solution.” Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas L. Rev. 693, 700 (1976). As a plurality of this Court explained just last year, “It is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.” Schuette v. BAMN, 2014.

The Court’s accumulation of power does not occur in a vacuum. It comes at the expense of the people. And they know it. Here and abroad, people are in the midst of a serious and thoughtful public debate on the issue of same-sex marriage. They see voters carefully considering same-sex marriage, casting ballots in favor or opposed, and sometimes changing their minds. They see political leaders similarly reexamining their positions, and either reversing course or explaining adherence to old convictions confirmed anew. They see governments and businesses modifying policies and practices with respect to same-sex couples, and participating actively in the civic discourse. They see countries overseas democratically accepting profound social change, or declining to do so. This deliberative process is making people take seriously questions that they may not have even regarded as questions before.

When decisions are reached through democratic means, some people will inevitably be disappointed with the results. But those whose views do not prevail at least know that they have had their say, and accordingly are—in the tradition of our political culture—reconciled to the result of a fair and honest debate. In addition, they can gear up to raise the issue later, hoping to persuade enough on the winning side to think again. “That is exactly how our system of government is supposed to work.” (Justice Scalia’s dissent, at 2-3).

But today the Court puts a stop to all that. By deciding this question under the Constitution, the Court removes it from the realm of democratic decision. There will be consequences to shutting down the political process on an issue of such profound public significance. Closing debate tends to close minds. People denied a voice are less likely to accept the ruling of a court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort of thing courts usually decide. As a thoughtful commentator observed about another issue, “The political process was moving . . . , not swiftly enough for advocates of quick, complete change, but majoritarian institutions were listening and acting. Heavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict.” Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N. C. L. Rev. 375, 385–386 (1985). Indeed, however heartened the proponents of same-sex marriage might be on this day, it is worth acknowledging what they have lost, and lost forever: the opportunity to win the true acceptance that comes from persuading their fellow citizens of the justice of their cause. And they lose this just when the winds of change were freshening at their backs.

Federal courts are blunt instruments when it comes to creating rights. They have constitutional power only to resolve concrete cases or controversies; they do not have the flexibility of legislatures to address concerns of parties not before the court or to anticipate problems that may arise from the exercise of a new right. Today’s decision, for example, creates serious questions about religious liberty. Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and their freedom to exercise religion is—unlike the right imagined by the majority—actually spelled out in the Constitution. (First Amendment)

Respect for sincere religious conviction has led voters and legislators in every State that has adopted same-sex marriage democratically to include accommodations for religious practice. The majority’s decision imposing same-sex marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommodations. The majority graciously suggests that religious believers may continue to “advocate” and “teach” their views of marriage. (majority opinion, at 27). The First Amendment guarantees, however, the freedom to “exercise” religion. Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.

Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage—when, for example, a religious college provides married student housing only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption agency declines to place children with same-sex married couples. Indeed, the Solicitor General candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some religious institutions would be in question if they opposed same-sex marriage. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 36–38. There is little doubt that these and similar questions will soon be before this Court. Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today.

Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’s decision is the extent to which the majority feels compelled to sully those on the other side of the debate. The majority offers a cursory assurance that it does not intend to disparage people who, as a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-sex marriage. (majority opinion, at 19). That disclaimer is hard to square with the very next sentence, in which the majority explains that “the necessary consequence” of laws codifying the traditional definition of marriage is to “demean or stigmatize” same-sex couples. (majority opinion, at 19). The majority reiterates such characterizations over and over. By the majority’s account, Americans who did nothing more than follow the understanding of marriage that has existed for our entire history—in particular, the tens of millions of people who voted to reaffirm their States’ enduring definition of marriage—have acted to “lock . . . out,” “disparage,” “disrespect and subordinate,” and inflict “dignitary wounds” upon their gay and lesbian neighbors. (majority opinion, at 17, 19, 22, 25). These apparent assaults on the character of fair-minded people will have an effect, in society and in court. (See Justice Alito’s dissent, at 6-7). Moreover, they are entirely gratuitous. It is one thing for the majority to conclude that the Constitution protects a right to same-sex marriage; it is something else to portray everyone who does not share the majority’s “better informed understanding” as bigoted. (majority opinion, at 19).

In the face of all this, a much different view of the Court’s role is possible. That view is more modest and restrained. It is more skeptical that the legal abilities of judges also reflect insight into moral and philosophical issues. It is more sensitive to the fact that judges are unelected and unaccountable, and that the legitimacy of their power depends on confining it to the exercise of legal judgment. It is more attuned to the lessons of history, and what it has meant for the country and Court when Justices have exceeded their proper bounds. And it is less pretentious than to suppose that while people around the world have viewed an institution in a particular way for thousands of years, the present generation and the present Court are the ones chosen to burst the bonds of that history and tradition.

*  *  *

If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.

I respectfully dissent.

 

CONCLUSION

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES - Supreme Court pic with rainbow-colored wedding rings

The Constitution is a set of core principles, delegated authority, and limits according to which We the People, established in state conventions, decided to have our country governed. Sure, these principles gradually change over time, as well the need for government to adapt to changing times. For example, in 1815, the federal government was expected to stay in DC, run its strictly enumerated programs (post office, patent office, etc), conduct foreign policy, and otherwise stay out of everyone’s hair. Americans enjoyed the fundamental right “to be left alone” by the federal government [“The makers of the Constitution: conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Olmstead v. United States, 1928]. Today we accept the notion that the government should take care of us and expect it to do more and more for our well-being and quality of life.  Our Founding Fathers understood that our understanding of government might change over time. They also understood that the Constitution shouldn’t be changed lightly and without sufficient time and opportunity to consider and reflect on the proposed changes. That is why they included Article V, which prescribes the precise processes to alter and amend the Constitution.

There are essentially two ways of dealing with gradual changes: (1) The legal path – thru the amendment process, which is a long deliberate process, and (2) The illegal path – the way that’s been used at least since FDR – which is to give judges great latitude and freedom to reinterpret ambiguous (and crystal clear ones!) parts of the Constitution; this is the quick process.  For progressives, the latter is the preferred process and for conservatives, the first process is what is preferred. For conservatives, the path to take when confronting a shift in prevailing attitudes in our country, such as social change in recognizing gay marriage, is to first require judges to interpret the Constitution literally (“strict constructionism”), and if the change is not addressed clearly in the Constitution, to introduce or address that change by passing a constitutional amendment. That’s the option preferred by conservatives, because conservatives are, by definition, opposed to change, and, in this approach, the Constitution will always be a product responsive to the wishes of the people as a whole and not a product created by judges.

While this may sound insufficient or insurmountable to certain minority groups because of the potential time it may take to gain a majority opinion in their favor, it serves the democratic process and makes sure that change is truly made wisely. The Constitution always protects the fundamental and essential rights of all persons, including all minority groups. It’s the “new rights” that we are talking about here.

I’m not saying that gay marriage should be banned. It may very well be the will of the people in their States and even in the United States as a whole, in support of a constitutional amendment removing the traditional definition of marriage. That is not the question for this article. What I am saying is that the Supreme Court should not have made that decision. It was beyond their authority to do so (just as it was beyond their authority to determine that the unborn have no constitutional rights and therefore can be killed).

Years before his passing, Justice Scalia did an interview in which he explained that “originalism” and “strict construction” as an approach to interpreting the Constitution is a dying position. He said that our youth is being taught, expressly, that the Constitution is “a living, breathing document.” He said that day after day when school systems bring their students to the Supreme Court building, he hears the teacher ask the kids: “What is the Constitution?” To which they would answer, in unison, “a living, breathing document.”  Our children, our youth, are being indoctrinated that the Constitution allows the country to be run not necessarily by an established rule of law but by the rule, or whim, of man.

The progressive and political nature of the Supreme Court poses a grave danger to the longevity and the integrity of the foundations that were agreed upon in the years when the States, and the people acting in convention in those States, debated, deliberated, and labored over the decision to delegate some of its power to a common government establish a federal union. Their deliberations and decisions were directly related to the meaning and intent of the Constitution; its meaning and operation were paramount to their decision. The Supreme Court, through many years of opinions, has reassigned new meaning and powers to the government, not by recognizing what it says but by ignoring what it says.

Indeed, little by little, the foundations of our Constitution have been eroded by the federal judiciary and over the course of its history (ever since the Marshall Court), its men in black robes have enlarged the powers of the federal government, have stripped reserved powers of the States, have secured for the government the unlimited right to the property and finances of the American people, have put the American people in a state of limbo as to the security of their fundamental rights under the First Amendment (religious rights, in particular) and Second Amendment, and have used the bench as an alternate forum to make laws. The result has been an erosion of the American system of checks and balances, especially in the ability of the States to check the federal government. A government without effective checks is a danger to the freedom of the people.

“At the establishment of our Constitutions,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Adamantios Coray in 1823, “the judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and harmless members of the government. Experience, however, soon showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office; that their decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors only, pass silent and unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions nevertheless become law by precedent, sapping by little and little the foundations of the Constitution and working its change by construction before any one has perceived that that invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its substance. In truth, man is not made to be trusted for life if secured against all liability to account.”

We inherently know when the executive and legislative branches overstep their constitutional (and in pursuance to it, statutory) authority. Anyone who has read the Constitution and takes the time to read our federal laws can tell when their limits have been exceeded. And the people and the States can decide how to respond to such unconstitutional action. But how do you challenge the judicial branch when they alone determine what the Constitution means (or now means) and the laws mean.

No doubt many will never be convinced that decisions of the Supreme Court should be opposed or ignored. No doubt that many will never believe that its opinions can be characterized as “unconstitutional.” If you are one of those individuals, consider how the Supreme Court, starting with the Marbury v. Madison decision has affected the delicate balance of government envisioned by our Founders and drafters and established in the Constitution:  The Constitution intended to, and did, establish three departments, coordinate and independent, capable of checking and balancing one another, with the officials of the most important branches (the legislative and the executive) being elected in a democratic process. And then the intended weakest branch, with its members appointed and thus outside the reach of the electorate, reserved to itself the power over the other branches and over the will of the people.

Yes, the Supreme Court and the other courts of the federal judiciary often abuse their power, put politics and agenda over a duty to impartially interpret the Constitution and its laws, make law from the bench, direct social change from the bench, and usurp powers reserved to the States or the People whenever it feels like in order that the federal government can exert the powers it wants and for the reasons it wants. Yes, its opinions are often unconstitutional. I hope this article has convinced you of that. I have used the very words, the explanations, of our esteemed Supreme Court justices to make my point as clear and as strong as possible.

I also hope that you find it unacceptable that it happens and that because “no one watches the watchers” we have accepted the notion that whatever the Court decides must become the law of the land.

I hope your next step will be to believe that such unconstitutional decisions, like unconstitutional laws and executive orders, must be called out for what they are and be prevented from being enforced. The enforcement of unconstitutional laws and policies, AND unconstitutional judicial opinions, is the very definition of TYRANNY.

Ultimately, my hope is that you will begin to research and read up on the remedies to prevent the enforcement of unconstitutional judicial opinions, share the knowledge with friends, and get involved with your local and state government (thru its officials) to educate them as well.

 

References:

Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015 (dissenting opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts) –    https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-556/dissent4.html

Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015 (dissenting opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas) –  https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-556/dissent6.html   [Read Justice Thomas’ explanation of the history and meaning of both the Due Process Clause (of the 5th amendment) and the history of Religious Liberty]

Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015 (dissenting opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia) –  https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-556/dissent5.html

Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015 (dissenting opinion by Justice Samuel Alito) –  https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-556/dissent7.html

Robert E. Riggs, “When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the Supreme Court, 1900-1990,” Hofstra Law Review, Volume 21,|Issue 3, Article 3 (1993).  Referenced at:  https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1867&context=hlr

Robert E. Riggs (1993) “When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 1900-90,” Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 21: Iss. 3, Article 3.  Referenced at:  http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss3/3

Tom Jippimg, “The Judiciary: The Strongest and Most Dangerous Branch?”, Enter Stage Right, March 4, 2002.  Referenced at:  http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0302/0302judiciary.htm   [Tom Jipping is the director of the Free Congress Foundation’s Center for Law and Democracy]

INTERPOSITION: The Duty to Say “NO!”

NO - Just say NO (signs)

by Diane Rufino, January 25, 2018

The word Interposition means “to place between; cause to intervene.” In the context of the Constitution and the system of government it has established in this country, interposition is the doctrine that says that an individual State may oppose any federal action it believes encroaches on its sovereignty. It is a doctrine tied to the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment, as we all know, is a restatement of the fact that government power is split between two sovereigns, the federal government and the individual States. The Constitution establishes a horizontal separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at the federal level. By the very nature of its limited grants of delegated powers to those branches, the Constitution also establishes a vertical separation of powers between the federal government and the State governments. By “vertical,” we mean that the federal and State governments are co-equal sovereigns. The Tenth Amendment is a restatement of the fact that the Union is not a consolidated one with unlimited power at the federal level but rather a federation of sovereign states with most of the day-to-day running of people’s lives and governing of communities being reserved to the States and the powers to regulate for safety and security, immigration, commerce, and currency being delegated to the common government. Dual Sovereignty. The Tenth Amendment, quite simply, reads: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People.”

Since the Tenth Amendment cannot enforce itself, interposition is one of the doctrines that allows the States and the People to stand up for the rights that are reserved to them.  Right now, the federal government has a monopoly over the meaning and scope of its powers. Congress makes the laws, the president signs the laws and enforces then, and the courts review them for constitutionality.  It wasn’t always this way. The federal courts were originally only supposed to render an “opinion” to the other branches. They were to take that opinion under advisement and amend the particular law or alter their conduct. The “check” that the “opinion” offered was that it was public; once the States found out the opinion, as sovereigns and as the co-parties to the compact known as the US Constitution, they always had the option to nullify and refuse to enforce a law or policy that the court deemed as unconstitutional. But the judicial branch made sure that its power was much more substantial than rendering a mere opinion. The federal monopoly was established when Chief Justice John Marshall handed down the Marbury v. Madison opinion in 1803.  Essentially the decision asserts that the Supreme Court is the tribunal tasked with interpreting the Constitution and as such, it’s “opinions” are not really “opinions” at all but binding decisions. Whatever the men in robes decide is the meaning and the intent of the Constitution IS the meaning and intent and its decisions are final and binding.

But rights and liberties are never secure when men and women have the power to interpret while also being motivated by political opinions, personal passions, etc. The Tenth Amendment MUST not be left to the federal government monopoly to ignore or re-interpret as it sees fit.

The remedy always available to those who hold the reserved powers is interposition – to recognize that certain acts are unconstitutional and exceed delegated powers (and hence are null and void and legally unenforceable) and then to take the necessary steps to make sure that they are NOT enforced. To allow them to be enforced is allowing government usurpation.

I. Interposition: Its Roots in the Magna Carta –

Interposition is a doctrine that the federal government abhors. Arizona tried to interpose in 2010 or so when it was fed up with the fact that the Obama administration refused to enforce immigration laws and the State was being overly burdened by illegal immigration. It passed a law giving its state law enforcement powers to determine which immigrants were undocumented and to require employers to do the same in the hiring process (e-verify). The Arizona legislature and Governor Jan Brewer interposed for the benefit of their citizens and for the proper functioning of the State. Quickly, however, Obama sued the State. How dare it interpose.

Where did this doctrine come from???

It has its roots in the Great English Charter itself – the Magna Carta, signed in the year 1215 by King John to formally recognize the “rights” recognized by ancient tradition and custom of the barons and other lower-class Englishmen. (Remember, this was Medieval England, the era of serfdom)

At the end of the Charter, the English barons included a section providing for the enforcement of its provisions. Section 61 read:

“Since, moveover, for God and the amendment of our kingdom and for the better allaying of the quarrel that has arisen between us and our barons, we have granted all these concessions, desirous that they should enjoy them in complete and firm endurance forever, we give and grant to them the underwritten security, namely, that the barons choose five and twenty barons of the kingdom, whomsoever they will, who shall be bound with all their might, to observe and hold, and cause to be observed, the peace and liberties we have granted and confirmed to them by this our present Charter, so that if we, or our justiciar, or our bailiffs or any one of our officers, shall in anything be at fault towards anyone, or shall have broken any one of the articles of this peace or of this security, and the offense be notified to four barons of the foresaid five and twenty, the said four barons shall repair to us (or our justiciar, if we are out of the realm) and, laying the transgression before us, petition to have that transgression redressed without delay. And if we shall not have corrected the transgression (or, in the event of our being out of the realm, if our justiciar shall not have corrected it) within forty days, reckoning from the time it has been intimated to us (or to our justiciar, if we should be out of the realm), the four barons aforesaid shall refer that matter to the rest of the five and twenty barons, and those five and twenty barons shall, together with the community of the whole realm, distrain and distress us in all possible ways, namely, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions, and in any other way they can, until redress has been obtained as they deem fit, saving harmless our own person, and the persons of our queen and children; and when redress has been obtained, they shall resume their old relations towards us.”

Put simply, Section 61 established a representative group of 25 barons, to be selected as they see fit, who would be tasked with the responsibility of making sure that the promises made by King John when he signed the Charter are kept, even at the point of rebellion against him. This group of 25 “shall be bound with all their might, to observe and hold, and cause to be observed, the peace and liberties we have granted and confirmed to them by this our present Charter.”

In other words, because the King may eventually ignore the promises he made, those who hold the rights and liberties have the right to decide when they’ve violated and then to take any and all steps to make sure that such violation is remedied.

I would argue that inherent in any compact that protects individual rights is the right of those who hold those rights to decide when they’ve been violated and then to take any and all steps to make sure that such violation is remedied.

I would also argue that in any social compact where government power is delegated and powers are reserved, that each party (the one receiving the delegated power and the ones holing the reserved powers) has the right to prevent the other from taking what is legally theirs. This doctrine therefore applies to the Constitution, itself being a social compact.

How did the Magna Carta come about?

II. The History – The Meeting at Runnymede and The Story of King John and the Magna Carta [Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2001. Referenced at: http://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/magna-carta.html ]

A. Who Was King John?

Myth and history are intertwined in the England of 800 years ago. We all remember the outlaw, Robin Hood. From his hideout in Sherwood Forest, he and his band of Merry Men preyed on the rich and gave to the poor. Their archenemy was the Sheriff of Nottingham, who took his orders from the sinister Prince John. While Robin Hood never existed, John certainly did. He was the central character in a real life drama that led to a milestone in human liberty: Magna Carta. Prince John’s older brother, Richard, became king of England when their father, Henry II, died in 1189. King Richard I (also called Richard the Lionhearted) spent almost the entire 10 years of his reign away from England. He fought in tournaments, led crusades and waged several wars on the continent of Europe.

Since Richard needed revenue to pay for his adventures, he taxed his subjects heavily. At one point Richard was captured by his enemies and held for ransom (a common practice in feudal Europe). Richard’s tax collectors in England had to raise an enormous sum of money to free him. Despite Richard’s demands, the people back home in England loved him as a conquering hero.

When Richard died in 1199, John became King. Unlike his brother, John tended to stay at home and run his kingdom on a day to day basis. John, however, continued his brother’s harsh tax policy. Because John lacked Richard’s heroic image and charisma, his subjects began to hate him for his constant demands for more tax money

B. King John vs. The Church –

King John made more enemies when he refused to accept the appointment of Stephen Langton as Archbishop of Canterbury, the most important position in the English Catholic Church. By so doing, John challenged the authority of Pope Innocent III in Rome, who punished John by excommunication. John retaliated by taxing the Church in England, confiscating its lands and forcing many priests to leave their parishes.

While King John carried on his dispute with the Pope, powerful English landowners called barons conspired against him. Fuming over John’s heavy taxes and other abuses of power, the barons plotted rebellion. To head them off, King John made an unexpected move.

In 1212, King John agreed to have Stephen Langton become Archbishop of Canterbury. John also promised to compensate the Church for its money and lands. John even went so far as to make England a fief of the Pope. King John still ruled England, but, as John’s liege lord, the Pope gained tremendous prestige throughout Europe. Pope Innocent was delighted and in 1213 ended John’s excommunication. With John now under the protection of the Church, the resentful barons retreated—at least for a while.

C. King John vs. the Barons —

Convinced that his throne was again safe, King John returned to one of his favorite projects. For years he had dreamed to retake possession of lands in France that had once belonged to his ancestors. Once before, John had led a military expedition to France. Although he won a number of battles, John failed to decisively defeat the French king. Now, in 1213, John planned another campaign.

An invasion of France required many soldiers and more money. Under feudal law, a liege lord had the right to call upon his vassals to provide knights or money during times of war. From the English barons, all vassals of King John, he demanded men-at-arms or gold to support his new French war. Many of the barons refused, having little interest in John’s quarrel with the French king. Enraged, King John set out to punish them by attacking their castles.

Early in 1214, he abandoned his domestic quarrels and left with a force of loyal barons and mercenaries (paid soldiers) for France. History repeated itself. John succeeded in winning some battles, but failed to gain control of the disputed lands.

D. The Road to Runnymede —

Soon after returning to English soil in October 1214, King John resumed his demand for money from the rebellious barons. His demands fell on deaf ears. Sensing John’s weakness after his failure in France, the barons began to make their own demands. In January 1215, a group of them appeared before King John asking for a written charter from him confirming ancient liberties granted by earlier kings of England. Evidence suggests that the newly appointed Archbishop Stephen Langton may have encouraged these demands.

John decided to stall for time; he would give the barons an answer later in the spring. In the meantime, John sent letters to enlist the support of Pope Innocent III, and also began to assemble a mercenary army.

In April, the barons presented John with more specific demands. John flatly rejected them. He remarked: “Why do not the barons, with these unjust exactions, ask my kingdom?”

In response, the barons withdrew their allegiance to King John, and started to form their own rebel army. At the head of the rebel forces was Robert FitzWalter, who called himself “Marshal of the army of God and Holy Church.” In an effort to cool things off, John proposed that the Pope settle their differences. With the Pope openly siding with King John, the barons refused. John ordered his sheriffs to crush the rebel barons and they retaliated by occupying London.

A stalemate ensued. The 40 or so rebel barons and their forces held London as well as their own fortified castles throughout England. King John commanded a slightly smaller force of loyalist barons and mercenaries. Unaligned were about 100 barons plus a group of church leaders headed by the ever-present Archbishop Stephen Langton. Langton (who was sympathetic to the rebels if not one himself) began to work for a negotiated settlement to prevent all-out civil war and arranged a meeting to be held at Runnymede, a meadow on the Thames west of London.

E. Meeting at Runnymede —

King John and his supporters, the rebel barons, the neutrals, church leaders and Archbishop Langton all met at Runnymede on June 15, 1215. Actually, the Charter was negotiated at Runnymede between 10 and 15 June 1215, with King John riding down each day from Windsor, and the barons encamped in their tents across the meadows beside the Thames. Significantly, while most of King John’s fighting men were scattered throughout his kingdom, the rebels appeared at full military strength.

Little is known about the details of this historic meeting, but we do know that King John placed his seal of approval on a document called the “Articles of the Barons.” Over the next few days these articles were rewritten, expanded, and put into the legal language of a royal charter. At some point, probably on June 19, King John put his seal on the final draft of what we call today “Magna Carta” or “The Great Charter.” In exchange, the rebellious barons renewed their oath of allegiance to King John, thus ending the immediate threat of civil war.

With the document, the nobles compelled John to execute this recognition of rights for both noblemen and ordinary Englishmen. The Charter begins with Article 1, which, besides asserting that “the English Church shall be free,” also states: “We have also granted to all freemen of our kingdom, for us and our heirs forever, all the underwritten liberties, to be had and held by them and their heirs, of us and our heirs forever.” Besides recognizing the right of the church to be free from governmental interference, the Magna Carta also recognized the rights of all free citizens to own and inherit property and to be protected from excessive taxes through representation in a “common counsel.” It established the principles of due process and equality before the law, the right to a jury of one’s peers, and the right of widows who owned property to choose not to remarry. It also contained provisions forbidding bribery and official misconduct.

And, as mentioned earlier, it included an enforcement provision: Section 61 read: “61. Since, moveover, for God and the amendment of our kingdom and for the better allaying of the quarrel that has arisen between us and our barons, we have granted all these concessions, desirous that they should enjoy them in complete and firm endurance forever, we give and grant to them the underwritten security, namely, that the barons choose five and twenty barons of the kingdom, whomsoever they will, who shall be bound with all their might, to observe and hold, and cause to be observed, the peace and liberties we have granted and confirmed to them by this our present Charter, so that if we, or our justiciar, or our bailiffs or any one of our officers, shall in anything be at fault towards anyone, or shall have broken any one of the articles of this peace or of this security, and the offense be notified to four barons of the foresaid five and twenty, the said four barons shall repair to us (or our justiciar, if we are out of the realm) and, laying the transgression before us, petition to have that transgression redressed without delay. And if we shall not have corrected the transgression (or, in the event of our being out of the realm, if our justiciar shall not have corrected it) within forty days, reckoning from the time it has been intimated to us (or to our justiciar, if we should be out of the realm), the four barons aforesaid shall refer that matter to the rest of the five and twenty barons, and those five and twenty barons shall, together with the community of the whole realm, distrain and distress us in all possible ways, namely, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions, and in any other way they can, until redress has been obtained as they deem fit, saving harmless our own person, and the persons of our queen and children; and when redress has been obtained, they shall resume their old relations towards us.

Tricky to the end, however, King John left off the names of the 25 barons who were to be tasked with the enforcement of the charter’s terms. By doing so, John intended to downplay the enforcement provision and in general hoped the Charter would become no more than a toothless symbol of his generosity to the kingdom.

Magna Carta of 1215 was not really intended to be a list of rights for Englishmen or even the barons themselves. It was more like a contract in which John bound himself to abide by its provisions. The barons only wanted King John to satisfy their complaints against his abusive rule, not overthrow the monarchy. The real significance of this document lies in the basic idea that a ruler, just like everyone else, is subject to the rule of law. When King John agreed to Magna Carta, he admitted that the law was above the king’s will, a revolutionary idea in 1215.

F. Aftermath —

King John surrendered significant power when he agreed to Magna Carta. It is doubtful that he really ever intended to live up to all his promises. Certainly, the barons hoped that its terms would be rigorously enforced. While John did satisfy some of the barons’ personal grievances, he secretly wrote the Pope asking him to cancel Magna Carta on the grounds that he signed it against his will. At the same time he continued to build up his mercenary army. Not trusting John’s intentions, the rebel barons held on to London and maintained their own army.

Pope Innocent III replied favorably to King John’s appeal. He condemned Magna Carta and declared it null and void. By September 1215, King John and his army were roving the countryside attacking the castles of individual barons, but he avoided the rebel stronghold of London. The barons charged that King John had defaulted on his agreement with them and they were justified in removing him from the throne. They offered the throne to the son of the French king, if he would aid their rebellion.

A long and bloody civil war loomed across England, when suddenly, King John died. A round of heavy eating and drinking apparently led to a case of dysentery causing his death on October 18, 1216. Ten days later John’s nine-year-old son, Henry, was crowned as the new king of England. With John out of the way, the conflict gradually ceased. Less than a month after Henry was crowned, his supporters confirmed Magna Carta in his name. This time it received the approval of the Pope.

Magna Carta, carrying with it the idea of “the rule of law,” was reconfirmed a number of times over the next 80 years, becoming a foundation of English law. Eventually, Magna Carta would become the source of important legal concepts found in our American Constitution and Bill of Rights. Among these are the principle of no taxation without representation and the right to a fair trial under law. These foundations of our own constitutional system had their beginnings in a meadow beside a river almost 800 years ago.

III. CONCLUSION

As I hope you all remember from school, the Magna Carta was a crucial turning point in the struggle to establish freedom and recognize individual rights. The ancient laws and customs by which England had been governed, and which had been abused by the King, were enumerated most clearly and explicitly on its parchment. His signature, his assent, was demanded by those who refused to be mistreated any longer by him. These ancient laws and customs, defended strongly by those who believed were not to be transgressed by the King, would eventually be thought of as human rights.

The next recorded milestone in the development of these “human rights” would be the Petition of Right, drafted in 1628 by the English Parliament and sent to Charles I as a statement of civil liberties and a reminder of the obligation of Kings to recognize that the throne is not above the law. (See my recent article “The English Roots of American Liberty,” January 20, 2018)

Winston Churchill once admonished the free world to learn to pronounce the word “No.” Summoning the wisdom of Alexander the Great, Churchill, in the face of Nazi aggression, challenged the free world to muster the courage to tell Hitler “no.” In his famous October 16, 1938, broadcast to the United States and England, termed “The Defense of Freedom and Peace: The Lights are Going Out”, Churchill reflected: “Alexander the Great remarked that the people of Asia were slaves because they had not learned to pronounce the word ‘No.’ Let that not be the epitaph of the English-speaking peoples or of Parliamentary democracy, or of France, or of the many surviving liberal States of Europe.”

If we don’t learn to say “NO,” then it may also become the epitaph of the United States.

It takes courage to stand up against a person or a body having great power. It often comes at some personal sacrifice. Our challenge is to stand up as a people, and as individual States, to the government officials, the government bodies, and yes, even federal judges who are violating, ignoring, eroding, or otherwise re-interpreting the Constitution our Bill of Rights. Each unconstitutional act usurps the powers delegated or reserved to the People and the States. Nature’s Law supersedes man’s law. Every failure to resist the tyranny posed by an unconstitutional act tightens the noose around freedom’s neck.

References:
The Magna Carta – http://www.constitution.org/eng/magnacar.htm

“The Meeting at Runnymede: The Story of King John and Magna Carta,” 2001, Constitutional Rights Foundation, 601 South Kinglsey Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90005. Referenced at: http://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/magna-carta.html [Section II, Parts A, B, C, D,, and F are taken directly from this source. Only a part of Section E comes this source].

Diane Rufino, “The English Roots of American Liberty,” For Love of God and Country (Diane’s blog), January 20, 2018. Referenced at: https://forloveofgodandcountry.com/2018/01/24/the-english-roots-of-american-liberty/

Jason K. Allen, “Pronouncing the Word ‘No’: The Most Important Lesson I Learned from Al Mohler,” Jason Kallen’s Blog, Nov. 9, 2015. Referenced at: https://jasonkallen.com/2015/11/pronouncing-the-word-no/