A Bill of Rights is What All Free People Are Entitled to Against Every Government

bill of rights - with james madison

by Diane Rufino, January 3, 2019

Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference……”    –  Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to James Madison, December 20, 1787

December 15 marks a very special day in our founding history – On that date in 1791, the first 14 states (Vermont had just been admitted to the Union as the 14th state), ratified the first 10 amendments to the US Constitution, known collectively as our Bill of Rights. We often take it for granted that these first ten amendments, our Bill of Rights, are included in our Constitution, but if we want to point to one reason the colonies went to war for their independence from Great Britain, it was to permanently secure the rights embodied in our Bill of Rights from all reaches of government. Without the Bill of Rights, the revolution would have been in vein.  Thomas Jefferson, probably the Founder who exerted the most pressure on James Madison for a Bill of Rights, advised: “A bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse.”  He wrote this to Madison on December 20, 1787, almost three months after the Constitution had been signed by its drafters in Philadelphia.

On Bill of Rights Day, we reflect upon those rights guaranteed in the first nine amendments (the tenth being a restatement of federalism – the strict separation of power between the federal government and the States) but more importantly, we should come to appreciate the efforts of certain particularly liberty-minded Founders who fought against great odds to make sure that our Constitution in fact included a Bill of Rights. After all, James Madison, considered the Constitution’s author, and most of the other Federalists did not see the need for a Bill of Rights and thought the Constitution wholly sufficient without it. That was the status of the Constitution when it went to the states for ratification.

What is a “Bill of Rights”?  A bill of rights, sometimes called a Declaration of Rights or a Charter of Rights, is a list of the most important rights belonging to the citizens of a country – rights that the King or other form of government must respect. The purpose is to protect those rights against infringement either by law or by conduct from public officials. The US Bill of Rights is the Declaration and enumeration is the individual rights memorialized in the Constitution intended to protect the individual against violations and abuses of power by the government. In that respect, our Bill of Rights is like most other bill of rights (including the English Bill of Rights is 1689 and the great Magna Carta of 1215).  This history of England, including the movement of groups of people (like the Puritans and Pilgrims), to the New World, is a history continually seeking for the recognition and security of fundamental human liberties. And early colonial history continued that tradition of setting out the rights and privileges of the individual in their government charters.

The Preamble to the Bill of Rights explains its clear purpose. It reads: “The Conventions of a number of the States having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will best insure the beneficent ends of its institution.”

In other words, the Bill of Rights is a further limitation on the power of government, above and beyond those limitations already imposed by its very design and delegation of limited powers.

HISTORY:

Again, a Bill of Rights (or Declaration of Rights, or Charter of Rights), is a list of the most important rights belonging to the citizens of a country that the King or other form of government must respect. Bills of rights may be “entrenched” or “unentrenched.”  A bill of rights that is “entrenched” cannot be amended or repealed by the governing legislature through regular procedure, but rather, it would require a supermajority or referendum. Bills of rights that are “entrenched” are often those which are part of a country’s constitution, and therefore subject to special procedures applicable to constitutional amendments. A bill of rights that is not entrenched (“unentrenched”) is merely statutory in form and as such can be modified or repealed by the legislature at will.

The history of the world shows that there have been limited instances where the rights of the people have been enumerated and/or protected by a Bill of Rights. This history includes the following charters, documents, or bills of right:

  • Magna Carta (1215; England) rights for barons
  • Great Charter of Ireland (1216; Ireland) rights for barons – Ireland became independent of Great Britain in 1937
  • Golden Bull of 1222 (1222; Hungary) rights for nobles – which interestingly, included the right of Nullification
  • Charter of Kortenberg (1312; Belgium) rights for all citizens “rich and poor”
  • Twelve Articles (1525; Germany) – considered the first draft of human rights and civil liberties in continental Europe after the Roman Empire.
  • Petition of Right (1628; England)
  • English Bill of Rights 1689
  • Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789; France) – inspired by Thomas Jefferson
  • The US Bill of Rights (1791)

The roots of our modern-day liberty originated in England, as far back as 1100, culminating there with the English Bill of Rights in 1689 and ultimately providing the blueprint for our very own US Bill of Rights in 1791. The roots of liberty, including the roots of our very own American liberty rights, can be found in the selection of charters and documents listed below:

  • The 1100 Charter of Liberties (also called the Coronation Charter) – The 1100 Charter of Liberties was a written proclamation offered by Henry I of England and issued upon his accession to the throne in 1100. It sought to bind the King to certain laws regarding the treatment of nobles, church officials, and individuals – most notably, certain marriage rights, rights of inheritance, amnesty rights, rights for the criminally-accused, and environmental protection (forests). It is considered to be the precursor to the Magna Carta.

 

  • The Magna Carta of 1215 (“the Great Charter”) – The barons at the time, frustrated by ten years of excessive taxation by King John in order to finance a campaign to regain lands in France only to watch the King return home in defeat, consolidated their power and threatened to renounce him. Over the next eight months, they made repeated demands to the King, requesting that he give them a guarantee that he would observe their rights. But these negotiations amounted to nothing. And so, on May 5, 1215, the barons gathered and agreed to declare war on him. On May 17, the barons captured London, the largest town in England, without a fight, and finally, King John took notice. With London lost and ever more supporters flocking to the side of the barons, he sent word that he would meet with them to discuss terms of peace.. Over the next few days, the barons assembled in great numbers on the fields of Runnymede, a relatively obscure meadow that lies between the town of Staines and Windsor castle, where King John was based. Negotiations took place over the next several days and finally, on June 15, King John affixed his seal to the document that would become known as the Magna Carta (or “The Great Charter”). The Magna Carta enumerated an expansive list (63 “chapters”) of rights for barons, and also provided the remedy of Nullification.  The principles extended beyond the often-recognized origin of the “No Taxation Without Representation” doctrine in chapter 12 (and hence the creation of a “people’s body” which addressed matters of taxation and spending) and the Due Process clause of chapter 39. The concepts of “Trial by Jury” and “No Cruel Punishments” are present in chapter 21; and the forerunner of the “Confrontation Clause” of our 6th Amendment addressed in chapters 38, 40, and 44. But the most important contribution of the Magna Carta is the claim that there is a fundamental set of principles which even the King must respect. Above all else, Magna Carta makes the case that the people have a “right” to expect boundaries from the King in their lives and with respect to their property. They have a right to expect “reasonable” conduct.  [King John would go on to ignore the promises he made in signing the Magna Carta]

 

  • The Petition of Right of 1628 – In 1628, under the leadership of Sir Edward Coke, a legal scholar-turned-practical politician, Parliament petitioned Charles I, son of the recently deceased King James I, to uphold the traditional rights of Englishmen, as set forth in the Magna Carta. It was an appeal to his sense of being a just King. Charles was already on his way to being a notorious tyrant. Parliament was not only fed up with is participation in the Thirty Years War (a highly destructive European war) against its consent, but when it refused to provide Charles the revenue to fight the war, he dissolved the body (several times, actually). That would lead Charles to raise revenue other ways – by gathering “forced loans” and “ship money” without Parliamentary approval (hence, taxation without representation in violation of the Magna Carta) and arbitrarily imprisoning those who refused to pay. Among the customary “diverse rights and liberties of the subjects” listed in the Petition of Right were no taxation without consent (as mentioned), “due process of law,” the right to habeas corpus, no quartering of troops, the respect for private property, and the imposition of no cruel punishment. King Charles did not consider himself bound by the Petition and so, he simply disregarded it. He would later be officially tried for high treason by a rump Parliament and beheaded in 1649. [The Petition of Right would have a profound effect on our US Bill of Rights: The Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment, the “Criminal Trials” clause of the 6th Amendment, and the “Civil Jury Trial” clause of the 7th Amendment all are influenced by the Petition of Right.  Furthermore, during the 1760s, the American colonists articulated their grievances against King George in terms similar to those used by Lord Coke in the Petition of Right to uphold the rights of Englishmen].

 

  • The English Bill of Rights of 1689 – After the Bloodless Revolution or “Glorious Revolution” (in which the English Parliament instigated a bloodless coup, replacing King James II with his daughter, Mary II and her husband, William III), Parliament set to right the abuses of its previous kings – Charles I, Charles II, and James II. It drafted and adopted a bill of rights, known as the English Bill of Rights, as which set out certain basic civil rights and clarified the right of secession for the British Crown. It was presented to William and Mary in February 1689 as a condition to the offer to become joint ruling sovereigns of England.  It was contractual in nature so that the acceptance of the throne was tied to their express promise to recognize the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights. A violation of that agreement would terminate the right of William and Mary to rule. The Bill of Rights lays down limits on the powers of the monarch and sets out the rights of Parliament. It further, and most importantly for this discussion, sets out certain rights of the individual, including:  the right to bear arms for self-defense, the right of Due Process, the right to petition government, such criminal defense rights as the right to be free from excessive bail, the right to a jury trial for the crime of high treason, and the right against any cruel and/or unusual punishment, the guarantee that there would be no taxation without representation, the right to be free of a standing army in times of peace, and the right to be free of any quartering of troops.  [Great Britain is unlike the United States in that it has no formal Constitution; rather, the English Bill of Rights, taken together with the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 and the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 are considered, in total, as the uncodified British constitution].

 

  • The colonies being organized under grants and agreements from England, it was assumed that English traditions applied. The colonists considered themselves British subjects and as such, they believed they were entitled to all the rights and privileges of Englishmen. That is why they reacted as they did to the taxes imposed by Parliament, why one protest theme was “No Taxation Without Representation,” why the Sons of Liberty formed, why they harassed the colonial stamp collectors and stamp masters until they resigned, why they engaged in acts of civil disobedience (such as preventing the British from unloading their ships at colonial ports) or hanging colonial governors in effigy, why they tossed crates of tea into the Boston Harbor, why men like Patrick Henry called for the raising and training of colonial militias, and why they were willing to confront the Redcoats with their muskets when they sought to destroy the stockpiles of colonial ammunition. It seemed that once again, as English history has shown true, Englishmen would have to exert their rights and demand that the King to respect them. Proper boundaries would once again have to be established.

 

  • King John’s rejection of the Magna Carta (1215) and King Charles’s rejection of the Petition of Right (1628) proved to our Founding Fathers that the system established in Great Britain provided only arbitrary security for individual rights. They would need to come up with a different system of government, grounded on more “enlightened” principles and “enlightened” government philosophy. And that is exactly what they did in the Declaration of Independence – announcing that the American states were united on the concept of Individual Sovereignty, that government power originated from the People, to serve the People, and not from kings (“the Divine Right of Kings”) to serve kings.

With what many believe to be divine guidance and protection, the thirteen original colonies fought and won their independence from Great Britain in 1781. Lord Cornwallis surrendered his British troops to General George Washington, Commander of the Continental Army, on October 19, 1781 and the Treaty of Paris, signed in September 1783, marked the official end of the struggle. Since the colonies worked together in a collaborative effort to communicate grievances and concerns to King George and Parliament and to engage in a concerted effort to prevent war, but then once war came, to fight and manage the war effort, it seemed only natural to continue to collaborate in their independence. The first attempt at a loose union of states, under the Articles of Confederation, was not very successful. The government lacked the enforcement power needed to effectively act on behalf of the states, such as the power to collect revenue to pay the war debt.

Taking note of the limitations of the common government (the Confederation Congress, aka, Congress of the Confederation, or sometimes even referred to still as the Continental Congress), certain members of our founding generation instigated for a Convention to amend that government. Eventually, in February 1787, Congress called for such a Convention to meet in May in Philadelphia “to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the Federal Government [the Articles of Confederation] adequate to the exigencies of the Union.” And so, the Convention did convene on May 25, 1787 in Philadelphia with delegates from all the states except Rhode Island. The Constitutional Convention, as it came to be known, quickly changed direction – from amending the Articles of Confederation to designing an altogether different form of government. James Madison would be the architect of that plan (the Virginia Plan).  The collective wisdom of the delegates at the Convention identified the weakness of the Virginia Plan, which for the colonies was the creation of a “national” government, with concentrated power in that government, rather than a “federal” government which left most of the sovereign power with the states. A federal government, with the sovereignty of the States keeping the sovereign power of the federal government in check, was the form of government that the delegates preferred. A government that could remain checked against abuses was one that honored the fiercely independent and freedom-loving nature of the colonies and one which would address the reasons for the revolution against Great Britain.

In the summer of 1787, delegates from the 13 states convened in Philadelphia and drafted a remarkable blueprint for self-government — the Constitution of the United States. The first draft set up a system of checks and balances that included a strong executive branch, a representative legislature and a federal judiciary.

The Constitution was remarkable, but deeply flawed. For one thing, it did not include a specific declaration – or bill – of individual rights. As it turned out, and luckily for us as depositories of certain “inalienable rights” as well as civil rights (those belonging to individuals living in a society, subject to the rule of law), the lack of a Bill of Rights turned out to be an obstacle to the Constitution’s ratification by the states that could not be overcome. The Federalists opposed including a bill of rights on the ground that it was unnecessary. According to James Madison, a leading Federalist, a Bill of Rights was not necessary, arguing that because the general government was one of limited powers, having only those powers specifically delegated to it and none touching on individual rights. Besides, he said, a Bill of Rights would only create confusion (inferring that any other right or privilege not listed in the Bill of Rights would be fair game for federal regulation) and also, state governments could ensure these freedoms without the need for a federal mandate. The Anti-Federalists, who were afraid of a strong centralized government and knowing that history has clearly shown that governments tend to concentrate power and tend towards centralization and then tyranny/abuse, refused to support the Constitution without one.

At the close of the Philadelphia Convention, on September 20, 1787, the delegates left with mixed feelings about the document they drafted. Of the 55 delegates to the Convention, only 39 signed it.  Of the 16 that did not sign, some left early (for business, health reasons, family concerns, or out of protest) and some refused to sign out of protest. Some of the more important delegates (ie, position and/or influence in their states) who refused to sign were the following:  George Mason of Virginia (because it did not contain a Bill of Rights), Luther Martin of Maryland (because it violated states’ rights), John Mercer of Maryland (because it did not contain a Bill of Rights), Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts (because it did not contain a Bill of Rights), John Lansing and Robert Yates, both of New York (because it created too strong of a government, which he characterized as much more “national” than “federal”), and Edmund Randolph of Virginia (because it contained insufficient checks and balances to prevent government abuse). Had some of our most active and influential founding fathers attended the Convention, there would have been far greater opposition to the final product. Those who refused to attend or who were unable to included: Patrick Henry (refused to attend, he “smelled a rat” who he believed would try to vest the common government with too much power), Richard Henry Lee (refused to attend because he too didn’t trust the motives of those who called it), Thomas Jefferson (was acting as Ambassador to France at the time, but offered to advise the delegates by correspondence), John Adams (was acting as Ambassador to Great Britain at the time), Samuel Adams (refused to attend because he rejected the purpose of the Convention) and John Hancock (refused to attend for the same reason as Sam Adams).

Many of those who refused to sign the Constitution vowed to fight its ratification at the state conventions – George Mason, Elbridge Gerry, the delegates from Maryland, Luther Martin and John Mercer, and the delegates from New York, John Lansing and Robert Yates. And some strong anti-Federalists who were not delegates at Philadelphia would oppose it as well –Richard Henry Lee, Sam Adams, John Hancock, James Monroe (Virginia), and New York’s Governor George Clinton (who wrote several anti-Federalist essays under the pen name “Cato”). Add to these “big guns” the biggest ones of all – Thomas Jefferson, who was as strong a proponent of a Bill of Rights as one could be, and Patrick Henry, perhaps our most vocal and passionate orator for liberty. Jefferson would have advised Madison to include one, and certainly would have taken issue with Madison’s position on the matter, even though he would have had to do so by correspondence. Perhaps that is the reason why Madison lapsed during the final days of the Convention in updating Jefferson as to the discussions and decisions made in the Convention. It wasn’t until a month after the Convention wrapped up, on October 24, that he finally wrote to him again and sent him a copy of the draft Constitution. We do know that as the debate intensified over a Bill of Rights, Jefferson wrote Madison with his strong opinion, including his letter of December 20, 1787, in which he wrote: “A bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse.”   [The Appendix at the end of this article contains the full commentary in Jefferson’s letter relating to the lack of Bill of Rights in the new Constitution].

On September 28, 1787, the Confederation Congress (aka, Congress of the Confederation) advised the states to begin calling their ratifying conventions, and several did so immediately. Madison left the Philadelphia Convention uncertain what the outcome of the ratification process would be. The dissent by Edmund Randolph and George Mason, both from his home state, and then their refusal to attach their names to the Constitution weighed very heavily on his mind. As Kevin Gutzman pointed out in his book James Madison and the Making of America, the influence that those two men alone had in the overall ratification process potentially could more than counter the entire “unanimity” of the Convention.

As we will see, Madison not only played a leading role in bringing about the Philadelphia Convention (he and Alexander Hamilton orchestrated the report to the Confederation Congress – the Annapolis Report – which made the recommendation that a convention be called in May 1787 in Philadelphia to address the defects of the Articles of Confederation), but he also played a critical supporting role (through his writings) in the debates in the state ratifying conventions, and then a more formal role when ratification seemed to be doomed. The Constitution was “his baby” and he was going to do all he could to see it adopted and a stronger union created. [In September 1786, a conference was called in Annapolis, Maryland to discuss the state of commerce in the fledgling nation. The national government had no authority to regulate trade between and among the states. The conference was called by Virginia, at the urging of Madison, to discuss ways to facilitate commerce and establish standard rules and regulations. Only five of the 13 states sent any delegates at all].

Between November 20, 1787 and January 9, 1788, five states – Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut – ratified the Constitution with relative ease, although the bitter minority report of the Pennsylvania opposition was widely circulated. Despite overwhelming success with these early conventions, the Federalists were well aware of the difficulties that lay ahead. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York were still to come and they knew that North Carolina and Rhode Island weren’t going to sign. In other words, the difficult journey still lied ahead because the anti-Federalist (opponents of the proposed Constitution) were aggressively campaigning against ratification, six states were in doubt, and the magic number of 9 states (Article VII – when 9 states ratified the Constitution, it would take effect) might never be achieved.

In the month after the close of the Convention, Madison found himself in New York and with some time to spare. It didn’t look good; too many political heavyweights were lining up against ratification. New York was unlikely to approve the Constitution. When John Lansing and Robert Yates abandoned the Philadelphia Convention, as Gutzman wrote, “they said that they had not been sent to Philadelphia to replace the Confederation with a national government.” New York’s strongest political figure, its Governor, George Clinton, sided with Lansing and Yates. Alexander Hamilton, a delegate to the Convention from NY, advised Madison that the best way to improve the chances of ratification in his state was to appeal directly to the electorate through the newspapers. After all, several anti-Federalists were already writing articles and other publications criticizing the Constitution and condemning the ambitious government it believed it created.

In addition to the anti-Federalist essays written by Governor Clinton (“Cato”), there were other, also powerful, essays published to criticize the Constitution and to highlight its many flaws. There was “Brutus” from New York (likely Robert Yates or Melancton Smith, or maybe even John Williams), “Centinel” from Pennsylvania (Samuel Bryan), “Agrippa” from Massachusetts (James Winthrop), and the “Federal Farmer” from Virginia (most likely Richard Henry Lee, or maybe Mercy Otis Warren). The is no list to identify with certainty which individuals authored the essays. Agrippa published 11 Letters “To the people,” and 5 essays “To the Massachusetts Convention” by February 5. Brutus published 11 of his 16 essays, Cato published all of his 7 essays, Centinel published 14 of his 18 letters, and Federal Farmer published all of his 18 letters between October 1787 and the start of the Massachusetts ratifying convention, which was January 9, 1788. Much to the dismay of the Federalists, the flood of Anti-federalist essays were starting to have their impact on the electorate and on more importantly, on the election of delegates, and key conventions were yet to meet (namely, New York and Virginia).  In fact, in both those states, the majority of delegates selected would be anti-Federalists.

[New York would call for its convention on February 1, select its delegates from April 29 to May 3, and set its date for June 17. Virginia would select its delegates in March, and set a date of June 2 for its convention].

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and prominent NY figure, lawyer John Jay agreed to address the anti-Federalist campaign, convinced that rejection of the Constitution would condemn the states to an unworkable union. It is likely that Madison took charge from the beginning, laying out a theme or roadmap for the essays, making sure that the criticisms of the anti-federalists were addressed, making sure the provisions of the Constitution that were most contentious were addressed and effectively explained, and that the arguments in favor of the Constitution were made that he wanted. When Jay became very ill, the bulk of the essays would have to be split between Hamilton and Madison; Jay would only be able to write 3 essays. The three men responded to each and every one of the criticisms of the anti-Federalist, in essay form, under the pen name “Publius.” Beginning in October 1787, these men penned 85 essays for New York newspapers and later collected them into 2 volumes entitled The Federalist (later to be referred to as The Federalist Papers), which addressed each concern of the anti-Federalists, analyzed the Constitution, detailed the thinking of the framers, anticipated scenarios posed by the critics, and explained what each provision meant. The Federalist Papers gave assurances that the fears of the anti-Federalists were unfounded and mere speculation and conjecture. One reading the Federalist Papers would believe the federal government to be one of strict and limited powers and without any threat of overstepping or abusing its powers. Comparing the government explained in the Federalist Papers to the one today would be to compare a pea to a grapefruit.

In contrast to its predecessor states (Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut), the Massachusetts convention was angry and contentious, and at one point, it erupted into a fistfight between Federalist delegate Francis Dana and anti-Federalist Elbridge Gerry when the latter was not allowed to speak. The impasse was resolved only when revolutionary heroes and leading anti-Federalists Samuel Adams and John Hancock agreed to ratification on the condition that the convention also propose amendments. In other words, Massachusetts’ ratification was a “conditional” one. [The convention’s proposed amendments included a requirement for grand jury indictment in capital cases, which would form part of the Fifth Amendment, and an amendment reserving powers to the states not expressly given to the federal government, which would later form the basis for the Tenth Amendment. Massachusetts’ Ratification is provided in the Appendix at the end of this article].

The next contentious convention would be in Virginia – in June.

At this point, I wanted to provide a timeline of the State Ratifying Conventions:

Timeline of State Ratifying Conventions:

Delaware – December 7, 1787 –  Delaware ratified the Constitution, 30-0.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/delaware-ratifies-30-0/ ]

Pennsylvania – December 12, 1787 – Pennsylvania ratified, 46-23.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/pennsylvania-ratifies-46-23/ ]

New Jersey – December 18, 1787 –  New Jersey ratified, 38-0.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/new-jersey-ratifies-38-0/ ]

Georgia – December 31, 1787 – Georgia ratified, 20-0.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/georgia-deed-of-ratification/ ]

Connecticut – January 9, 1787 –  Connecticut ratified 128-40.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/connecticut-ratifies-128-40/]  

Massachusetts – February 6, 1788 – The delegates to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention were split on whether to ratify the Constitution or reject it, and so they came up with a compromise.  The high road explanation is that responsible leaders from both parties, including Adams and Hancock, convened and said, “Look, we’ve been at this now for nearly a month. We’re not making any progress whatsoever. The country is in crisis and if Massachusetts doesn’t sign, then we’re down the tubes. Is there some way we can come to some common ground on this?” And the common ground was that Massachusetts would ratify now with an expectation that in the First Congress amendments would be proposed to alter the Constitution. This is known as the Massachusetts Compromise. And enough people bought into it because Hancock bought into it, that it swayed enough delegates to ensure ratification. So the high ground is the sense of crisis, the sense of duty, the sense of Hamilton‘s remark in Federalist 85 that states would be better off signing quickly and working within the system, and that sense that Massachusetts had a responsibility to step up and take the lead. Ultimately, the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention ratified 187-168 with 9 proposed amendments – again with the understanding and expectation that a Bill of Rights would be added.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/stagethree/ ]

New Hampshire – February 14, 1788  – A majority of the delegates to the New Hampshire Ratifying Convention were opposed to ratification, and so the delegates to the convention voted to postpone until June 18, at which time they would take up the issue of ratification again.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/stagethree/ ]

Rhode Island – March 24, 1788 – Rhode Island rejected the call for a state ratifying convention; the state had no intention of even considering a new constitution.

Maryland – April 26, 1788 – Maryland ratified 63-11.   [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/stagefour/#maryland ]

South Carolina – May 23, 1788 – South Carolina ratified, 149-73, with 5 Declarations and Resolves.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/tansill/ratification-southcarolina/ ]

New Hampshire – June 21, 1788 – New Hampshire ratified 57-47, with 12 proposed amendments.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/new-hampshire-ratifies-57-47-with-12-proposed-amendments/ ]

Virginia – June 25, 1788 –  Virginia ratified 89-79, with 20 Bill of Rights and 20 proposed amendments.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/virginia-ratifies-89-79-with-20-proposed-amendments/ ]

On July 2, 1788, the Confederation Congress (still under the Articles of Confederation at the time), adopted the ratification of the US Constitution. The old union (13 colonies-turned-states) was dissolved at that point and a new union, comprising the states that had ratified up until this point (DE, PA, NJ, GA, CT, MA, NH, MD, SC, and VA) was formed.

New York – July 25-26, 1788 – New York ratified on July 26, after debating the day before whether to ratify with amendments or not. It ratified by a slim margin, 30-27, with 25 Bill of Rights and 31 proposed amendments.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/new-york-ratifies-30-27-with-31-proposed-amendments/ ].  The first three Bill of Rights read:

(1)  That all Power is originally vested in and consequently derived from the People, and that Government is instituted by them for their common Interest Protection and Security.

(2)  That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness are essential rights which every Government ought to respect and preserve.

(3)  That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the People, whensoever it shall become necessary to their Happiness; that every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People of the several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they may have granted the same; And that those Clauses in the said Constitution, which declare, that Congress shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any Powers not given by the said Constitution; but such Clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified Powers, or as inserted merely for greater Caution.  [= “RESUMPTION CLAUSE.”  This condition to ratification, as the states of Virginia and Rhode Island also exercised this condition, is critical to understanding the reserved right of a state to secede from the Union].

(4)  That the People have an equal, natural and unalienable right, freely and peaceably to Exercise their Religion according to the dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society ought to be favored or established by Law in preference of others.

(5)  That the People have a right to keep and bear Arms; that a well-regulated Militia, including the body of the People capable of bearing Arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free State;

North Carolina – August 2, 1788 – North Carolina voted 184-84 against ratification.  [http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/elliot/vol4/northcarolina0802/ ]

On September 13, 1788, the Confederation Congress prepared for the new government to take its place. On January 7, 1789, presidential electors were selected, and on February 4, the first election was held to select representatives to the new government under the US Constitution. The candidates receiving the top votes for president were George Washington and John Adams, and so they became the country’s first president and vice-president, respectively. James Madison was elected to the first US Congress from the state of Virginia. The first US Congress was inaugurated on March 4, and finally, on March 30, Washington was inaugurated. He delivered what would become one of the most memorable and often-cited Inaugural addresses.

The first government created by the US Constitution was installed.

North Carolina – November 21, 1789 –  North Carolina ratified 194-77, with 20 Bill of Rights and 21 proposed amendments

Rhode Island – May 29, 1790 –  Rhode Island ratified 34-32, with 18 Bill of Rights and 21 proposed amendments.  [Reference:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/tansill/ratification-rhodeisland/ ]

***  Timeline of Ratification of the US Constitution, Reference:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/bor/timeline/.  By clicking on the State Ratifying Convention, you can pull up the debates, the votes, and the proposed amendments associated with each state’s vote.  Also, I have included, in the Appendix at the end of this article, the proposed Bill of Rights and/or proposed amendments proposed by the certain states in their ratifications].

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Having co-written The Federalist Papers to help secure ratification in New York, James Madison left the state for Virginia, to take up the battle there. [The Virginia Convention would be held before the New York Convention, two weeks before, but as it turned out, they would continue simultaneously].  Back in Virginia, Madison would have to face Patrick Henry, George Mason, Edmund Randolph, James Monroe, Richard Henry Lee (one-time president of the Continental Congress) and William Grayson (VA representative in the Continental Congress). George Mason had authored the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights and the state constitution (chief author, at least) so he would clearly be a forceful authority on the necessity of a Bill of Rights. Mason and Lee would mount the most strenuous opposition to the proposed Constitution, in favor of amending it to include a Bill of Rights. Patrick Henry would oppose it on states’ rights grounds as well. He urged that Virginia hold out for amendments.

Virginia elected its delegates to the Convention in March 1788, and many men – many prominent men – ran for a seat. Interestingly, some of the more prominent men who chose not to run, or who did not win, included George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Beverley Randolph, Richard Henry Lee, and a few others. The most prominent men who were elected included James Madison, Patrick Henry, George Mason, Governor Edmund Randolph, James Monroe, William Grayson, Edmund Pendleton, George Wythe, George Nicholas, former VA Governor Benjamin Harrison V, and John Marshall (who would go on to become our most influential Supreme Court Chief Justice). Of the 168 delegates, the majority were anti-Federalists.

In his book James Madison and the Making of America, Gutzman goes into detail with respect to Mason’s objections to the proposed Constitution. He wrote:

On October 7, Mason sent a letter to [George] Washington including his objections to the Constitution. An amended version of notes he had made during the Philadelphia Convention, this document essentially repeated complaints Mason had raised then: There was no Declaration of Rights, and the Supremacy Clause meant state declarations would be unavailing; the House was too small; the Senate had money powers, although it did not represent the people; the combination of legislative and executive powers in the Senate endangered liberty’ the federal judiciary would swallow up the state judiciaries and thus allow the rich to oppress the poor; the president lacked an executive council, which meant he would be led by the Senate; and the vice-president, in limbo between the Senate and the executive branch, was a dangerous personage – besides which he would give one state three Senate votes, which was unfair.

In addition to these objections, Mason also went public with his Philadelphia Convention prediction that the Commerce Clause would empower the eight northern states to abuse the five southern ones. There would be a tendency for Congress to read almost anything into the Necessary & Proper Clause, which threatened both states’ rights and individuals’ rights.  [James Madison and the Making of America, pg. 189]

Virginia’s Convention met from June 2 – June 27. The Convention would end up pitting Patrick Henry against James Madison, with the former spending much more time on the floor speaking.  Henry was Madison’s most formidable antagonist in the ratification fight.  Henry was perhaps our most passionate founding father, being known for his fiery speeches and his imagery. He was the voice of the revolution. As Gutzman wrote: “He was the great guardian of Virginians’ self-government and inherited rights. He was also an orator without parallel, one who could cause hair to stand up on the necks even of his most devout opponents.”  He did not disappoint at the Convention.

On June 8, he took to the floor to accuse the proposed government created by the Constitution of being a consolidated one. His position was that a confederated government (under the Articles) was being replaced by a consolidated government. He objected to the introductory phrase “We the People…,” claiming that it conjured up the notion that the government would be a consolidated national one. He wanted the language changed to “We the States…”  In his speech that day, he said:

“It is said eight States have adopted this plan. I declare that if twelve States and a half had adopted it, I would, with manly firmness, and in spite of an erring world, reject it. You are not to inquire how your trade may be increased, nor how you are to become a great and powerful people, but how your liberties can be secured; for liberty ought to be the direct end of your Government. Having premised these things, I shall, with the aid of my judgment and information, which, I confess, are not extensive, go into the discussion of this system more minutely. Is it necessary for your liberty that you should abandon those great rights by the adoption of this system? Is the relinquishment of the trial by jury and the liberty of the press necessary for your liberty? Will the abandonment of your most sacred rights tend to the security of your liberty? Liberty, the greatest of all earthly blessings-give us that precious jewel, and you may take every thing else: But I am fearful I have lived long enough to become an fellow: Perhaps an invincible attachment to the dearest rights of man, may, in these refined, enlightened days, be deemed old fashioned: If so, I am contented to be so: I say, the time has been when every pore of my heart beat for American liberty, and which, I believe, had a counterpart in the breast of every true American: But suspicions have gone forth-suspicions of my integrity-publicly reported that my professions are not real. 23 years ago was I supposed a traitor to my country; I was then said to be the bane of sedition, because I supported the rights of my country: I may be thought suspicious when I say our privileges and rights are in danger.”

One of the more contentious days came on June 24; the Convention was winding down. George Wythe opened the day’s proceedings with a speech in favor of ratifying the Constitution before amending it. Madison followed, emphasizing many of the same themes he and Hamilton and Jay had addressed in The Federalist essays. Just as the elderly Benjamin Franklin had urged his fellow delegates in Philadelphia to quit their bickering and work together for the greater good at, Madison essentially tried to make the same point in Richmond. As to the position that amendments should be added before Virginia ratified, Madison argued that it was unreasonable. He didn’t think it was reasonable to expect the other states (eight of them) to retract their unconditional ratifications in order to accommodate Virginia’s demand that the Constitution be first amended, and particularly to include a Bill of Rights. Up until that point, Madison had remained relatively quiet at the Convention. And even when he spoke, he came across as meek. But he was never one to project very well. When he spoke on the 24th, it was in a strained, quiet tone. But he spoke articulately and rationally, and he addressed the many concerns of the anti-Federalists.

When he concluded, he yielded the floor to Henry. From Gutzman’s book:

An account given by Federalist Archibald Stuart proves the point. Henry concluded his speech by calling attention to ‘the awful dangers” attendant upon their vote. “I see beings of a higher order, Henry thundered, “anxious concerning our decision.”  “Our own happiness alone is not affected by the event – All nations are interested in the determination. We have it in our power to secure the happiness of one half of the human race….”    [James Madison and the Making of America, pg. 233]

The Convention was getting ready to take a vote when an obscure delegate endorsed Patrick Henry’s call for a list of amendments. “The delegate said that he could not vote for ratification until he was assured that amendments protecting Virginians’ historic rights would be recommended. Madison answered that he would not oppose any ‘safe’ amendments (but continued to assert that he believed it unnecessary, and perhaps even dangerous.’” [Ibid, pg. 235]

Ultimately, on June 25, the delegates voted against first proposing amendments to the other states prior to Virginia’s ratification (ie, having the other states recall their unconditional ratification and re-consider ratification after amendments were added) and voted 89-79 in favor of ratification, with proposed amendments.  On June 27, the Convention adopted a set of 40 proposed amendments. A committee, headed by law professor George Wythe, drafted the amendments – 20 enumerated individual rights (Bill of Rights) and the other 20 enumerated states’ rights. The amendments were forwarded to the Confederation Congress. [Virginia’s Ratification is provided in the Appendix at the end of this article. Take note of its Bill of Rights – it includes a “Resumption Clause”].

While there were delegates at several conventions who supported an “amendments before” approach to ratification, it soon shifted to an “amendments after” for the sake of trying to hold the Union together. Ultimately, only North Carolina and Rhode Island waited for amendments from Congress before ratifying.

Four days prior to the conclusion of the Virginia Convention, on June 21, 1788, New Hampshire ratified the Constitution. What makes that date special is that when New Hampshire ratified, with its 12 proposed amendments, the required number of state ratifications, according to Article VII of the Constitution, had been met to establish the Constitution. [Article VII – “The ratification of the conventions of nine states, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the states so ratifying the same.”} The Constitution would become operational. A new union (comprised of those states that had ratified) was created and the new frame of government would be established.

The New York ratification convention met on June 17, 1788, while the Virginia Convention was still debating ratification. As with Virginia, a majority of its 67 delegates were anti-Federalists. (The New York Convention would last over month – from June 17 until July 26). On the opening day, the anti-Federalists, led by Governor Clinton, clamored for a Bill of Rights and fought to preserve the autonomy of the state against what it believed were actual and potential federal encroachments. Hamilton (the only NY delegate to the Philadelphia Convention to sign the Constitution) and the Federalists, on the other hand, contended that a stronger central government would provide a solid base from which New York could grow and prosper. While the debates were contentious, the Federalists were ultimately successful and on July 26, the Constitution was ratified by a very slim margin, 30-27, but with 25 Bill of Rights and 31 proposed amendments. The Convention also voted to call for a second federal convention.  [New York’s Ratification is provided in the Appendix at the end of this article. Take note of its Bill of Rights – it includes a “Resumption Clause”].

On September 13, 1788, the Articles of Confederation Congress certified that the new Constitution had been ratified by more than enough states for the new system to be implemented and directed the new government to meet in New York City on the first Wednesday in March the following year. On March 4, 1789, the new frame of government came into force with eleven of the thirteen states participating – and without a Bill of Rights.

Opposition to the new Constitution among leading Virginians lingered. It would continue to be a thorn in James Madison’s ass…  the man who deceived the states into sending delegates to Philadelphia believing they were tasked with proposing amendments to the Articles of Confederation (when all along, he wanted them to take up the issue of an all-new scheme of government – his scheme, the “Virginia Plan”), the man who thought his scheme had finally been realized, and the man who supposedly held that “not a letter of the Constitution” should be altered.

After Virginia’s ratification and New York’s ratification, the future of the Constitution, as ratified, was not certain.  New York wanted to call another federal convention (to amend the new Constitution?  To get rid of the new Constitution?) and several powerful Virginians, with Patrick Henry taking the lead, seemed likely to move for the same.

As fate would have it, Madison set his sights on the US Senate. But there was one problem for him – the Constitution (pre-17th Amendment) empowered the state legislatures to elect senators, but the VA state legislature (VA General Assembly) was comprised of many enemies he had made in his efforts to deceive the states at the Philadelphia Convention, to write the Constitution, and to secure its ratification, including the great Patrick Henry. And Henry and his fellow anti-Federalists got the chance to get even: in its selection of Senators,  the legislature chose Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson.

Both Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson agreed with Patrick Henry that the Constitution should have been amended to include a Bill of Rights (at the least) before it was ratified. Both, it seems, would favor a second convention.

Madison, at this point, was warming somewhat to the notion of amendments, but it’s not sure if he was warming because he agreed that a Bill of Rights is essential to limit powers of government or if he was just nervous that the issue might be the one to sink his Constitution. One thing is for certain though, he would have rather the Constitution be amended by the first option in Article V (amendments proposed by Congress and then sent to the states for adoption) than by a second convention (the second option in Article V; a convention of states). Kevin Gutzman addressed this in his book:

For one thing, some states would oppose a convention so strongly that they would reflexively oppose any amendment it might propose. For another, it would be easier to have Congress propose amendments than to follow the process in Article V of the Constitution for convening another meeting like the one at Philadelphia. Finally, another convention would include members with extreme views on both ends of the political spectrum, enflame the public mind, and produce nothing conductive to the general good. He had seen how the first convention had worked, and he did not want to hazard a second – which, too, would undermine the impression of the American republic’s stability left in European capitals by the success of the recent ratification campaign.  [James Madison and the Making of America, pg. 241]

Defeated in his bid for the US Senate, Madison decided to stand for the House of Representatives. But again, he would be at the mercy of his nemesis, Patrick Henry. Henry wielded power in the General Assembly, and that power included the ability to draw congressional districts. To spite Madison, he helped draw a map that put Montpelier (Madison’s home) in the same district as James Monroe’s house. In the Richmond Convention, Monroe had aligned himself with Henry, Mason, and Grayson and had voted “nay” on the vote for ratification. “Because Monroe had been an authentic hero in the revolution – suffering a significant wound in Washington’s great victory at Trenton – and had established a respectable legislative record in both Virginia and in the Congress of the Confederation, his opposition would be formidable.” [Ibid, pg. 241]

Madison campaigned against Monroe, and due to the contentious issue of the Constitution lacking a Bill of Rights, Madison softened on the issue of adding amendments. Perhaps all the letters that Jefferson sent him at this time emphasizing the need for a Bill of Rights had something to do with it.  “If pursued with a proper moderation and in a proper mode [meaning that the First Congress would propose amendments for the states’ approval, per Article V], they would serve the double purpose of satisfying the minds of well-meaning opponents and of providing additional guards in favor of liberty.”  [Ibid, pg. 242].  Taking Madison at his word and believing him to be a man of his word, voters selected him over Monroe for the US House of Representatives.

On March 4, 1789, the first US Congress was seated, in New York City’s Federal Hall. The first thing to do was to organize itself. On April 1, the House of Representatives elected its officers, and the Senate did the same on April 6. Also on the 6th, the House and Senate met in joint session and counted the Electoral College ballots for the selection of president. George Washington was certified as president (having been unanimously selected) and John Adams as vice president.

On April 30, 1789, George Washington was inaugurated as the nation’s first president, also at Federal Hall, delivering the Inaugural Address that James Madison had written for him. In that message, Washington addressed the subject of amending the Constitution. He urged the legislators:

“Whilst you carefully avoid every alteration which might endanger the benefits of an united and effective government, or which ought to await the future lessons of experience; a reverence for the characteristic rights of freemen, and a regard for public harmony, will sufficiently influence your deliberations on the question, how far the former can be impregnably fortified or the latter be safely and advantageously promoted…..”

Madison knew that as long as the concerns of the anti-Federalists regarding the Constitution remained unaddressed, the threat of a new convention would remain, and so he would take the initiative to propose amendments (comprising a Bill of Rights) himself.  By taking the initiative to propose amendments himself through the Congress, he hoped to preempt a second constitutional convention that might, it was feared, undo  the difficult compromises of 1787, and open the entire Constitution to reconsideration, thus risking the dissolution of the new federal government. Writing to Jefferson, he stated, “The friends of the Constitution, some from an approbation of particular amendments, others from a spirit of conciliation, are generally agreed that the System should be revised. But they wish the revisal to be carried no farther than to supply additional guards for liberty.” He also felt that amendments guaranteeing personal liberties would “give to the Government its due popularity and stability.” Finally, he hoped that the amendments “would acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion.” [Historians continue to debate the degree to which Madison considered the amendments of the Bill of Rights necessary, and to what degree he considered them politically expedient; in the outline of his address, he wrote, “Bill of Rights—useful—not essential—”].  (see Wikipedia)

On June 8, Madison introduced a series of Constitutional amendments in the House of Representatives for consideration. Among his proposals was one that would have added introductory language stressing natural rights to the Preamble. Another would apply parts of the Bill of Rights to the states as well as the federal government. Several sought to protect individual personal rights by limiting various Constitutional powers of Congress. He urged Congress to keep the revision to the Constitution “a moderate one,” limited to protecting individual rights.

Madison was deeply read in the history of government and used a range of sources in composing the amendments. The English Magna Carta inspired the right to petition and to trial by jury, for example, while the English Bill of Rights of 1689 provided an early draft for the right to keep and bear arms and also for the right against cruel and unusual punishment.

The greatest influence on Madison’s text, however, was existing state constitutions, and especially Virginia’s. Many of his amendments, including his proposed new preamble, were based on the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which were drafted in 1776 by another great nemesis, anti-Federalist George Mason. To reduce future opposition to ratification, Madison also looked for recommendations shared by many states. He did provide one, however, that no state had specifically requested: “No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.” He did not include an amendment that every state had asked for, one that would have made tax assessments voluntary instead of contributions. Madison’s proposed the following constitutional amendments:

First. That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration, that all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.

That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.

Secondly. That in article 1st, section 2, clause 3, these words be struck out, to wit: “The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative, and until such enumeration shall be made;” and in place thereof be inserted these words, to wit: “After the first actual enumeration, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number amounts to—, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that the number shall never be less than—, nor more than—, but each State shall, after the first enumeration, have at least two Representatives; and prior thereto.”

Thirdly. That in article 1st, section 6, clause 1, there be added to the end of the first sentence, these words, to wit: “But no law varying the compensation last ascertained shall operate before the next ensuing election of Representatives.”

Fourthly. That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, be inserted these clauses, to wit: The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.

The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.

The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.

The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well-armed and well-regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.

No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor at any time, but in a manner warranted by law.

No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment, or one trial for the same offence; nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation, to be confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to have a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.

Fifthly. That in article 1st, section 10, between clauses 1 and 2, be inserted this clause, to wit: No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.

Sixthly. That, in article 3d, section 2, be annexed to the end of clause 2d, these words, to wit: But no appeal to such court shall be allowed where the value in controversy shall not amount to — dollars: nor shall any fact triable by jury, according to the course of common law, be otherwise re-examinable than may consist with the principles of common law.

Seventhly. That in article 3d, section 2, the third clause be struck out, and in its place be inserted the clauses following, to wit: The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments, and cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the militia when on actual service, in time of war or public danger) shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed requisites; and in all crimes punishable with loss of life or member, presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall be an essential preliminary, provided that in cases of crimes committed within any county which may be in possession of an enemy, or in which a general insurrection may prevail, the trial may by law be authorized in some other county of the same State, as near as may be to the seat of the offence.

In cases of crimes committed not within any county, the trial may by law be in such county as the laws shall have prescribed. In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate.

Eighthly. That immediately after article 6th, be inserted, as article 7th, the clauses following, to wit: The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the Legislative Department shall never exercise the powers vested in the Executive or Judicial, nor the Executive exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial, nor the Judicial exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Executive Departments.

The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively.

Ninthly. That article 7th, be numbered as article 8th.

[References:  See the Appendix, at the end of this article, for James Madison’s Speech in the House of Representatives, June 8, 1789, proposing a Bill of Rights, and also see Wikipedia: “United States Bill of Rights”].

The House passed a joint resolution containing 17 amendments based on Madison’s proposal. The Senate changed the joint resolution to consist of 12 amendments and rejected Madison’s suggestions for the Preamble. A joint House and Senate Conference Committee settled remaining disagreements in September. On October 2, 1789, President Washington sent copies of the 12 amendments adopted by Congress to the states. Again, the states would have to call up conventions – this time to debate and ratify the proposed amendments.

In the meantime, North Carolina finally ratified the Constitution, 194-77, with 20 Bill of Rights and 21 proposed amendments. She remained true to her principles – that she would not ratify a constitution without a Bill of Rights included.  Note that while North Carolina was second to last to ratify the Constitution, she was third to ratify the Bill of Rights, on December 22, 1789).

On December 15, Virginia was the eleventh state to adopt the amendments. Having been adopted by the requisite three-fourths of the several states (there being 14 States in the Union at the time, as Vermont had been admitted into the Union on March 4, 1791), the ratification of Articles Three through Twelve was completed and they became Amendments 1 through 10 of the Constitution – also known as our US Bill of Rights. President Washington informed Congress of this on January 18, 1792.

The original First and Second amendments fell short of the required 3/4 majority to make it into the Constitution, but interestingly, the original proposed second amendment (which addressed when Congress can change its pay) finally was adopted in 1992 to become our last amendment, the 27th amendment.

Note that the US Bill of Rights applies only to action by the federal government. It places limits only on its power. As most of you may know from your state constitutions, states have included similar guarantees of liberty of their own. Article I of the North Carolina State Constitution, for example, lists the NC Bill of Rights. The 14th Amendment has been mis-applied to incorporate all guarantees of rights and privileges on the states, and in fact, the 14th amendment, even though it was never constitutionally ratified, is the number one basis for all constitutional challenges.

It is a shame that the cartoon depiction of the Bill of Rights attached leaves off the 9th and 10th Amendments. The 9th Amendment states that the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. And the 10th Amendment states that all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the states or to the people. These amendments underscore the unique foundation of American liberty – that government is not the ultimate sovereign and individuals enjoy only those rights and privileges the government is generous enough to grant them. In America, rights are endowed on each individual by the Creator, inseparable from our very humanity, and government power derives from the natural and inherent right of each person to govern himself and to protect himself, his family, and his property. This is the concept of Individual Sovereignty referred to in the Declaration of Independence, the document that provides the foundational principles, the rights, and expectations for each State in this Union (despite what the federal government might say). It is the document that recognized each state as an independent sovereign for the world to take note; it is the document for which the Treaty of Paris of 1783 addressed to end the war for American Independence. The treaty included this provision: “Britain acknowledges the United States (New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia[15]) to be free, sovereign, and independent states…..

James Madison wrote: “In Europe, charters of liberty have been granted by power. America has set the example … of charters of power granted by liberty. This revolution in the practice of the world, may, with an honest praise, be pronounced the most triumphant epoch of its history, and the most consoling presage of its happiness.”

I urge everyone to take time today and read the Bill of Rights and understand what each guarantees and why. After all, they protect your most essential liberty rights.

 

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References:

Kevin R.C. Gutzman, James Madison and the Making of America; St. Martin’s Press (NY), 2012.

Gordon Lloyd, “The Bill of Rights,” Teaching American History. Referenced at:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/bor/roots-chart/

The Six Stages of Ratification – Stage III: Winter in New England: Postpone and Compromise (Massachusetts – February 6, 1788 and New Hampshire (postpones) – February 24, 1788) –http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/stagethree/

Report of the House Select Committee, July 28, 1789 –  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/report-of-the-house-select-committee/

House Debates Select Committee Report, August 13-24, 1789 –  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/house-debates-select-committee-report/

Ratification of the Constitution, State-by-State –  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/overview/

US Constitution, Virginia’s Ratification, from the Library of Congress (from its copy of Elliot’s Debates) –   https://www.usconstitution.net/rat_va.html

Day-to-Day Summary of the Virginia Ratifying Convention  –   http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/virginiatimeline/   OR  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/virginia/

US Constitution, New York’s Ratification, from the Library of Congress (from its copy of Elliot’s Debates) – https://www.usconstitution.net/rat_ny.html

Day-to-Day Summary of the New York Ratifying Convention  –  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/newyorktimeline/     OR:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/newyork/

The Debates in the Several State Ratifying Conventions (Elliott’s Debates) – http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/elliot/   [On this site, you can click on links for the following state conventions and it will bring you to calendars so you can see what they did on a day-by-day basis: Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina]

James Madison Proposes a Bill of Rights to Congress, June 8, 1789) – http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/madison-speech-proposing-the-bill-of-rights-june-8-1789.php

United States Bill of Rights,” Wikipedia.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Bill_of_Rights

Patrick Henry’s Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 8, 1788 – http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-anti-federalist-papers/speech-of-patrick-henry-(june-5-1788).php

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, dated December 20, 1787, Founders Online –  https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0454

Chart: Approval of the Bill of Rights in Congress and the States — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Bill_of_Rights

 

APPENDIX #1  (Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, dated December 20, 1787, on the topic of the new Constitution and the lack of a Bill of Rights)

“…….I have little to fill a letter. I will therefore make up the deficiency by adding a few words on the Constitution proposed by our Convention. I like much the general idea of framing a government which should go on of itself peaceably, without needing continual recurrence to the state legislatures. I like the organization of the government into Legislative, Judiciary and Executive. I like the power given the Legislature to levy taxes; and for that reason solely approve of the greater house being chosen by the people directly. For though I think a house chosen by them will be very ill-qualified to legislate for the Union, for foreign nations etc. yet this evil does not weigh against the good of preserving inviolate the fundamental principle that the people are not to be taxed but by representatives chosen immediately by themselves. I am captivated by the compromise of the opposite claims of the great and little states, of the latter to equal, and the former to proportional influence. I am much pleased too with the substitution of the method of voting by persons, instead of that of voting by states….  There are other good things of less moment. I will now add what I do not like. First the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly and without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the laws of the land and not by the law of Nations. To say, as Mr. Wilson does that a bill of rights was not necessary because all is reserved in the case of the general government which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given which is not reserved might do for the Audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present confederation which had declared that in express terms. It was a hard conclusion to say because there has been no uniformity among the states as to the cases triable by jury, because some have been so incautious as to abandon this mode of trial, therefore the more prudent states shall be reduced to the same level of calamity. It would have been much more just and wise to have concluded the other way that as most of the states had judiciously preserved this palladium, those who had wandered should be brought back to it, and to have established general right instead of general wrong. Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference……”

[Reference:  https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0454 ]

 

APPENDIX #2  (James Madison’s Speech in Congress, June 8, 1789, proposing a Bill of Rights)

I am sorry to be accessary to the loss of a single moment of time by the house. If I had been indulged in my motion, and we had gone into a committee of the whole, I think we might have rose, and resumed the consideration of other business before this time; that is, so far as it depended on what I proposed to bring forward. As that mode seems not to give satisfaction, I will withdraw the motion, and move you, sir, that a select committee be appointed to consider and report such amendments as are proper for Congress to propose to the legislatures of the several States, conformably to the 5th article of the constitution.

I will state my reasons why I think it proper to propose amendments; and state the amendments themselves, so far as I think they ought to be proposed. If I thought I could fulfil the duty which I owe to myself and my constituents, to let the subject pass over in silence, I most certainly should not trespass upon the indulgence of this house. But I cannot do this; and am therefore compelled to beg a patient hearing to what I have to lay before you. And I do most sincerely believe that if congress will devote but one day to this subjects, so far as to satisfy the public that we do not disregard their wishes, it will have a salutary influence on the public councils, and prepare the way for a favorable reception of our future measures.

It appears to me that this house is bound by every motive of prudence, not to let the first session pass over without proposing to the state legislatures some things to be incorporated into the constitution, as will render it as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as it has been found acceptable to a majority of them. I wish, among other reasons why something should be done, that those who have been friendly to the adoption of this constitution, may have the opportunity of proving to those who were opposed to it, that they were as sincerely devoted to liberty and a republican government, as those who charged them with wishing the adoption of this constitution in order to lay the foundation of an aristocracy or despotism. It will be a desirable thing to extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community any apprehensions, that there are those among his countrymen who wish to deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly fought and honorably bled. And if there are amendments desired, of such a nature as will not injure the constitution, and they can be ingrafted so as to give satisfaction to the doubting part of our fellow citizens; the friends of the federal government will evince that spirit of deference and concession for which they have hitherto been distinguished.

It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this house, that, notwithstanding the ratification of this system of government by eleven of the thirteen United States, in some cases unanimously, in others by large majorities; yet still there is a great number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it; among whom are many respectable for their talents, their patriotism, and respectable for the jealousy they have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its motive. There is a great body of the people falling under this description, who as present feel much inclined to join their support to the cause of federalism, if they were satisfied in this one point: We ought not to disregard their inclination, but, on principles of amity and moderation, conform to their wishes, and expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this constitution. The acquiescence which our fellow citizens shew under the government, calls upon us for a like return of moderation. But perhaps there is a stronger motive than this for our going into a consideration of the subject; it is to provide those securities for liberty which are required by a part of the community. I allude in a particular manner to those two states who have not thought fit to throw themselves into the bosom of the confederacy: it is a desirable thing, on our part as well as theirs, that a re-union should take place as soon as possible. I have no doubt, if we proceed to take those steps which would be prudent and requisite at this juncture, that in a short time we should see that disposition prevailing in those states that are not come in, that we have seen prevailing [in] those states which are.

But I will candidly acknowledge, that, over and above all these considerations, I do conceive that the constitution may be amended; that is to say, if all power is subject to abuse, that then it is possible the abuse of the powers of the general government may be guarded against in a more secure manner than is now done, while no one advantage, arising from the exercise of that power, shall be damaged or endangered by it. We have in this way something to gain, and, if we proceed with caution, nothing to lose; and in this case it is necessary to proceed with caution; for while we feel all these inducements to go into a revisal of the constitution, we must feel for the constitution itself, and make that revisal a moderate one. I should be unwilling to see a door opened for a re-consideration of the whole structure of the government, for a re-consideration of the principles and the substance of the powers given; because I doubt, if such a door was opened, if we should be very likely to stop at that point which would be safe to the government itself: But I do wish to see a door opened to consider, so far as to incorporate those provisions for the security of rights, against which I believe no serious objection has been made by any class of our constituents, such as would be likely to meet with the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses, and the approbation of three-fourths of the state legislatures. I will not propose a single alteration which I do not wish to see take place, as intrinsically proper in itself, or proper because it is wished for by a respectable number of my fellow citizens; and therefore I shall not propose a single alteration but is likely to meet the concurrence required by the constitution.

There have been objections of various kinds made against the constitution: Some were levelled against its structure, because the president was without a council; because the senate, which is a legislative body, had judicial powers in trials on impeachments; and because the powers of that body were compounded in other respects, in a manner that did not correspond with a particular theory; because it grants more power than is supposed to be necessary for every good purpose; and controls the ordinary powers of the state governments. I know some respectable characters who opposed this government on these grounds; but I believe that the great mass of the people who opposed it, disliked it because it did not contain effectual provision against encroachments on particular rights, and those safeguards which they have been long accustomed to have interposed between them and the magistrate who exercised the sovereign power: nor ought we to consider them safe, while a great number of our fellow citizens think these securities necessary.

It has been a fortunate thing that the objection to the government has been made on the ground I stated; because it will be practicable on that ground to obviate the objection, so far as to satisfy the public mind that their liberties will be perpetual, and this without endangering any part of the constitution, which is considered as essential to the existence of the government by those who promoted its adoption.

The amendments which have occurred to me, proper to be recommended by congress to the state legislatures are these:

First. That there be prefixed to the constitution a declaration–That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from the people. That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.

Secondly. That in article 2st. section 2, clause 3, these words be struck out, to wit, “The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative, and until such enumeration shall be made.” And that in place thereof be inserted these words, to wit, “After the first actual enumeration, there shall be one representative for every thirty thousand, until the number amount to after which the proportion shall be so regulated by congress, that the number shall never be less than nor more than but each state shall after the first enumeration, have at least two representatives; and prior thereto.”

Thirdly. That in article 2st, section 6, clause 1, there be added to the end of the first sentence, these words, to wit, “But no law varying the compensation last ascertained shall operate before the next ensuing election of representatives.”

Fourthly. That in article 2st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, be inserted these clauses, to wit, The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience by in any manner, or on any pretext infringed.

The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.

The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good, nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.

The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well-armed, and well-regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.

No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor at any time, but in a manner warranted by law.

No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment, or one trial for the same office; nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation, to be confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to have a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.

Fifthly. That in article 2st, section 10, between clauses 1 and 2, be inserted this clause, to wit:

No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.

Sixthly. That article 3d, section 2, be annexed to the end of clause 2d, these words to wit: but no appeal to such court shall be allowed where the value in controversy shall not amount to___dollars: nor shall any fact triable by jury, according to the course of common law, be otherwise re-examinable than may consist with the principles of common law.

Seventhly. That in article 3d, section 2, the third clause be struck out, and in its place be inserted the classes following, to wit:

The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments, and cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the militia when on actual service in time of war or public danger) shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed requisites; and in all crimes punishable with loss of life or member, presentment or indictment by a grand jury, shall be an essential preliminary, provided that in cases of crimes committed within any county which may be in possession of an enemy, or in which a general insurrection may prevail, the trial may by law be authorized in some other county of the same state, as near as may be to the seat of the offence.

In cases of crimes committed not within any county, the trial may by law be in such county as the laws shall have prescribed. In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate.

Eighthly. That immediately after article 6th, be inserted, as article 7th, the clauses following, to wit:

The powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial; nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.

The powers not delegated by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively.

Ninthly. That article 7th, be numbered as article 8th.  The first of these amendments, relates to what may be called a Bill of Rights; I will own that I never considered this provision so essential to the federal constitution, as to make it improper to ratify it, until such an amendment was added; at the same time, I always conceived, that in a certain form and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither improper nor altogether useless. I am aware, that a great number of the most respectable friends to the government and champions for republican liberty, have thought such a provision, not only unnecessary, but even improper, nay, I believe some have gone so far as to think it even dangerous. Some policy has been made use of perhaps by gentlemen on both sides of the question: I acknowledge the ingenuity of those arguments which were drawn against the constitution, by a comparison with the policy of Great Britain, in establishing a declaration of rights; but there is too great a difference in the case to warrant the comparison: therefore the arguments drawn from that source, were in a great measure inapplicable. In the declaration of rights which that country has established, the truth is, they have gone no farther, than to raise a barrier against the power of the crown; the power of the legislature is left altogether indefinite. Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience, came in question in that body, the invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respecting which, the people of America are most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the British constitution.

But although the case may be widely different, and it may not be thought necessary to provide limits for the legislative power in that country, yet a different opinion prevails in the United States. The people of many states, have thought it necessary to raise barriers against power in all forms and departments of government, and I am inclined to believe, if once bills of rights are established in all the states as well as the federal constitution, we shall find the although some of them are rather unimportant, yet, upon the whole, they will have a salutary tendency.

It may be said, in some instances they do no more than state the perfect equality of mankind; this to be sure is an absolute truth, yet it is not absolutely necessary to be inserted at the head of a constitution.

In some instances they assert those rights which are exercised by the people in forming and establishing a plan of government. In other instances, they specify those rights which are retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the legislature. In other instances, they specify positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of the compact. Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from the social compact which regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature. In other instances they lay down dogmatic maxims with respect to the construction of the government; declaring, that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches shall be kept separate and distinct: Perhaps the best way of securing this in practice is to provide such checks, as will prevent the encroachment of the one upon the other.

But whatever may be [the] form which the several states have adopted in making declarations in favor of particular rights, the great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode. They point these exceptions sometimes against the abuse of the executive power, sometimes against the legislative, and, in some cases, against the community itself; or, in other words, against the majority in favor of the minority.

In our government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard against the abuse in the executive department than any other; because it is not the stronger branch of the system, but the weaker: It therefore must be levelled against the legislative, for it is the most powerful, and most likely to be abused, because it is under the least control; hence, so far as a declaration of rights can tend to prevent the exercise of undue power, it cannot be doubted but such declaration is proper. But I confess that I do conceive, that in a government modified like this of the United States, the great danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be levelled against that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of power: But this [is] not found in either the executive or legislative departments of government, but in the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority.

It may be thought all paper barriers against the power of the community are too weak to be worthy of attention. I am sensible they are not so strong as to satisfy gentlemen of every description who have seen and examined thoroughly the texture of such a defense; yet, as they have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community, it may be one mean to control the majority from those acts to which they might be otherwise inclined.

It has been said by way of objection to a bill of rights, by many respectable gentlemen out of doors, and I find opposition on the same principles likely to be made by gentlemen on this floor, that they are unnecessary articles of a republican government, upon the presumption that the people have those rights in their own hands, and that is the proper place for them to rest. It would be a sufficient answer to say that this objection lies against such provisions under the state governments as well as under the general government; and there are, I believe, but few gentlemen who are inclined to push their theory so far as to say that a declaration of rights in those cases is either ineffectual or improper.

It has been said that in the federal government they are unnecessary, because the powers are enumerated, and it follows that all that are not granted by the constitution are retained: that the constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of the people; and therefore a bill of rights cannot be so necessary as if the residuum was thrown into the hands of the government. I admit that these arguments are not entirely without foundation; but they are not conclusive to the extent which has been supposed. It is true the powers of the general government are circumscribed; they are directed to particular objects; but even if government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the same manner as the powers of the state governments under their constitutions may to an indefinite extent; because in the constitution of the United States there is a clause granting to Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof; this enables them to fulfil every purpose for which the government was established. Now, may not laws be considered necessary and proper by Congress, for it is them who are to judge of the necessity and propriety to accomplish those special purposes which they may have in contemplation, which laws in themselves are neither necessary or proper; as well as improper laws could be enacted by the state legislatures, for fulfilling the more extended objects of those governments. I will state an instance which I think in point, and proves that this might be the case. The general government has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the direction of the legislature: may not general warrants be considered necessary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was supposed at the framing of their constitutions the state governments had in view. If there was reason for restraining the state governments from exercising this power, there is like reason for restraining the federal government.

It may be said, because it has been said, that a Bill of Rights is not necessary, because the establishment of this government has not repealed those declarations of rights which are added to the several state constitutions: that those rights of the people, which had been established by the most solemn act, could not be annihilated by a subsequent act of the people, who meant, and declared at the head of the instrument, that they ordained and established a new system, for the express purpose of securing to themselves and posterity the liberties they had gained by an arduous conflict.

I admit the force of this observation, but I do not look upon it to be conclusive. In the first place, it is too uncertain ground to leave this provision upon, if a provision is at all necessary to secure rights so important as many of those I have mentioned are conceived to be, by the public in general, as well as those in particular who opposed the adoption of this constitution. Beside some states have no bills of rights, there are others provided with very defective ones, and there are others whose bills of rights are not only defective, but absolutely improper; instead of securing some in the full extent which republican principles would require, they limit them too much to agree with the common ideas of liberty.

It has been objected also against a Bill of Rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration, and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the general government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution.

It has been said, that it is necessary to load the constitution with this provision, because it was not found effectual in the constitution of the particular states. It is true, there are a few particular states in which some of the most valuable articles have not, at one time or other, been violated; but does it not follow but they may have, to a certain degree, a salutary effect against the abuse of power. If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights. Beside this security, there is a great probability that such a declaration in the federal system would be enforced; because the state legislatures will jealously and closely watch the operation of this government, and be able to resist with more effect every assumption of power than any other power on earth can do; and the greatest opponents to a federal government admit the state legislatures to be sure guardians of the people’s liberty. I conclude from this view of the subject, that it will be proper in itself, and highly politic, for the tranquility of the public mind, and the stability of the government, that we should offer something, in the form I have proposed, to be incorporated in the system of government, as a Declaration of the Rights of the people.

In the next place I wish to see that part of the constitution revised which declares, that the number of representatives shall not exceed the proportion of one for every thirty thousand persons, and allows one representative to every state which rates below that proportion. If we attend to the discussion of this subject, which has taken place in the state conventions, and even in the opinion of the friends to the constitution, an alteration here is proper. It is the sense of the people of America, that the number of representatives ought to be increased, but particularly that it should not be left in the discretion of the government to diminish them, below that proportion which certainly is in the power of the legislature as the constitution now stands; and they may, as the population of the country increases, increase the house of representatives to a very unwieldy degree. I confess I always thought this part of the constitution defective, though not dangerous; and that it ought to be particularly attended to whenever congress should go into the consideration of amendments.

There are several lesser cases enumerated in my proposition, in which I wish also to see some alteration take place. That article which leaves it in the power of the legislature to ascertain its own emolument is one to which I allude. I do not believe this is a power which, in the ordinary course of government, is likely to be abused, perhaps of all the powers granted, it is least likely to abuse; but there is a seeming impropriety in leaving any set of men without control to put their hand into the public coffers, to take out money to put in their pockets; there is a seeming indecorum in such power, which leads me to propose a change. We have a guide to this alteration in several of the amendments which the different conventions have proposed. I have gone therefore so far as to fix it, that no law, varying the compensation, shall operate until there is a change in the legislature; in which case it cannot be for the particular benefit of those who are concerned in determining the value of the service.

I wish also, in revising the constitution, we may throw into that section, which interdicts the abuse of certain powers in the state legislatures, some other provisions of equal if not greater importance than those already made. The words, “No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, etc.” were wise and proper restrictions in the constitution. I think there is more danger of those powers being abused by the state governments than by the government of the United States. The same may be said of other powers which they possess, if not controlled by the general principle, that laws are unconstitutional which infringe the rights of the community. I should therefore wish to extend this interdiction, and add, as I have stated in the 5th resolution, that no state shall violate the equal right of conscience, freedom of the press, or trial by jury in criminal cases; because it is proper that every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights. I know in some of the state constitutions the power of the government is controlled by such a declaration, but others are not. I cannot see any reason against obtaining even a double security on those points; and nothing can give a more sincere proof of the attachment of those who opposed this constitution to these great and important rights, than to see them join in obtaining the security I have now proposed; because it must be admitted, on all hands, that the state governments are as liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the general government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against.

I think it will be proper, with respect to the judiciary powers, to satisfy the public mind on those points which I have mentioned. Great inconvenience has been apprehended to suitors from the distance they would be dragged to obtain justice in the supreme court of the United States, upon an appeal on an action for a small debt. To remedy this, declare, that no appeal shall be made unless the matter in controvers amounts to a particular sum:

This, with the regulations respecting jury trials in criminal cases, and suits at common law, it is to be hoped will quiet and reconcile the minds of the people to that part of the constitution.

I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the state conventions, that several are particularly anxious that it should be declared in the Constitution, that the powers not therein delegated, should be reserved to the several states. Perhaps words which may define this more precisely, than the whole of the instrument now does, may be considered as superfluous. I admit they may be deemed unnecessary; but there can be no harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as stated. I am sure I understand it so, and do therefore propose it.

These are the points on which I wish to see a revision of the Constitution take place. How far they will accord with the sense of this body, I cannot take upon me absolutely to determine; but I believe every gentlemen will readily admit that nothing is in contemplation, so far as I have mentioned, that can endanger the beauty of the government in any one important feature, even in the eyes of its most sanguine admirers. I have proposed nothing that does not appear to me as proper in itself, or eligible as patronized by a respectable number of our fellow citizens; and if we can make the constitution better in the opinion of those who are opposed to it, without weakening its frame, or abridging its usefulness, in the judgment of those who are attached to it, we act the part of wise and liberal men to make such alterations as shall produce that effect.

Having done what I conceived was my duty, in bringing before this house the subject of amendments, and also stated such as wish for and approve, and offered the reasons which occurred to me in their support; I shall content myself for the present with moving, that a committee be appointed to consider of and report such amendments as ought to be proposed by congress to the legislatures of the states, to become, if ratified by three-fourths thereof, part of the Constitution of the United States. By agreeing to this motion, the subject may be going on in the committee, while other important business is proceeding to a conclusion in the house. I should advocate greater dispatch in the business of amendments, if I was not convinced of the absolute necessity there is of pursuing the organization of the government; because I think we should obtain the confidence of our fellow citizens, in proportion as we fortify the rights of the people against the encroachments of the government.

[Reference:  http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/madison-speech-proposing-the-bill-of-rights-june-8-1789.php ]

 

APPENDIX #3  (STATE RATIFICATIONS):

I.  NEW YORK RATIFICATION (on July 26, 1788), with 25 Bill of Rights:

WE the Delegates of the People of the State of New York, duly elected and Met in Convention, having maturely considered the Constitution for the United States of America, agreed to on the seventeenth day of September, in the year One thousand Seven hundred and Eighty seven, by the Convention then assembled at Philadelphia in the Common—wealth of Pennsylvania (a Copy whereof precedes these presents) and having also seriously and deliberately considered the present situation of the United States, Do declare and make known.

— That all Power is originally vested in and consequently derived from the People, and that Government is instituted by them for their common Interest Protection and Security.

—  That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness are essential rights which every Government ought to respect and preserve.

—  That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the People, whensoever it shall become necessary to their Happiness; that every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People of the several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they may have granted the same; And that those Clauses in the said Constitution, which declare, that Congress shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any Powers not given by the said Constitution; but such Clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified Powers, or as inserted merely for greater Caution.  [Note:  This provision, or condition is known as a “RESUMPTION CLAUSE.”  This condition to ratification, as the states of Virginia and Rhode Island also exercised this condition, is critical to understanding the reserved right of a state to secede from the Union].

—  That the People have an equal, natural and unalienable right, freely and peaceably to Exercise their Religion according to the dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society ought to be favored or established by Law in preference of others.

—  That the People have a right to keep and bear Arms; that a well-regulated Militia, including the body of the People capable of bearing Arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free State;

—  That the Militia should not be subject to Martial Law except in time of War, Rebellion or Insurrection.

—  That standing Armies in time of Peace are dangerous to Liberty, and ought not to be kept up, except in Cases of necessity; and that at all times, the Military should be under strict Subordination to the civil Power.

—  That in time of Peace no Soldier ought to be quartered in any House without the consent of the Owner, and in time of War only by the Civil Magistrate in such manner as the Laws may direct.

—  That no Person ought to be taken imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, or be exiled or deprived of his Privileges, Franchises, Life, Liberty or Property but by due process of Law.

—  That no Person ought to be put twice in Jeopardy of Life or Limb for one and the same Offence, nor, unless in case of impeachment, be punished more than once for the same Offence.

—  That every Person restrained of his Liberty is entitled to an enquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof if unlawful, and that such enquiry and removal ought not to be denied or delayed, except when on account of Public Danger the Congress shall suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

—  That excessive Bail ought not to be required; nor excessive Fines imposed; nor Cruel or unusual Punishments inflicted.

—  That (except in the Government of the Land and Naval Forces, and of the Militia when in actual Service, and in cases of Impeachment) a Presentment or Indictment by a Grand Jury ought to be observed as a necessary preliminary to the trial of all Crimes cognizable by the Judiciary of the United States, and such Trial should be speedy, public, and by an impartial Jury of the County where the Crime was committed; and that no person can be found Guilty without the unanimous consent of such Jury. But in cases of Crimes not committed within any County of any of the United States, and in Cases of Crimes committed within any County in which a general Insurrection may prevail, or which may be in the possession of a foreign Enemy, the enquiry and trial may be in such County as the Congress shall by Law direct; which County in the two Cases last mentioned should be as near as conveniently may be to that County in which the Crime may have been committed. And that in all Criminal Prosecutions, the Accused ought to be informed of the cause and nature of his Accusation, to be confronted with his accusers and the Witnesses against him, to have the means of producing his Witnesses, and the assistance of Council for his defense, and should not be compelled to give Evidence against himself.

—  That the trial by Jury in the extent that it obtains by the Common Law of England is one of the greatest securities to the rights of a free People, and ought to remain inviolate.

—  That every Freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person his papers or his property, and therefore, that all Warrants to search suspected places or seize any Freeman his papers or property, without information upon Oath or Affirmation of sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive; and that all general Warrants (or such in which the place or person suspected are not particularly designated) are dangerous and ought not to be granted.

—  That the People have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for their common good, or to instruct their Representatives; and that every person has a right to Petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of Grievances.

—  That the Freedom of the Press ought not to be violated or restrained.

—  That there should be once in four years an Election of the President and Vice President, so that no Officer who may be appointed by the Congress to act as President in case of the removal, death, resignation or inability of the President and Vice President can in any case continue to act beyond the termination of the period for which the last President and Vice President were elected.

—  That nothing contained in the said Constitution is to be construed to prevent the Legislature of any State from passing Laws at its discretion from time to time to divide such State into convenient Districts, and to apportion its Representatives to and amongst such Districts.

—  That the Prohibition contained in the said Constitution against ex post facto Laws, extends only to Laws concerning Crimes.

—  That all Appeals in Causes determineable according to the course of the common Law, ought to be by Writ of Error and not otherwise.

—  That the Judicial Power of the United States in cases in which a State may be a party, does not extend to criminal Prosecutions, or to authorize any Suit by any Person against a State.

—  That the Judicial Power of the United States as to Controversies between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States is not to be construed to extend to any other Controversies between them except those which relate to such Lands, so claimed under Grants of different States.

—  That the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States, or of any other Court to be instituted by the Congress, is not in any case to be increased enlarged or extended by any Fiction Collusion or mere suggestion;

—  And That no Treaty is to be construed so to operate as to alter the Constitution of any State.

Under these impressions and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot be abridged or violated, and that the Explanations aforesaid are consistent with the said Constitution, And in confidence that the Amendments which shall have been proposed to the said Constitution will receive an early and mature Consideration: We the said Delegates, in the Name and in the behalf of the People of the State of New York Do by these presents Assent to and Ratify the said Constitution. In full Confidence nevertheless that until a Convention shall be called and convened for proposing Amendments to the said Constitution, the Militia of this State will not be continued in Service out of this State for a longer term than six weeks without the Consent of the Legislature thereof; — that the Congress will not make or alter any Regulation in this State respecting the times places and manner of holding Elections for Senators or Representatives unless the Legislature of this State shall neglect or refuse to make Laws or regulations for the purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable of making the same, and that in those cases such power will only be exercised until the Legislature of this State shall make provision in the Premises; — that no Excise will be imposed on any Article of the Growth production or Manufacture of the United States, or any of them within this State, Ardent Spirits excepted; And that the Congress will not lay direct Taxes within this State, but when the Monies arising from the Impost and Excise shall be insufficient for the public Exigencies, nor then, until Congress shall first have made a Requisition upon this State to assess levy and pay the Amount of such Requisition made agreeably to the Census fixed in the said Constitution in such way and manner as the Legislature of this State shall judge best, but that in such case, if the State shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion pursuant to such Requisition, then the Congress may assess and levy this States proportion together with Interest at the Rate of six per Centum per Annum from the time at which the same was required to be paid.

[Reference:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/new-york-ratifies-30-27-with-31-proposed-amendments/ ].

 

II.  VIRGINIA RATIFICATION (June 25, 1788), with 20 Bill of Rights and 20 proposed amendments:

Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia, June 26, 1788. Virginia ratified the Constitution in two steps. The first was the declaration of ratification. The second was a recommendation that a bill of rights be added to the Constitution, and that a list of amendments also be added in accordance with Article 5.  [Reference: https://www.usconstitution.net/rat_va.html ]

Step 1:

WE the Delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pursuance of a recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Convention, having fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and being prepared as well as the most mature deliberation hath enabled us, to decide thereon, DO in the name and in behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will: that therefore no right of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified, by the Congress, by the Senate or House of Representatives acting in any capacity, by the President or any department or officer of the United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes: and that among other essential rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.  [Note:  This provision, or condition is known as a “RESUMPTION CLAUSE.”  This condition to ratification, as the states of New York and Rhode Island also exercised this condition, is critical to understanding the reserved right of a state to secede from the Union].

With these impressions, with a solemn appeal to the searcher of hearts for the purity of our intentions, and under the conviction, that, whatsoever imperfections may exist in the Constitution, ought rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein, than to bring the Union into danger by a delay, with a hope of obtaining amendments previous to the ratification.

Step 2:  Virginia, do by these presents assent to, and ratify the Constitution recommended on the seventeenth day of September, one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven (September 17, 1787), by the Federal Convention for the Government of the United States; hereby announcing to all those whom it may concern, that the said Constitution is binding upon the said People, according to an authentic copy hereto annexed, in the words following:

Wythe reported, from the Committee appointed, such amendments to the proposed Constitution of Government for the United States, as were by them deemed necessary to be recommended to the consideration of the Congress which shall first assemble under the said Constitution, to be acted upon according to the mode prescribed in the fifth article thereof; and he read the same in his place, and afterwards delivered them in at the clerk’s table, where the same were again read, and are as follows:

That there be a Declaration or Bill of Rights asserting and securing from encroachment the essential and unalienable rights of the people in some such manner as the following:

1st. That there are certain natural rights of which men when they form a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life, and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

2d. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates therefore are their trustees, and agents, and at all times amenable to them.

3d. That the Government ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people; and that the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind.

4th. That no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator or judge, or any other public office to be hereditary.

5th. That the legislative, executive and judiciary powers of government should be separate and distinct, and that the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression by feeling and participating the public burthens, they should at fixed periods be reduced to a private station, return into the mass of the people; and the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elections, in which all or any part of the former members to be eligible or ineligible, as the rules of the Constitution of Government, and the laws shall direct.

6th. That elections of Representatives in the legislature ought to be free and frequent, and all men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community, ought to have the right of suffrage: and no aid, charge, tax or fee can be set, rated, or levied upon the people without their own consent, or that of their representatives, so elected, nor can they be bound by any law, to which they have not in like manner assented for the public good.

7th. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws by any authority without the consent of the representatives, of the people in the legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.

8th. That in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence and be allowed counsel in his favor, and to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty (except in the government of the land and naval forces) nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself.

9th. That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, privileges or franchises, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the law of the land.

10th. That every freeman restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy to enquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the same, if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be denied nor delayed.

11th. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is one of the greatest securities to the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.

12th. That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by recourse to the laws for all injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that all establishments, or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive and unjust.

13th. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

14th. That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his papers, and property; all warrants therefore to search suspected places, or seize any freeman, his papers or property, without information upon oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive, and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person without specially naming or describing the place or person, are dangerous and ought not to be granted.

15th. That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common good, or to instruct their representatives; and that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of grievances.

16th. That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated.

17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free state. That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit; and that in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power.

18th. That no soldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in time of war in such manner only as the laws direct.

19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.

20th. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others.

[References:  https://www.usconstitution.net/rat_va.html  and http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/virginia-ratifies-89-79-with-20-proposed-amendments/ ]

 

III.  MASSACUSETTS RATIFICATION (“Conditional Ratification,” February 6, 1788), with 9 proposed amendments:

The Convention have impartially discussed, and fully considered the Constitution for the United States of America, reported to Congress by the Convention of Delegates from the United States of America, and submitted to us by a resolution of the General Court of the said Commonwealth, passed the twenty fifth day of October last past, and acknowledging with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe in affording the People of the United States in the course of his providence an opportunity deliberately and peaceably without fraud or surprise of entering into an explicit and solemn Compact with each other by assenting to and ratifying a New Constitution in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure Domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of Liberty to themselves and their posterity; Do in the name and in behalf of the People of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts assent to and ratify the said Constitution for the United States of America.

And as it is the opinion of this Convention that certain amendments and alterations in the said Constitution would remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of many of the good people of this Commonwealth and more effectually guard against an undue administration of the Federal Government, The Convention do therefore recommend that the following alterations and provisions be introduced into the said Constitution.

First, That it be explicitly declared that all Powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several States to be by them exercised.

Secondly, That there shall be one representative to every thirty thousand persons according to the Census mentioned in the Constitution until the whole number of the Representatives amounts to Two hundred.

Thirdly, That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them by the fourth Section of the first article, but in cases when a State shall neglect or refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned or shall make regulations subversive of the rights of the People to a free and equal representation in Congress agreeably to the Constitution.

Fourthly, That Congress do not lay direct Taxes but when the Monies arising from the Impost and Excise are insufficient for the public exigencies nor then until Congress shall have first made a requisition upon the States to assess levy and pay their respective proportions of such Requisition agreeably to the Census fixed in the said Constitution; in such way and manner as the Legislature of the States shall think best, and in such case if any State shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion pursuant to such requisition then Congress may assess and levy such State’s proportion together with interest thereon at the rate of Six per cent per annum from the time of payment prescribed in such requisition.

Fifthly, That Congress erect no Company of Merchants with exclusive advantages of commerce.

Sixthly, That no person shall be tried for any Crime by which he may incur an infamous punishment or loss of life until he be first indicted by a Grand Jury, except in such cases as may arise in the Government and regulation of the Land and Naval forces.

Seventhly, The Supreme Judicial Federal Court shall have no jurisdiction of Causes between Citizens of different States unless the matter in dispute whether it concerns the realty or personally be of the value of three thousand dollars at the least. nor shall the Federal Judicial Powers extend to any actions between Citizens of different States where the matter in dispute whether it concerns the Realty or personally is not of the value of Fifteen hundred dollars at the least.

Eighthly, In civil actions between Citizens of different States every issue of fact arising in Actions at common law shall be tried by a Jury if the parties or either of them request it.

Ninthly, Congress shall at no time consent that any person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States shall accept of a title of Nobility or any other title or office from any King, prince or Foreign State.

And the Convention do in the name and in behalf of the People of this Commonwealth enjoin it upon their Representatives in Congress at all times until the alterations and provisions aforesaid have been considered agreeably to the Fifth article of the said Constitution to exert all their influence and use all reasonable and legal methods to obtain a ratification of the said alterations and provisions in such manner as is provided in the said Article.

[Reference:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/massachusetts-ratifies-187-168-with-9-proposed-amendments/ ]

 

 IV.  SOUTH CAROLINA RATIFICATION (May 23, 1788), with 5 Declarations and Resolves

And Whereas it is essential to the preservation of the rights reserved to the several states, and the freedom of the people under the operations of a General government that the right of prescribing the manner time and places of holding the Elections to the Federal Legislature, should be forever inseparably annexed to the sovereignty of the several states. This convention doth declare that the same ought to remain to all posterity a perpetual and fundamental right in the local, exclusive of the interference of the General Government except in cases where the Legislatures of the States, shall refuse or neglect to perform and fulfil the same according to the tenor of the said Constitution.

This Convention doth also declare that no Section or paragraph of the said Constitution warrants a Construction that the states do not retain every power not expressly relinquished by them and vested in the General Government of the Union.

Resolved that the general Government of the United States ought never to impose direct taxes, but where the monies arising from the duties, imposts and excise are insufficient for the public exigencies nor then until Congress shall have made a requisition upon the states to Assess levy and pay their respective proportions of such requisitions And in case any state shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion pursuant to such requisition then Congress may assess and levy such state’s proportion together with Interest thereon at the rate of six per centum per annum from the time of payment prescribed by such requisition

Resolved that the third section of the Sixth Article ought to be amended by inserting the word “other” between the words “no” and “religious,”

Resolved that it be a standing instruction to all such delegates as may hereafter be elected to represent this State in the general Government to exert their utmost abilities and influence to effect an Alteration of the Constitution conformably to the foregoing Resolutions.

Done in Convention the twenty third day of May in the year of our Lord One thousand Seven hundred and eighty eight and of the Independence of the United States of America the twelfth

[Reference:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/tansill/ratification-southcarolina/ ]

 

V.  NEW HAMPSHIRE RATIFICATION (June 21, 1788), with 12 proposed amendments:

In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the State of New—Hampshire June the Twenty first 1788.

The Convention having Impartially discussed and fully considered the Constitution for the United States of America, reported to Congress by the Convention of Delegates from the United States of America & submitted to us by a Resolution of the General Court of said State passed the fourteenth Day of December last past and acknowleging with grateful Hearts the goodness of the Supreme ruler of the Universe in affording the People of the United States in the Course of his Providence an Opportunity, deliberately & peaceably without fraud or surprise of entering into an Explicit and solemn compact with each other by assenting to & ratifying a new Constitution in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, Insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to themselves & their Posterity—Do In the Name & behalf of the People of the State of New—Hampshire assent to & ratify the said Constitution for the United States of America. And as it is the Opinion of this Convention that certain amendments & alterations in the said Constitution would remove the fears & quiet the apprehensions of many of the good People of this State & more Effectually guard against an undue Administration of the Federal Government— The Convention do therefore recommend that the following alterations & provisions be introduced into the said Constitution.—

First, That it be Explicitly declared that all Powers not expressly & particularly Delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several States to be, by them Exercised.—

Secondly, That there shall be one Representative to every Thirty thousand Persons according to the Census mentioned in the Constitution, until the whole number of Representatives amount to Two hundred.—

Thirdly, That Congress do not Exercise the Powers vested in them, by the fourth Section of the first Article, but in Cases when a State shall neglect or refuse to make the Regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations Subversive of the rights of the People to a free and equal Representation in Congress. Nor shall Congress in any Case make regulations contrary to a free and equal Representation.—

Fourthly, That Congress do not lay direct Taxes but when the money arising from Impost, Excise and their other resources are insufficient for the Public Exigencies; nor then, untill Congress shall have first made a Requisition upon the States, to Assess, Levy, & pay their respective proportions, of such requisitions agreeably to the Census fixed in the said Constitution in such way & manner as the Legislature of the State shall think best and in such Case if any State shall neglect, then Congress may Assess & Levy such States proportion together with the Interest thereon at the rate of six per Cent per Annum from the Time of payment prescribed in such requisition—

Fifthly. That Congress shall erect no Company of Merchants with exclusive advantages of Commerce.—

Sixthly, That no Person shall be Tried for any Crime by which he may incur an Infamous Punishment, or loss of Life, until he first be indicted by a Grand Jury except in such Cases as may arise in the Government and regulation of the Land & Naval Forces.—

Seventhly, All Common Law Cases between Citizens of different States shall be commenced in the Common Law—Courts of the respective States & no appeal shall be allowed to the Federal Court in such Cases unless the sum or value of the thing in Controversy amount to three Thousand Dollars.—

Eighthly, In Civil Actions between Citizens of different States every Issue of Fact arising in Actions at Common Law shall be Tried by Jury, if the Parties, or either of them request it—

Ninthly, Congress shall at no Time consent that any Person holding an Office of Trust or profit under the United States shall accept any Title of Nobility or any other Title or Office from any King, Prince, or Foreign State.—

Tenth, That no standing Army shall be Kept up in time of Peace unless with the consent of three fourths of the Members of each branch of Congress, nor shall Soldiers in Time of Peace be quartered upon private Houses without the consent—of the Owners.—

Eleventh, Congress shall make no Laws touching Religion, or to infringe the rights of Conscience—

Twelfth, Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion.—

And the Convention Do. In the Name & behalf of the People of this State enjoin it upon their Representatives in Congress, at all Times untill the alterations and provisions aforesaid have been Considered agreeably to the fifth Article of the said Constitution to exert all their Influence & use all reasonable & Legal methods to obtain a ratification of the said alterations & Provisions, in such manner as is provided in the said article—And That the United States in Congress Assembled may have due notice of the assent & Ratification of the said Constitution by this Convention.—It is resolved that the Assent & Ratification aforesaid be engrossed on Parchment, together with the Recommendation & injunction aforesaid & with this Resolution—And that John Sullivan Esquire President of Convention, & John Langdon Esquire President of the State Transmit the same Countersigned by the Secretary of Convention & the Secretary of the State under their hands & Seals to the United States in Congress Assembled.

[Reference:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/new-hampshire-ratifies-57-47-with-12-proposed-amendments/ ]

 

VI.  NORTH CAROLINA RATIFICATION (November 21, 1789), with 20 Bill of Rights:

Resolved, That a Declaration of Rights, asserting and securing from encroachment the great Principles of civil and religious Liberty, and the unalienable Rights of the People, together with Amendments to the most ambiguous and exceptional Parts of the said Constitution of Government, ought to be laid before Congress, and the Convention of the States that shall or may be called for the Purpose of Amending the said Constitution, for their consideration, previous to the Ratification of the Constitution aforesaid, on the part of the State of North Carolina.

Declaration of Rights:

1st. That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life, and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

2d. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from the people; that magistrates therefore are their trustees, and agents, and at all times amenable to them.

3d. That Government ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people; and that the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind.

4th That no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator or judge, or any other public office to be hereditary.

5th. That the legislative, executive and judiciary powers of government should be separate and distinct, and that the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression by feeling and participating the public burthens, they should at fixed periods be reduced to a private station, return into the mass of the people; and the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elections; in which all or any part of the former members to be eligible or ineligible, as the rules of the Constitution of Government, and the laws shall direct.

6th. That elections of Representatives in the legislature ought to be free and frequent, and all men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community, ought to have the right of suffrage: and no aid, charge, tax or fee can be set, rated, or levied upon the people without their own consent, or that of their representatives, so elected, nor can they be bound by any law, to which they have not in like manner assented for the public good.

7th. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws by any authority without the consent of the representatives, of the people in the Legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.

8th. That in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence and be allowed counsel in his favor, and to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty (except in the government of the land and naval forces) nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself.

9th That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, privileges or franchises, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the law of the land.

10th. That every freeman restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy to inquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the same, if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be denied nor delayed.

11th. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is one of the greatest securities to the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.

12th. That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by recourse to the laws for all injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that all establishments, or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive and unjust.

13th. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted

14th. That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his papers, and property: all warrants therefore to search suspected places, or seize any freeman, his papers or property, without information upon oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive, and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person without specially naming or describing the place or person, are dangerous and ought not to be granted.

15th. That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common good, or to instruct their representatives; and that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of grievances.

16th. That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of Liberty, and ought not to be violated.

17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free state. That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to Liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit; and that in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by the civil power.

18th. That no soldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in time of war in such manner only as the Laws direct

19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.

20th. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others.

Amendments to the Constitution:  (21 amendments were proposed, but I only included the first here):

  1. THAT each state in the union shall, respectively, retain every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this constitution delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the departments of the Federal Government.

[Reference:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/tansill/ratification-northcarolina/ ]

 

VII.  RHODE ISLAND RATIFICATION (November 21, 1789), with 18 Bill of Rights:

We the Delegates of the People of the State of Rhode-Island, and Providence Plantations, duly elected and met in Convention, having maturely considered the Constitution for the United States of America, agreed to on the seventeenth day of September, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven, by the Convention then assembled at Philadelphia, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (a Copy whereof precedes these presents) and having also seriously and deliberately considered the present situation of this State, do declare and make known

1st That there are certain natural rights, of which men when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and protecting Property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

2d That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from the People; that magistrates therefore are their trustees and agents, and at all times amenable to them.

3d That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness [Note: This is a “RESUMPTION CLAUSE.”  New York and Virginia also included such a clause/condition in their ratifications], :-That the rights of the States respectively, to nominate and appoint all State Officers, and every other power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the departments of government thereof, remain to the people of the several states, or their respective State Governments to whom they may have granted the same; and that those clauses in the said constitution which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply, that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said constitution, but such clauses are to be construed as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.

4th That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, and not by force or violence, and therefore all men, have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored, or established by law in preference to others.

5th That the legislative, executive and judiciary powers of government, should be separate and distinct, and that the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating the public burthens, they should at fixed periods be reduced to a private station, return into the mass of the people, and the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elections, in which all, or any part of the former members, to be eligible or ineligible, as the rules of the constitution of government and the laws shall direct.

6th That elections of representatives in legislature ought to be free and frequent, and all men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community ought to have the right of suffrage, and no aid, charge tax or fee can be set, rated or levied upon the people, without their own consent or that of their representatives so elected, nor can they be bound by any law, to which they have not in like manner assented for the public good.

7th That all power of suspending laws or the execution of laws, by any authority without the consent of the representatives of the people in the legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.

8th That in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence and be allowed counsel in his favor, and to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty; (except in the government of the land and naval forces) nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself.

9th That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or disseised of his freehold, liberties, privileges, or franchises, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the trial by jury, or by the law of the land.

10th That every freeman restrained of his liberty, is intitled to a remedy, to enquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the same if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be denied or delayed.

11th That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man the antient trial by jury, as hath been exercised by us and our ancestors, from the time whereof the memory of man is not to the contrary, is one of the greatest securities to the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolate.

12th That every freeman ought to obtain right and justice, freely and without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that a establishments or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive and unjust.

13th That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.

14th That every person has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers or his property, and therefore that all warrants to search suspected places or seize any person, his papers or his property, without information upon oath, or affirmation, of sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive, and that all general warrants (or such in which the place or person suspected, are not particularly designated,) are dangerous, and ought not to be granted.

15th That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together, to consult for their common good, or to instruct their representatives; and that every person has a right to petition or apply to the legislature for redress of grievances.

16th That the people have a right to freedom of speech and of writing, and publishing their sentiments, that freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated.

17th That the people have a right to keep and bear arms, that a well-regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free state; that the militia shall not be subject to martial law except in time of war, rebellion or insurrection; that standing armies in time of peace, axe dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up, except in cases of necessity; and that at all times the military should be under strict subordination to the civil power; that in time of peace no soldier ought to be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, and in time of war, only by the civil magistrate, in such manner as the law directs.

18th That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent, to employ another to bear arms in his stead.

Under these impressions, and declaring, that the rights aforesaid cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid, are consistent with the said constitution, and in confidence that the amendments hereafter mentioned, will receive early and mature consideration, and conformably to the fifth article of said constitution, speedily become a part thereof; We the said delegates, in the name, and in the behalf of the People, of the State of Rhode-Island and Providence-Plantations, do by these Presents, assent to, and ratify the said Constitution. In full confidence nevertheless, that until the amendments hereafter proposed and undermentioned shall be agreed to and ratified pursuant to the aforesaid fifth article, the militia of this State will not be continued in service out of this State for a longer term than six weeks, without the consent of the legislature thereof; That the Congress will not make or alter any regulation in this State, respecting the times, places and manner of holding elections for senators or representatives, unless the legislature of this state shall neglect, or refuse to make laws or regulations for the purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable of making the same; and that n those cases, such power will only be exercised, until the legislature of this State shall make provision in the Premises, that the Congress will not lay direct taxes within this State, but when the monies arising from the Impost, Tonnage and Excise shall be insufficient for the public exigencies, nor until the Congress shall be have first made a requisition upon this State to assess, levy and pay the amount of such requisition, made agreeable to the census fixed in the said constitution, in such way and manner, as the legislature of this State shall judge best, and that the Congress will not lay any capitation or poll tax.

[Reference:  http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/tansill/ratification-rhodeisland/ ]

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Undoing the American Republic with Welfare and Institutionalized Poverty (That’s Why Welfare Reform is So Important!)

WELFARE - work hard, millions depend on you (BEST)

by Diane Rufino, September 30, 2018

Government programs such as welfare and other social means-tested programs characterize very well the government’s general policy towards poverty: Make individuals “comfortable” in their poverty rather than incentivize them to become self-sufficient. Those dependent on government have little incentive to vote against its interests; those dependent on government have little incentive to vote for fiscal conservatism and for constitutional conservatism.

The premise of this article is three-fold:

(1)  To make the argument that government entitlement and other social welfare policies (means-tested programs), rather than serving “the general welfare” and helping to raise people out of poverty, in fact are really just increasingly making individuals “more comfortable” in their poverty, are increasingly relieving them of the “burden” of having to provide for themselves and their families, and in their sum, are creating institutionalized dependency. We see it already, and have seen it for many years now – welfare has become a way of life and not just a temporary program of aid and assistance; even worse, it has become a generational way of life.

(2)  Dependency, and certainly institutionalized dependency, by its very nature, puts individuals completely at odds with the notion of freedom. An individual cannot be free and dependent on government at the same time.  As more become dependent on government, there is no other course than the destruction of our republic and the transformation to socialism. Socialism is the death blow to individual liberty. The rights of the individual, the property of the individual, the work and production of the individual, becomes subject to the needs and best interests of the collective. Socialism is the death blow to the great American experiment.

(3)  Entitlement Programs, like block grants to the States (per “contact agreements”), are Unconstitutional.

A GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED POWERS?

As the title of this article suggests, I intend to address the constitutionality of Welfare and other means-tested social programs. The United States was once a country that prided itself on the ambition, creativity, ingenuity, energy, and production of the American people. Americans worked hard; they provided for themselves and their families. Without the lure of a safety-net, people became creative and ambitious and did whatever they could to make a living and provide for themselves and their family. With people like that, with social pressure like that, is it any wonder that our country was so successful and created such profound wealth? Is it any wonder that people were able to climb the social ladder so quickly and children and grandchildren became more successful than their parents? Is it any wonder why the United States became such an attractive magnet for the impoverished and downtrodden of the world?

But after the era of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the United States slowly and steadily became a welfare state, with Lyndon B. Johnson taking the most credit for what our country has become.  In 1964, with the Civil Rights bill looming, Johnson said to his political cronies: “These Negroes, they’re getting pretty uppity these days and that’s a problem for us since they’ve got something now they never had before, the political pull to back up their uppityness. Now we’ve got to do something about this, we’ve got to give them a little something, just enough to quiet them down, not enough to make a difference.”

Well, it did make quite a difference. Rather than help pull African-Americans out of poverty, welfare often doomed them to institutionalized poverty. Rather than help African-Americans overcome the prejudices, discriminations, and actions that held them back in the past, welfare was responsible for the greatest change in community dynamics which would have unfortunate consequences for them – it destroyed the black family.  The impact of welfare policies on marriage and family have been dramatic: Out-of-wedlock birthrates have skyrocketed among all demographic groups in the US but most notably among African Americans. In the mid-1960s, the out-of-wedlock birth rate was scarcely 3% for whites, 7.7% for Americans overall, and 24.5% among blacks. By 1976, those figures had risen to nearly 10% for whites, 24.7% for Americans as a whole, and 50.3% for blacks specifically. And today, the numbers stand at 29% for whites, 41% for the nation overall, and 73% for blacks. In other words, thanks to the welfare state, the entire country is moving rapidly in the wrong direction, but blacks in particular have reached a point of veritable catastrophe.

Is welfare constitutional??   I’ll eventually get to that question.

First of all, where does the supposed constitutional authority come from to redistribute wealth in the name of “welfare” or “security”?  The usual answer is the “General Welfare” clause of the Constitution. In the opening paragraph of Article I, Section 8 (which delegates to Congress the powers it is legally authorized to exercise), we find the “General Welfare” Clause. We have seen that term previously, of course – in the Preamble to the Constitution. In that opening paragraph of Article I, Section 8, Congress is granted power to tax and spend for the “general welfare of the United States.” From early in our history there were arguments about what sort of spending was truly for the general welfare. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, for instance, argued in 1791 that bounties paid to innovative new manufacturing concerns would qualify as spending for the general welfare. But Hamilton understood that the appropriations had to meet a standard of  uniformity throughout the Union. And for decades, Congress and various presidential administrations (mostly Republican) considered whether various “internal improvement” projects could legally constitute spending “for the general welfare.”

The government is not one of unlimited powers. We all know this. The US Constitution, as ratified by the individual states, created a common government of expressly-delegated powers which taken together, provide for some common essential functions (like safety and security, speaking with “one voice” in dealing with foreign nations and the Indian tribes, ensuring that commerce is made “regular,” and providing a uniform system of currency). Its powers were not intended to reach inside the state to regulate or affect the conduct of its citizens.

And yet the Constitution contains a clause that references “the General Welfare.” It’s called the “General Welfare Clause” and its purpose means one thing to big government folks and another to those who hold true to the historical view of the Constitution.

This clause is a special friend of  big-government politicians and intellectuals, and an enemy of limited-government folks. It is the catch-all phrase by which the federal government claims the authority to enact so much of its unconstitutional legislation and to carry out so much unconstitutional taxing and spending.

When the federal government wishes to create and expand welfare programs, to meddle in education, to provide grants for certain groups of individuals to attend college, to assist women in aborting their babies, to establish a national healthcare system, to serve the enormous immigration population (including illegals), to provide financial support for refugees, or to coerce the states to increase their drinking age or lower their speed limit,  progressives cite the “General Welfare” clause for constitutional authority.

Constitutional conservatives, on the other hand, push back with the argument that the General Welfare Clause is NOT, in fact a grant of power or source of authority.

Which is the correct view?  And why is it so important?

THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE:

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution lists the delegated functions of the federal legislative branch (Congress): Its opening paragraph includes the General Welfare Clause:

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;  —And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

[This last provision is called the “Necessary & Proper” Clause; it is typical language included in contracts at the time making clear that the party delegated a particular function or functions can take the “necessary” steps to carry out that function or those functions.]

FEDERAL SPENDING:  IS IT ALL CONSTITUTIONAL? 

The federal government spends money, through grants, tuition, other types of “assistance,” etc, to do things it cannot otherwise accomplish through actual constitutional authority. For example, the federal government provides funding to States to build roads, bridges, train tracks, airports, electric grids, libraries, swimming pools, housing, and other infrastructure; it provides funding to educate our children and to require public schools to implement affirmative action and other special programs for minorities and for students with disabilities; it provides funding for pre-school and day care; it provides funding to re-train the unemployed; it provides funding for relief aid; it provides funding for state and local law enforcement; it provides funding for Medicaid, food stamps, free lunch programs, and other social services; it provides funding to aid illegals; and it provides funding to individuals for college tuition, tuition remission, as scholarship awards, for housing, etc.

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 grants the US government the power to raise and spend money. Is that power limited?  Or is it unqualified and unlimited?  We all know the government’s view.

The government may believe it is justified under the General Welfare Clause, for example, to provide healthcare for the elderly (or for everyone), to provide old-age pension, to fund public health projects; to invest in and conduct basic research; to provide subsidies for agriculture; to build libraries, and even to provide emergency aid for natural disasters. But under what theory of a “limited government” is Congress justified in taxing and spending for such purposes as building roads, bridges, train tracks, airports, electric grids, libraries, swimming pools, and housing, educating our children, providing pre-school and day care; re-training the unemployed, and bailing out big banks and big industry (such as the auto industry)?  The answer is that according to the delegated powers vested in Congress in Article I, Section 8, none of those responsibilities is allowed. “The powers not delegated to the States, nor prohibited to them, are reserved to the States and to the People.”  Then Tenth Amendment tells us that all of these objects rightfully belong to the States. While the government assumes the authority to tax and spend for these objects from the General Welfare Clause, it is the Tenth Amendment that supersedes.

The amount spent on such programs is staggering:

First of all, the US Treasury divides all federal spending into three groups: mandatory spending, discretionary spending and interest on debt. Mandatory and discretionary spending account for more than ninety percent of all federal spending, and pay for all of the government services and programs on which many rely. Federal spending for 2015 was broken down as follows: Mandatory spending at 64.4%, Discretionary spending at 29.3%, and Interest on the debt at 6.03%.

Discretionary spending refers to the portion of the budget that is decided by Congress through the annual appropriations process each year. These spending levels are set each year by Congress. In fiscal year 2015, $1.1 trillion out of a total budget of $3.8 trillion was spent on discretionary spending. By far, the biggest category of discretionary spending is spending on the Pentagon and related military programs. Examples of other well-known programs paid for by discretionary spending include the early childhood education program Head Start (included in Housing & Community), Title I grants to disadvantaged schools and Pell grants for low-income college students (Education), other school funding, food assistance for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), training and placement for unemployed people provided by Workforce Investment Boards (in Social Security, Unemployment and Labor), and scientific research through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Science Foundation (NSF), among many others.

Mandatory spending is spending that Congress legislates outside of the annual appropriations process, usually less than once a year. Out of a total budget of $3.8 trillion, $2.45 trillion was spend on mandatory spending. It is dominated by the well-known “earned-benefit” programs Social Security and Medicare (that is, people have money taken out of their wages for these programs). It also includes widely used safety net programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps), and a significant amount of federal spending on transportation, among other things.

Many mandatory programs’ spending levels are determined by eligibility rules. For example, Congress decides to create a program like Social Security. It then sets criteria for determining who is eligible to receive benefits from the program, and benefit levels for people who are eligible. The amount of money spent on Social Security each year is then determined by how many people are eligible and apply for benefits, whether or not they have paid into the program. [Note: Congress does not decide each year to increase or decrease the budget for Social Security or other earned benefit programs. Instead, it periodically reviews the eligibility rules and may change them in order to exclude or include more people, or offer more or less generous benefits to those who are eligible, and therefore change the amount spent on the program].

Mandatory spending makes up nearly two-thirds of the total federal budget. Social Security alone comprises more than 1/3 of mandatory spending and around 23% of the total federal budget. Medicare makes up an additional 23% of mandatory spending and 15% of the total federal budget. [See:  https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/spending/ ]

The question is: Are these grants and other forms of assistance to the States constitutional?  Perhaps such programs as Social Security and Medicare are constitutional, or at least at one time were (that is, when salary deductions for them were still considered a property right), but now they are simply considered another federal tax.

But what about the other programs??   Welfare (for the poor and the generational dependents), education funding, funding for transportation, state grants?

On the government’s website (https://www.grants.gov/learn-grants/grant-policies.html; “A Short History of Federal Grant Policy”), there is this explanation:

      Billions of dollars in Federal grants are awarded each year for programs and projects that benefit the public. This assistance is rooted in the Constitution and its call to “promote the general Welfare.”

      It wasn’t until the 1970’s, however, that Federal grant policy began to evolve into what it is today. The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, passed in 1977, set out to guide government agencies in their use of Federal funds – particularly by defining the roles of contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants. Contracts, the law states, should be awarded when a Federal agency is acquiring something – an improved computer network, for example. Grants and cooperative agreements, meanwhile, should be awarded when a Federal agency is providing assistance, such as funding for a lower-income housing program in an at-risk urban community.

The federal government, by law, has established a grant program (mandatory grants and discretionary grants) whereby it provides funding to the states as a means to further its policies or to coerce conformity among the states on matters it has no actual constitutional authority to legislate. These grants are contractual in nature and so, legally, if the particular state accepts the money, it agrees to the conditions attached to it. It’s a matter of free will. And so the government achieves contractually, and coercively (because money is an attractive carrot) what it cannot achieve constitutionally. It is the means by which the federal government can control and coerce the States; it is the means by which the federal government can achieve an end-run around the Constitution and accomplish unconstitutionally what the Constitution legally does not allow it to accomplish. Federal grants to the states (grants-in-aid) are a primary mechanism that the federal government uses to extend its influence into state and local affairs.

The matter of federal funding and the coercion associated with it was addressed in 1987 with the Supreme Court case South Dakota v. Dole. The case centered on the constitutionality of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, which was passed in 1984.  Specifically the Supreme court was asked to consider the limitations that the Constitution places on the authority of the US Congress when it uses its authority to influence the individual states in areas of authority normally reserved to the states.

The National Minimum Drinking Age Act (NMDAA) withheld 10% of federal highway funding from states that did not maintain a minimum legal drinking age of 21. South Dakota, which allowed 19-year-olds to purchase beer, challenged the law as an abuse of power, naming Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole as the defendant.

The Court, in a 7-2 opinion, upheld the statute’s constitutionality. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, articulated a 5-point rule for considering the constitutionality of expenditure cuts of the type in the NMDAA:

  • The spending must promote “the general welfare.”
  • The condition must be unambiguous.
  • The condition should relate “to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.”
  • The condition imposed on the states must not, in itself, be unconstitutional.
  • The condition must not be coercive.

Rehnquist concluded that the NMDAA met the first three restrictions and thus was a constitutional exercise of Congressional authority. Furthermore, he wrote that Congress did not violate the Tenth Amendment because it merely exercised its right to control its spending nor did the statute coerce the states since it cut only a small percentage of federal funding.  According to Rehnquist, Congress applied pressure, but not irresistible pressure.

I believe the opinion was a poor exercise of judicial interpretation, and it hurts me to say that considering what a fan I usually am of William Rehnquist.

While contacts are always allowable, the question I ask is whether it is constitutional in the first place for the federal government to collect tax money for the purpose of doing something unconstitutional (even if it is by contract). I think it is an unconstitutional object of the taxing power. The power to coerce through funding is the power to coerce period.

If the federal government can use public funding to extend its authority, why can’t a state government have its citizens withhold federal tax dollars and direct it to itself instead in order to further its state authority under the Tenth Amendment?

Federal grants, put simply, are not only an unconstitutional exercise of the federal taxing and spending power but act to distort and erode the critical balance of government power between the states and the federal government.

SEPARATE GRANT OF POWER OR QUALIFYING PHRASE?

The words “General Welfare” actually create something of a dilemma. Either the founders didn’t really intend to create a general government of limited powers, or the General Welfare clause doesn’t really mean unlimited federal authority to do things beneficial to the nation as a whole.  What is it?

The answer, of course is easy. It’s just not the convenient answer for the federal government.

The grant of power to “provide . . . for the general welfare” raises a two–fold question:  (1) How may Congress provide for “the general welfare,” and (2) What is “the general welfare” that it is authorized to promote?

The first half of this question was answered by Thomas Jefferson in his opinion (to President George Washington and the First US Congress) on the government’s authority to establish a National Bank as follows: “The laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. They [Congress] are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please; but only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose.” The clause, in short, is not an independent grant of power, but a qualification of the taxing power. Although a broader view has been occasionally asserted, and although Congress has acted under that assumption, the Supreme Court has NOT upheld that view.

Let’s start by looking at construction:

The “General Welfare” clause, as one can notice and read, is set off by commas after the delegation of taxing power, for the purpose of clarifying WHAT the taxes collected are to be spent on. The powers enumerated in the following lines go into more specifics as to what Section 8 means when it says “to provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.” The fact that the framers followed up the general welfare clause in Article I Sec. 8 with specific enumerated powers indicates the latter – a qualification on federal authority. If they had intended Congress should have the power to do virtually anything and everything to promote the general welfare, they wouldn’t have bothered to include specific powers.

We don’t need to speculate on what the “General Welfare” clause means and we shouldn’t have to take the word of a politically-appointed Supreme Court justice. We only need to look at the explanation provided by the author of the Constitution himself, James Madison.

In a letter to James Robertson, dated April, 20, 1831, Madison makes quite clear that the phrase “for the General Welfare” is not a separate grant of power:

“With respect to the two words “general welfare,” I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail of powers connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would be a metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of proofs was not contemplated by its creators.”

The General Welfare Clause is not an enlargement clause, authorizing the government to tax and spend to pay the nation’s debts, to provide for the common defense, and to do anything it wants for the general welfare. It is a clarifying clause, serving once again as a reminder the goals of the government. The goals, of course, are stated in the Preamble to the Constitution:  “To form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity….”

Again, if our Founding Fathers and drafters of the Constitution had intended Congress should have the power to do virtually anything and everything it wanted in order to promote the general welfare, they wouldn’t have bothered to include specific delegations of power. If the government was intended to be one of unlimited and consolidated powers, what state would have ratified it?  The truth is that the Constitution was sold to the States, through written and oral assurances, as one creating a common government of limited powers to serve the States and to carry out their common functions.

James Madison, as I hope everyone knows, was a primary author of The Federalist Essays, which became known as The Federalist Papers. Knowing that of the 55 delegates who attended the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, only 39 signed it at the end (September 17).  Some didn’t sign because they had already left explained the convention and several didn’t sign because they could not lend it their support.  He also knew that some heavy hitters refused to even attend the convention because of grave suspicions of what the convention might try to do and that they would not support his Constitution in the state ratifying conventions. And in fact, during the ratification debates, Anti-Federalists who opposed the Constitution voiced fears that people would come along and assert that the term “General Welfare” granted unlimited power to the federal government.

Madison, together with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, wrote the Federalist essays (ie, the Federalist Papers) as a means to explain each provision of the Constitution and for the purpose of providing assurances to the States as they contemplated whether to adopt it or not. In particular, the Federalist essays addressed the fears, the skepticism, the concerns of the Anti-Federalists (who had written a series of essays highlighting the defects in the new Constitution). The Federalist Papers, coming from the primary author of the Constitution, the man who called for the Convention, the man who provided the rough draft (rough outline) of the proposed new government), the man who attended each day, the man who took faithful notes of the proceedings and debates, the man who was almost universally perceived as being honest and trustworthy, and the man who most had a stake in seeing the Constitution through to its adoption (since it was his vision to scrap the Articles of Confederation) in favor of a new government), are without a doubt the most important and the primary authority on the meaning and intent of the US Constitution.

With that in mind, Madison addressed the scope of the General Welfare Clause in his Essay No. 41:

      For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power?  Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.

He went on, in Essay No. 41:

      In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be wrought into articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them. Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power ‘to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,’ amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms ‘to raise money for the general welfare.’

Again, the Federalist Papers, because of how wrote the essays and for the purpose they were written, are the primary authority on the meaning and intent of the US Constitution.

Madison further illuminated the intended meaning of the General Welfare Clause in a letter written to Edmund Pendleton in 1793, pointing out that the phrase was lifted from the Articles of Confederation and was intended to retain its meaning in the new Constitution.

       “If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will promote the general welfare, the Government is no longer a limited one possessing enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to particular exceptions. It is to be remarked that the phrase out of which this doctrine is elaborated, is copied from the old articles of Confederation, where it was always understood as nothing more than a general caption to the specified powers, and it is a fact that it was preferred in the new instrument for that very reason as less liable than any other to misconstruction.”

According to Madison, “the most important and fundamental question” with respect to the intent and meaning of the Constitution and the design of the government created was the meaning of and the relationship between the General Welfare Clause and the enumeration of particular powers in Article I, Sect. 8. This question, as he explained in Federalist No. 41, is the most “fundamental” because the answer determines the very “idea” or “nature” of the U.S. Constitution. It determines the ambition of the federal government.  Legal scholars and commentators virtually agree that the clause was not a separate grant of power but rather a substantive grant of power for the generally-stated end (see the Preamble to the Constitution). They agree that the primary purpose of the ensuing enumeration was to define more particularly the ends alluded to by the phrase “General Welfare.” Hence, the meaning of the general constitutional government in the American federal system is a government oriented to a limited number of limited ends.

I would argue then, that any “taxing and spending” for purposes not permitted under the enumerated powers, and in fact, reserved to the States per the Tenth Amendment, is impermissible and unconstitutional.

But we all know that the States are weak and the Supreme Court, because of its general aversion to cling to a meaning associated with an era long gone, intentionally ignores what our Founders have said and what they have written. They prefer to engage in their progressive way of interpreting the document in order to update it – which is merely a way of saying that they want to ignore the intended restraints on the federal government in order to transfer more and more power to it.

So the words “general welfare” must mean something other than a grant of power for Congress to do whatever it pleased. What exactly did the framers mean?

Two words in the clause hold the key – the words general and common. The phrase simply means that any tax collected must be collected to the benefit of the United States as a whole, not for partial or sectional (i.e. special) interests. The federal government may promote the general welfare, or common good, but it must do so within the scope of the powers delegated and without favoritism.

Let’s look at what the Supreme Court has said:

The Constitution contains two references to “the General Welfare” — one occurring in the Preamble and the other in the Taxing and Spending Clause. The Supreme Court, in the case Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), has held the mention of the clause in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution “has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the Government of the United States or on any of its Departments.”  Furthermore, the Court has held that the understanding of the General Welfare Clause contained in the Taxing and Spending Clause adheres to the construction given it by Associate Justice Joseph Story in his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States:

“A power to lay taxes for any purposes whatsoever is a general power; a power to lay taxes for certain specified purposes is a limited power. A power to lay taxes for the common defense and general welfare of the United States is not in common sense a general power. It is limited to those objects. It cannot constitutionally transcend them.”    [Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, in §919]

Justice Story concluded that the General Welfare Clause is not a grant of general legislative power, but a qualification on the taxing power which includes within it a federal power to spend federal revenues on matters of general interest to the federal government.

The problem with Justice Story’s comment (above) is that the “General Welfare” does NOT mean “General Interest to the federal government.” It means the “general welfare of the American people.” The clause means that the US Congress the power to spend for matters affecting only the national welfare, and not certain groups particularly.

The problem is that the federal government is addicted to taxing; it gives government the ability to carry out its expressly-delegated function and also the ability to carry out functions it has no authority to regulate. The latter it accomplishes by bribery – I mean, it offers the states grant money (in exchange for complying with conditions; conditioned spending).

When challenged on the federal government’s constitutional authority to create welfare programs, meddle in educations, take over public education, offer programs specifically for illegal aliens and Hispanic green-card holders, or run a national healthcare system, progressives will almost always appeal to the “General Welfare Clause.” Because they believe the government SHOULD be handling such tasks, they advance the “all-inclusive” and “all-authoritative” view of the Clause. And who is really willing to challenge this – the greater than 50% of the people who depend on government programs enacted “for the so-called General Welfare”?  At some point, there will be so very many people unable to support themselves and provide the substance to take care of themselves and their families and who look to the government that the federal courts are going to have to officially re-interpret the General Welfare Clause to give Congress a blank check to legislate for any reason related to the “general” welfare or to the welfare of any particular group of people. And perhaps that is the reason the government has, over the years, established so many policies designed to get Americans dependent on it for their essentials. Perhaps that is why Democrats in particular, continue to make sure that those on entitlement and other social programs are increasingly more “comfortable” in their poverty rather than pressured to abandon a life of dependency for one of employment and production.

WELFARE: CONSTITUTIONAL or NOT?  HOW BETTER TO PROVIDE A SAFETY-NET?

As explained above, I believe any taxiing and spending for objects NOT expressly tasked to the federal government by Article I, Sect. 8, is unconstitutional. There is no provision in the Constitution for (1) Discretionary Spending; (2) Grants and Other Types Assistance, which includes things like grants and scholarships for education, grants to the States (for roads, bridges, airports, ports, railroad tracks, public schools, Medicaid and other dependency programs, healthcare, etc); (3) Education; (4) Universal Healthcare; or (5) Welfare and other government-sponsored public assistance programs. All of these types of spending (although one might argue that for the most part, some are duplicated) allow the government to do the following:

(1)  Maintain a high federal taxation rate

(2)  Accomplish what the Constitution itself does not allow it to do.  (They permit the government to make an end-run around the Constitution)

(3)  Control people. A person dependent on government will never vote against its interests.

(4)  Exercise control over the States  (Most States can’t fund all that the State requires internally and for its people through the money that it raises by state taxation, and that is why they almost reflexively and automatically put their hands out when the federal government offers government assistance)

(5)  Apply coercion to the States.  (Again, most States can’t fund all that the State requires internally and for its people through the money that it raises by state taxation, and that is why they almost reflexively and automatically put their hands out when the federal government offers government assistance, even though they know that the funds come with strings and often times, it deprives the State of the decisions and options it could have exercised on its own)

(6)  Establish uniformity among the States (slowly erasing the borders that distinguish one state and its “politics” from another).  Dangling funds in front of a State that is otherwise strapped for funds is coercive pressure (regardless of what judges who sit on a bench in DC say) and usually results in the States accepting the money, agreeing to its conditions, and sacrificing little by little its state autonomy and sovereignty.

In other words, the spending identified above, including funding (grants) to the States and including welfare and other means-tested assistance programs, are unconstitutional.

Healthcare is a social program, plain and simple; it is socialist at its core. Those who the government determines are able to pay their insurance premiums must do so, and in fact, will be burdened with an increase in premiums. Why?  Because they are paying not only to cover themselves and their families, but to help cover all those in poverty who can’t afford healthcare on their own. It is a government program based on simple re-distribution of wealth and socialism. One group of individuals suffers a burden while another group receives a hand-out. Both pretty much get the same level of healthcare coverage.

Government, or universal, healthcare is not legitimately covered by the “General Welfare” Clause because the program doesn’t apply equally to everyone. It is a program whereby the government commandeers half the American population to cover (pay) the healthcare insurance premium costs of the other half. One half benefits in every sense of the word while the other half is forced to incur an additional burden.

Welfare, and other means-tested social programs, are other programs based on re-distribution of wealth. Those who work and make enough are required to pay federal income taxes. They work at least 3 months out of the year to pay the government what it requires, which is essentially 30% of their income and a lot more for other types of assets. Those who don’t work or only work a little (and don’t make enough) can go on welfare and can take advantage of other means-tested social programs. They can sit around and wait for their government checks – money that flows directly from those who earn and produce to those who don’t.

These programs are not legitimately covered by the “General Welfare” Clause because frankly, it doesn’t fit the definition of “general welfare.” The opening paragraph of Article I, Sect. 8 means that any tax collected must be collected in order that the government (Congress) can fund all the projects pertaining to the express powers granted to it (ie, the enumerated powers), which collectively are covered by the phrase “for the common defense and to provide for the general welfare.” Welfare and other means-tested social programs do NOT benefit the citizens of the United States as a whole, but rather benefit only a subset of the people. In fact, a good portion of citizens are harmed in order to benefit the others. That hardly seems fair. The Constitution doesn’t empower the US Congress to institutionalize giving and compassion. It only empowers Congress to act in those areas that the States originally agreed to in 1788. [On June 21, 1788 the Constitution became the official governing document of the United States of America when New Hampshire became the ninth of thirteen states to ratify it, per Article VII].

The grants to the States are simply unconstitutional because the federal government, in Article I, Sect. 8, was not delegated the authority to address any of the purposes for which the grants are offered. If the government can simply accomplish through funds (conditional funding) what it can’t accomplish according to the Constitution, then the government is not a limited one but one easily and most likely capable of becoming overly ambitious and controlling. If the government can simply accomplish through funds (conditional funding) what it can’t accomplish according to the Constitution, then our government is not longer “federal” but “national.” And we see that is absolutely true today.

Let’s go back to Welfare (and other means-tested social programs) and look at the inherent unfairness in the program. One group of people exists on welfare and other social programs; their needs and essentials are provided by the government. Since they earn no money, they pay no federal taxes. The other group is self-sufficient and is able to provide for themselves and their families (the way it was supposed to be), and because they are considered “successful,” the government demands that they pay a fairly substantial federal income tax. In fact, all their income, all their property, and all their assets must be diligently disclosed to the IRS.  Government, of course, doesn’t provide its own money but rather must obtain it, usually through taxpayer funding. So, the first group, on welfare, is not supported by the government but rather by hard-working tax-paying citizens.  One groups pays (heavily) and the other sits back and receives; yet both enjoy the freedoms, the civil rights, and the privileges, as well as the safety and security provided by the United States. But, truth be told, both exist differently and both are not served equally from the government. Here are some differences:

(a) Those on welfare don’t need to work; they don’t even need to get out of bed or get off the couch. They can socialize or they can spend all day with their kids.  Those not on welfare must work and must always be concerned that their jobs are secure.

(b)  Those on welfare don’t have to worry where their money comes from and don’t have to live check to check for their rent and their grocery bills. They get a check from the government which they can count on. Those not on welfare often live check to check; in fact, they sometimes have to take on a second job or have their spouse go to work to cover bills.  (The ironic thing is that those on welfare often tell Health & Human Services Office that there are no jobs, yet those not on welfare often have no problem finding a second job)

(c)  Those on welfare get a break in college tuition; there are lots of scholarship and tuition assistance aid to help them; those not on welfare pay more for their children to go to college.

(d)  Those on welfare get free healthcare.  Those not on welfare have to pay for their own health insurance or make sure they get a job that provides it.

(e)  Those on welfare (or those who meet other means-tested criteria) can also get food stamps (to help them buy more nutritious food), assistance for daycare (even though they don’t work), housing assistance, assistance to help cover heat and air-conditioning, etc etc.  In other words, over the years, more and more social programs have been created to help make people more comfortable in their poverty. They do NOTHING to help them become independent and self-sufficient, and in fact, do everything to establish the hand-outs as a way of life.

(f)  Those on welfare can have all the kids they want, including with as many different men as they want. Sure, they are supposed to disclose the name and contact information of the father of each child to Health & Human Services, but knowing people who have worked with HHS, women aren’t always forthcoming with such information. My mother, who worked for years with the New Hanover County Department of Health & Human Services, used to tell me how frustrating it was to work there and what a scam Welfare is. She told me how mostly black women would come in to the office with two and three and four kids and want their check. She would ask them for the name of the father of the children, and the response would be “I don’t know” or “Just give me my damn check.” She would call for her supervisor and eventually, every single time, they would get their check without giving any information.  Those not on welfare have to make a cost-benefit analysis when planning their families. Having children isn’t a scam to them or a money-making scheme. Their concerns are always whether they can afford them and provide a good life for them.

(g)  Those on welfare are supposed to continually look for work and report their efforts to HHS, but we know that’s a joke. Most know exactly how to game the system. When those not on welfare need to find a new job, they make an honest and great effort to do so.

(h)  Those on welfare can do drugs and abuse alcohol whenever they want and still collect their checks. Those not on welfare must always conduct themselves in a manner to be good and responsible employees; they must show up for work on time, be alert, be productive, not call out excessively, and must be able to pass an on-the-spot drug test.

(i)  Those on welfare never have to worry about keeping a record of their expenses, keeping receipts, or hiring an accountant to navigate the federal income tax form. They never have to worry about being audited by the IRS or will never know the absolute fear of getting a certified letter from them.  They will never have to worry about having the IRS telling them that they should have paid more in taxes and so, the money they planned to use for a vacation must be turned over immediately. Those not on welfare are slaves to the IRS and to the April 15 deadline to file their taxes.

(j)  Those on welfare never have to worry about saying or doing anything on social media or in their private lives that might somehow prevent them from receiving their checks. Those not on welfare, however, must forever be diligent in what they say, how they say it, where they say it, to who they say it, and they must be careful to give the appearance of being neutral on religion and politics and social issues should a co-worker somehow find out or should Human Resources find out. Personal opinions and politics, and activism and association…  these once traditional exercises of the First Amendment now can be reason to be fired from a job or to be denied an interview.

(l)  Those on welfare automatically get an increase in their living expenses with each additional child. Those not on welfare do not. Those not on welfare (ie, those who have honest employment) cannot game the system and defraud their employer.

(m)  Those on welfare can exploit various ways to exploit the entitlement system, including colluding with men to have additional children and splitting the welfare funds.

Welfare and other government hand-out programs offer only one positive benefit: They offer a safety net to those who temporarily are unable to work and provide for themselves and their family. This safety net was intended to be temporary, to provide for the individual while he or she figures out a way to get back on his/her feet and back into the workforce. It was NOT intended to be a way of life. It was NOT intended to be a viable alternative to a career or being a productive member of society. On the other hand, welfare and other government hand-out programs offer many negative effects (many perhaps are unintended consequences), including the following:

  • They generate and reward sloth
  • They relieve too many young people of the energy they would need to invest in an education or to learn a skill
  • They result in a lack of ambition
  • They result in an obese population (as someone from New Dehli once explained to his family: “I want to live in America. I want to live in a country where the poor people are obese.” Dinesh D’Souza tells this story)
  • They have resulted in, and continue to result in, the destruction of the family unit (welfare contains marriage penalties)
  • They have increased, and continue to increase, the level of poverty in our country [Families with an absent father, black and white alike, generally occupy the bottom rung of America’s economic ladder. Regardless of race or ethnicity, the poverty rate for single parents with children is several times higher than the corresponding rate for married couples with children. According to Robert Rector, with the Heritage Foundation, “the absence of marriage increases the frequency of child poverty 700 percent” and thus constitutes the single most reliable predictor of a self-perpetuating underclass. Articulating a similar theme many years ago, Martin Luther King, Jr. said, “Nothing is so much needed as a secure family life for a people to pull themselves out of poverty”]
  • They inspire and encourage too many people to stay on welfare and not look for employment (cost-benefit analysis)
  • They perpetuate of ignorance, illiteracy, etc
  • They serve as a viable alternative to getting an education
  • They reward those who did not take public education seriously nor took any initiative to learn a skill
  • They reward women for having children without being married
  • They reward women for not cooperating with authorities to identify the father or fathers of their children (in order to have them provide child care)
  • They have created generational government dependency (young girls imprint on their mothers and get pregnant without being married in order to be taken care of rather than get educated and work)
  • Rather than serve the positive goal of providing a temporary safety-net until the applicant can get back on his or her feet, they have become a permanent means of support. Dependency has become a way of life. (Over the years, more and more social programs have been created to help make people more comfortable in their poverty. They do NOTHING to help them become independent and self-sufficient, and in fact, do everything to establish the hand-outs as a way of life)
  • They have resulted in the increase in crime, drug use, and human decay [In agreeing to sign the Civil Rights legislation of 1965, LBJ’s chief objective was to reduce dependency by blacks and put an end to the disproportionately high rate of black poverty. He said he wanted “to break the cycle of poverty” and make “taxpayers out of tax eaters.” He further claimed that his programs would bring to an end the “conditions that breed despair and violence,” those being “ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs”]
  • They have ruined whole communities
  • They have created a class system in the US (those who are dependent and are takers; and those who are independent and produce).
  • They have caused one group of citizens to distrust and to have no respect for another group of people (because many recipients are non-citizens)
  • They have caused people to question the legitimacy of the voting system [Is it fair for people living off the government (ie, other people), to have the ability to vote and have a say in how other people’s money is spent? Maybe there should be a progressive voting system like there is a progressive income tax…. Those with more money and assets are taxed at a higher level so maybe their votes should carry greater weight]

To highlight the differences between those on welfare and other social programs with those who provide for themselves one sentence, I would sum it up this way: Those on welfare receive a check without any conditions attached; those not on welfare are subject to.

The federal government has been financing government-provided welfare since the 1930s. Of the more than $1.1 trillion spent in fiscal year 2016, federal expenditures accounted for $829 billion (or 74% of all funding related to welfare programs), and state expenditures accounted for $297 billion (or 26%). Most state spending ($213 billion) is done on one single program – Medicaid. In terms of GDP, welfare alone accounts for 6%. It has risen steadily and quickly in the years after Ronald Reagan left office. During LBJ’s term, welfare spending accounted for 1.5% of GDP; during Carter’s term it more than doubled – to 3.6%; during Reagan’s term, it remained the same and even dipped; but then after he left office, it began to increase quickly and steadily.

Imagine how much each taxpayer could be relieved in his or her federal taxation burden if the federal government taxed only for the spending for which it is constitutionally allowed.  Imagine how much each individual State could then tax its citizens. They would be able to raise money on their own to cover internal expenses – the running of the State and the care of its people – and more importantly, they could spend that money AS THEY SEE FIT, and not within the conditions imposed by the federal government. Imagine how, if this financial dependency were ended, the rightful balance between federal and state government power could be better achieved.  Taking away the financial power to coerce and control leaves the States in a better position to stand up to the federal government rather than to cower and concede.

As mentioned above, the spending identified above, including funding (grants) to the States and including welfare and other means-tested assistance programs, are unconstitutional.  Yet there are citizens who feel passionate and strongly that those who can give up some of their income should do so in order to take care of those who are less fortunate, those who are legitimately disabled (and not like some friends I know who filed for disability because of their obesity), those who work but can’t provide enough for their family (while still continuing to have more and more kids), those who are here illegally and need help providing for their growing families, those who have children without being or getting married (including those who refuse to provide information to the authorities for child-support), those who are crafty at defrauding the system, those who ignored the opportunity to become educated and hence can’t get anything other than a minimum-wage job, and those who simply don’t want to work.  I wonder if they feel so passionate and so supportive of these people because they know that it is other people’s hard-earned money that will be used to support them. I wonder if they would feel the same if the money was taken from them, their family, their food allowance, and their recreation fund.  I think the only legal way that the federal government can offer welfare and other means-tested assistance programs is if it asks each taxpayer, at the time they file their taxes, if they would be willing to donate additional of their money for the care of the poor. I’m sure many would agree to do so. I’m also sure that such programs would have much less funding which means criteria would be stricter and time restraints would have to be added. The programs would clearly have to be temporary in nature and because of stringent criteria, there would be indirect pressure to get off as soon as possible.

So, let me list out some solutions to the problem of federal discretionary spending, including Welfare and state grants:

(i)  My first solution to this out-of-control, unconstitutional-taxing and spending bloated government is for the States to challenge each item of federal spending for constitutionality. For each item that is not constitutional, the federal income tax rate should be reduced accordingly.

(ii)  My second solution (and this one is for Welfare only) would be the one outlined in the previous full paragraph (each taxpayer can offer to send additional of their money to the government for welfare programs). Personally, I like this one.  This forces people to put up or shut up. It forces people to put their money where their mouth is.

(iii)  My third solution is each state to establish a State Escrow Account. (I’ve written an article on this and how it would work).  Each State would review the federal budget and determine which items are constitutional or not. It would then adjust the federal budget accordingly. Then it would determine the pro rata share of that budget that North Carolina residents would provide. The state would require all residents to have their federal income tax first reviewed by the State Treasury Department. Only the portion that corresponds to constitutional federal spending would be forwarded to the IRS and the remainder would be deposited in the State Escrow Account. The state would then determine for itself what to do with the escrow funds – either returning it to its residents or applying it to state projects, thus relieving the state of any un-necessary reliance on the federal government and moving the state towards the independence it was intended to have.

(iv)  My last solution is to keep welfare and the other means-tested social programs, but to treat them like state grants and attached strict conditions to recipient status. Remember, welfare and other such social entitlement programs are like state grants in that they both are an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing and spending power. Conditions should be attached for two essential reasons: (1) to ensure that recipients can only receive benefits for a LIMITED time (there will need to be time limits); and (2) to make it so burdensome that recipients will want to get off of government assistance as soon as possible, whether that means they will look at marriage and education more favorably or will invest in career training programs or will make sure they do not have further children which may tend to keep them dependent on government aid. Some conditions that should be placed on free government aid (ie, other people’s money) include:

  • Mandatory birth control. (No government check without first receiving a monthly birth control shot)
  • No increase in the welfare check and no additional funds should the recipient have another child while on public assistance
  • Suspension of the right to vote
  • Definite earmarks are attached to the funding. Funds can only go towards essential food items, housing, and transportation. Any person on government assistance who can afford a new car will be automatically kicked out of the program
  • No free cell phones
  • No visits to the nail salon
  • No funding for air-conditioning (Lowe’s sells a great $12 fan which works wonders in the heat)
  • Mandatory proof of job searches (including signed statements from each employer consulted, including the reason the person could not be considered or interviewed. Job searches will be viewed with extreme scrutiny for potential for fraud and abuse; for example, a person who has a criminal record should not be looking for a job with law enforcement or education, daycare, etc because such jobs expressly require employees to have no criminal background history)
  • Mandatory community college or GED courses for those who did not graduate high school or who barely graduated (those who severely lack the basic skills and knowledge imputed on an adult, or a young adult)
  • Mandatory college or community college courses for those who have no college diploma, associates degree, vocational training, etc (No government check without a report showing course status; if a person is not working, he or she must be developing their career and building valuable job skills)
  • Children of a person on welfare must be doing well in school (average or better)
  • Proof of citizenship must be provided (and confirmed by the Social Security Department). Identity fraud will result in immediate deportation
  • Recipients must show they are drug-free (mandatory drug-testing)
  • Random audits will be conducted
  • Mandatory visits from a social worker to assess the cleanliness and order of the home and the environment for the child (or children)
  • Recipients must be available for community service when the state government needs them

I’m sure there are other conditions that I haven’t thought of and I’m sure that others would make some suggestions of their own.  In fact, I would encourage those who have read this article to comment and add their suggestions.

Milton Friedman, an economist, was highly critical of welfare, and noted several times how it should be judged by its results and outcomes and not by its intentions.  He also said: “There’s been one underlying basic fallacy in this idea of welfare measures, and that is that it is feasible and possible to do good with other people’s money. That view has two flaws. If I want to do good with other people’s money, I first have to take it away from them. That means that the welfare state philosophy of doing good with other people’s money, at it’s very bottom, is a philosophy of violence and coercion. It’s against freedom, because I have to use force to get the money. In the second place, very few people spend other people’s money as carefully as they spend their own.”

If we are going to coerce and extort money from taxpayers, not merely to provide safety and security for the country or to legislate for the enumerated objects in Article I, Section 8, but also to support those who don’t want to even try to support themselves and their families, then the very least we should do is provide accountability to those taxpayers (those hard-working men and women whose paychecks are seized by the government for 1/3 of the year) and that is to attach strict and limiting conditions to welfare checks. The program, which would have to be run as one that is contractual in nature and not as a constitutional responsibility, must be so burdensome, so intrusive, so violative of freedom, and so unattractive to the recipient that he or she will absolutely want to spend as little time as possible on it.  Well that’s the hope anyway.

 

References:

John Perazzo, “How the Liberal Welfare Destroyed Black America,” Front Page Magazine, May 5, 2016.  Referenced at:  https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/262726/how-liberal-welfare-state-destroyed-black-america-john-perazzo

Mike Maharrey, “The General Welfare Clause is Not About Writing Checks,” The Tenth Amendment Center, August 28, 2014.  Referenced at:  https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2014/08/28/the-general-welfare-clause-is-not-about-writing-checks/

Federalist No. 41 –  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed41.asp

“Federal Aid to States and Local Governments,” Congressional Budget Office (CBO), April 18, 2018.  Referenced at: https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/federal-aid-to-state-and-local-governments

The Delegates Who Didn’t Sign the Constitution –  https://www.constitutionfacts.com/us-constitution-amendments/those-who-didnt-sign-the-constitution/

Delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia (May 27 – September 1787) –  http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/marryff.html

“Federal Grants to State and Local Governments (1960-2017) – Chart Analysis,” Mercatus Center (George Mason University).  Referenced at:  https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Federal-grant-aid-state-and-local-chart-analysis-pdf.pdf

“Federal Spending on Benefits and Services for People with Low Income: In Brief,” Congressional Research Service, Feb. 6, 2018.  Referenced at:  https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45097.pdf

“Spending for the General Welfare,” Cornell Law School.  Referenced at:  https://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/art1frag29_user.html

Jefferson’s Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (1791), Avalon Project (Yale Law School).   Referenced at:  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bank-tj.asp

Grant Policy –  https://www.grants.gov/learn-grants/grant-policies.html

Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go?,” National Priorities Project.  Referenced at:  https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/spending/

Matthew J. Franck, “The Lawless Welfare State,” National Review, Jan. 13, 2013.  Referenced at:  https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2010/05/17/lawless-welfare-state/

 

Thomas Jefferson Articulates the Remedy of NULLIFICATION in an Opinion Written to George Washington in 1791

THOMAS JEFFERSON - wire glasses

by Diane Rufino, September 16, 2018

In 1791, Thomas Jefferson wrote an opinion on the constitutionality of a National Bank. It is an important commentary on the meaning and intent of the US Constitution, in particular the two general clauses – the General Welfare Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.

President George Washington’s Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton proposed the creation of a national bank. He advised that a national bank would “give great facility or convenience in the collection of taxes” and would facilitate the government’s assumption of the states’ Revolutionary War debts, thus serving the taxing power of the federal government. Not sure if such a bank was a constitutional exercise of government legislative power, Washington asked Hamilton and Jefferson, his Secretary of State, to articulate their positions.

And so, on Feb. 15, 1791, Jefferson submitted an opinion to Washington against the creation of a National Bank, explaining that it was not authorized by any specific delegation of power nor was it contemplated by any of the general clauses. In specific, he articulated that the “Necessary & Proper” Clause meant that Congress could take action only when it was necessary (and proper) to bring into effect any of the specifically enumerated powers; that is, without those means without which the grant of power would be meaningless. The clause did not mean Congress could pursue action that was merely convenient or helpful.”  Jefferson said that all the functions of which Hamilton was concerned – the collection of taxes, the paying of war debt, etc – could all be carried into execution without a bank. Therefore, as a constitutional matter, he concluded that a bank was not necessary, and consequently not authorized by the “Necessary & Proper” phrase.

Hamilton’s opinion was different. He argued that the Constitution, in Article I, Section 8, created a legislature not only of specific powers but of implied powers as well.

In the end, the House and then the Senate approved a bill establishing a charter for the first National Bank, and President Washington, siding with Hamilton, signed it. The first Bank of the United States was built in Philadelphia.

Chef Justice John Marshall, the man credited with transforming the role of the Supreme Court, later chose to ignore Jefferson’s opinion and commentary when the constitutionality of the national bank came before the Court in 1819 – in McCulloch v. Maryland.  His opinion in that case echoed Hamilton’s view that the federal government is indeed one of express AND implied powers, an issue that was DIRECTLY addressed and dismissed at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and again when states expressed concern in their ratifying conventions.

While this Opinion by Thomas Jefferson shows us how our federal judiciary willingly chooses to ignore four country’s most important and most credible authority on the meaning and intent of the Constitution when it is faced with the chance to assign greater power to the federal government, there is another reason why this opinion is important: It explains the intended checks and balances on the federal legislature, both horizontal and vertical. The Supreme Court would later find the most important check to be unconstitutional. Imagine that.

At the end of his Opinion, Jefferson writes:

“The negative of the President is the shield provided by the Constitution to protect against the invasions of the legislature: 1. The right of the Executive. 2. Of the Judiciary. 3. Of the States and State legislatures. The present is the case of a right remaining exclusively with the States, and consequently one of those intended by the Constitution to be placed under its protection.”

In other words, the rightful checks on the lawmaking power of the US Congress include:

(1)  The President (he can veto or refuse to sign the bill into law; or he can, by Executive Order, explain that certain provisions are unenforceable because they exceed authority)

(2)  The courts  (the federal courts can strike down a law as “unconstitutional”)

(3)  The States and State legislatures (The States can separately find a federal law to be unconstitutional, per their understanding of the Constitution and per their reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment)

Number (3) above is NULLIFICATION and includes INTERPOSITION. These are the rightful remedies reserved to each State, according to Jefferson when the federal government exceeds its delegated authority under the Constitution and specifically, when it attempts to legislate in areas reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment. A law passed without constitutional authority is a law is a nullity; it is unenforceable.  And it SHOULD be.  It is up to the States, as the most important of the Checks and Balances (a vertical check) to make sure that the people, protected by the Constitution as to the lawful bounds of government, are not subject to unconstitutional laws.

Here you have it, from the earliest days of our republic, the clear and simple articulation of the right of Nullification.

Jefferson, of course, would go on to articulate it much more clearly and forcibly, in the Kentucky Resolves of 1799 (a series of resolutions he wrote secretly for the Kentucky state legislature to oppose the highly unconstitutional Alien & Sedition Acts, enacted by the administration of John Adams. In the Kentucky Resolves of 1799, Jefferson wrote:

“If those who administer the general government be permitted to transgress the limits fixed by that compact, by a total disregard to the special delegations of power therein contained, annihilation of the state governments, and the erection upon their ruins, of a general consolidated government, will be the inevitable consequence: That the principle and construction contended for by sundry of the state legislatures, that the general government is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, stop nothing short of despotism; since the discretion of those who administer the government, and not the constitution, would be the measure of their powers: That the several states who formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction; and that a NULLIFICATION, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy: That this commonwealth does upon the most deliberate reconsideration declare, that the said alien and sedition laws, are in their opinion, palpable violations of the said constitution; and however cheerfully it may be disposed to surrender its opinion to a majority of its sister states in matters of ordinary or doubtful policy; yet, in momentous regulations like the present, which so vitally wound the best rights of the citizen, it would consider a silent acquiescence as highly criminal: That although this commonwealth as a party to the federal compact; will bow to the laws of the Union, yet it does at the same time declare, that it will not now, nor ever hereafter, cease to oppose in a constitutional manner, every attempt from what quarter soever offered, to violate that compact.”

Nullification is, and has always been, a rightful remedy by which each State can review the constitutionality of government acts and policy (and even federal court opinions) and if an abuse is found, to protect the citizens in their States from the tyranny that would result from their enforcement.

 

References:

Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, Avalon Project (Yale Law School).  Referenced at:  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bank-tj.asp

Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, February 15, 1791, Opinion on Bill for Establishing a National Bank, from the Works of Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, from the Library of Congress.  Referenced at:  https://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mtj/mtj1/013/013_0984_0990.pdf    [NOTE:  The Library of Congress was formed when Thomas Jefferson donated the contents of his personal library]

The Kentucky Resolves of 1799 (The Constitution Society).  Referenced at:  http://www.constitution.org/cons/kent1799.htm

4th of July: Reflections

4th of JULY

by Diane Rufino, July 4, 2018

Happy 4th of July!

We celebrate the 4th of July as our Independence Day but it’s really not the date that our country, comprised at the time of the 13 original colonies, became independent from Great Britain. The 4th of July is the date when the Second Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence, which is a very significant date in our country’s path to independence. With the Declaration, the colonies were proclaiming to the world their intent to separate or secede from Britain and establish themselves as sovereign independent states. That would be their goal in fighting the British. A single-paragraph resolution was passed prior to July 4 which simply declares the colonies’ independence. That simple resolution accomplished the goal of officially declaring independence from Britain. But the Second Continental Congress wanted a more detailed version, articulating the reasons for seeking independence, in order to make its case soundly “to a candid world.” To that end, Thomas Jefferson was delegated the important task. The character of the independent colonies would depend on the words and ideals that Jefferson wrote. And so, on July 4, 1776, the Second Continental Congress adopted Jefferson’s grand Declaration of Independence.

The war with Britain began on April 19, 1775, with “the shot heard around the world” at Lexington. That was the date when the forces under Britain’s General Gage went looking to confiscate and destroy Boston’s arsenal of ammunition and thereby render them unable to defend themselves. But for the first year, the colonies, through the First Continental Congress, hoped to end hostilities and resume a good relationship with their mother country. And so it pursued a course of negotiations. But, as Patrick Henry emphasized in his famous “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death!” speech: “We have petitioned; we have remonstrated; we have supplicated; we have prostrated ourselves before the throne, and have implored its interposition to arrest the tyrannical hands of the ministry and Parliament. Our petitions have been slighted; our remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult; our supplications have been disregarded; and we have been spurned, with contempt, from the foot of the throne. In vain, after these things, how can we indulge the fond hope of peace and reconciliation? There is no longer any room for hope. If we wish to be free, if we mean to preserve inviolate those inestimable privileges for which we have been so long contending, if we mean not basely to abandon the noble struggle in which we have been so long engaged, and which we have pledged ourselves never to abandon until the glorious object of our contest shall be obtained, we must fight!”

And so the colonies came together. It was no longer a war only involving Massachusetts. If Britain could exercise tyrannical rule over the citizens of Boston and the rest of the Commonwealth, it would surely do the same to the other colonies. In the second year of the war, the Second Continental Congress conducted and managed the war as one for independence.

The Revolutionary War would end five years later, on October 19, 1861, when General Cornwallis surrendered to General George Washington at Yorktown. The war would officially be over, and the colonies officially recognized by Britain as 13 independent sovereigns on September 3, 1783 when the Treaty of Paris was signed by representatives of King George III and by Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, John Jay, and David Hartley as representatives for the colonies.

The Treaty of Paris declared the intention of both parties to “forget all past misunderstandings and differences” and “secure to both perpetual peace and harmony.” It went on to state:

“Britain acknowledges the United States (New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia) to be free, sovereign, and independent states, and that the British Crown and all heirs and successors relinquish claims to the Government, property, and territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof…..”

The revolutionary and magnificent principles articulated in the Declaration not only laid the political and philosophical foundation of our country but it changed the course of the entire world. Mankind has been eternally better off for those principles. But the sad truth is that most of the ideals set forth in the Declaration have been rejected by the very history of our country. The Declaration will continue to mean very little until we as a country reject and condemn the actions of Abraham Lincoln when he invaded, coerced, and subjugated the southern states back into the Union when they sought independence. And the Declaration will continue to mean very little until we reject the notion that our government has the right and primary purpose of seeking its own power and permanent existence rather than existing primarily to secure the fundamental rights of the individual (but subject to being altered or abolished when it ceases to serve that goal and instead frustrates the exercise of those rights).

But Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence will always stand as a testament to the best and most noble intentions of man in establishing an ordered society predicated on the inalienable rights of the individual.

HAPPY 4th of JULY!

 

***  I apologize for posting this article late, but my computer crashed and burned, and I had to research and purchase another.

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES: The Very Real Tendency of Federal Courts to Render Unconstitutional Opinions

THOMAS JEFFERSON - with reading glasses

(Photo Credit – FreakingNews.com)

by Diane Rufino, March 26, 2018

We are all used to the accusations that a certain Executive Action is unconstitutional or a federal law is unconstitutional, and we are used to challenges to them in federal court. We remember how the progressive federal appellate courts of the 11th and 9th circuits struck down President Trump’s proposed travel ban as an unconstitutional exercise of discretion. And we here in North Carolina are still stunned and outraged at the 4th Circuit for usurping our state’s right to a democratic form of government (Article IV, Section 4 of the US Constitution) and our reserved powers under the 10th amendment when it struck down our duly-enacted Voter ID Law.

We all understand that unconstitutional actions by those branches must be recognized and addressed; they must be struck down and thus not enforceable.

What we don’t hear are accusations that certain Supreme Court, and other federal court decisions, are unconstitutional. The truth is that they, just like the actions of the other ranches, are capable of exceeding proper authority and presenting an abuse of power that amounts to federal tyranny.

Why do we just accept their decisions? Why is it that we simply tell ourselves and others: “Well, the Court has decided. It has handed down its opinion.” And then we surrender our protests to that decision, even though we KNOW it is an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power.

Thomas Jefferson recognized the potential of the federal judiciary for profound abuses of power even as early as 1801. In a letter he wrote to his friend, Adamantios Coray, on October 31, 1823, he warned: “At the establishment of our constitutions, the judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and harmless members of the government. Experience, however, soon showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office; that their decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors only, pass silent and unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions, nevertheless, become law by precedent, sapping, by little and little, the foundations of the constitution, and working its change by construction, before any one has perceived that that invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its substance. In truth, man is not made to be trusted for life if secured against all liability to account.”

How do we know for sure that certain federal court opinions are unconstitutional? Sometimes the justices are truthful and tell us so in their dissenting opinions. And sometimes they explain in detail why it is so.

I wrote an article a few days ago about just such a case, the Obergefell v. Hodges case (2015) – the gay marriage decision. Four justices out of the nine wrote dissenting opinions explaining exactly why the majority opinion (5-4) was unconstitutional. So, instead of focusing on the majority opinion in a court decision, as I almost always do, in this article, I focus on the dissenting opinions.

I think it’s important for people to know – to understand – that federal court opinions are often incorrectly decided and moreover, are often decided by exercising power and discretion that they DO NOT HAVE.

The article, “OBERGEFELL v. HODGES: The Scathing Dissent by Chief Justice John Roberts Explains Why the Majority Opinion Was an Abuse of Judicial Power Under the US Constitution,” is posted on my blogsite:  https://forloveofgodandcountry.com/2018/03/23/obergefell-v-hodges-the-scathing-dissent-by-chief-justice-john-roberts-explains-why-the-majority-opinion-was-an-abuse-of-judicial-power-under-the-us-constitution/

 

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES: The Scathing Dissent by Chief Justice John Roberts Explains Why the Majority Opinion Was an Abuse of Judicial Power Under the US Constitution

 

GAY MARRIAGE - Mitch and Cam (2)

by Diane Rufino, March 16, 2018

“If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.”  — Chief Justice John Roberts, dissenting opinion, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

I’ve been writing articles for years, mostly to help enlighten and educate others who may not have the time or opportunity to read as much as I have. The Tea Party movement – whether you choose to believe it to be a physical grassroots movement to help return our country to its intended constitutional design or a intangible gut reaction by the American people in response to years of destructive progressive policies that have resulted in our large, bloated, ineffective, wasteful, overly-imposing, over-regulating, aggressive, elitist, condescending, above-the-law, and unconstitutional government and in too much intrusion in their lives, too many conditions on their rights, and too much control over their decisions and their property – has awakened a new era of patriotism. It has resulted in a return to education on our founding documents and founding values, it has resulted in a good chunk of the American people wanting to understand how our government got so oft-kilter and how such disastrous policies resulted from it, it has resulted in a good chunk of the American people devoting their spare time to “watchdog” activities in which they watch and research actions by their local, state, and federal officials, it has resulted in a good chunk of the American people keeping informed and updated on the issues, and it has resulted in a good chunk of the American people (true conservatives) taking an active role in politics and committing themselves to finding and supporting conservative, fiscally-responsible, constitutionally-minded individuals for office. The Tea Party movement, again, whether a physical grassroots movement or simply the gut reaction of individuals to reaffirm America’s ideals, has spurred a new “revolutionary” spirit in this county, determined to reel back the disastrous policies of the past half of a century or more, determined to bring back the absolute protections of our founding generation for the rights and declarations recognized in the Bill of Rights, including religious liberties, the right to have and bear arms, free speech, and the reserved powers of the individual (free) states.

And so, most of what I write seeks to educate on what our Founding Fathers sought to establish with this union of states that we call the United States and then what they, in fact, did establish. I spend a lot of time writing about history and the using history to explain the meaning and intent of our founding documents, including the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and Bill of Rights. I also spend a lot of time writing about the different remedies to address the various violations by the three branches of government. The hope in all my writings is to help Americans adopt the proper mindset necessary to recognize abuses by the federal government (and why they are abuses) and to then seek the proper remedies in order to stem the obvious slide into government tyranny that we have been witnessing over the past many years (but which is now in overdrive). The proper mindset is the key. The hope is, through education and a re-acquaintance with our founding principles (and the compelling history behind them), to spark a fire in them which reminds them of the American revolutionary spirit: “We don’t have to take it!”  To take the abuse that government unconstitutionally exercises is to give up on the American dream of our founding generation, to give up on the notion that individual liberty is worth defending, and to willfully give up the awesome responsibility we have as Americans to preserve what was handed to us by our forefathers to subsequent generations.

The first step, of course, is to recognize the violations committed by the branches of the federal government –  all three of them. And then, most importantly, to seek to do something about them.

We’ve heard of abuses of power by the federal legislative branch and by the executive branch. The Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), as written, intended, and passed by Congress on March 23,2010, was an unconstitutional piece of legislation (the Supreme Court admitted so, exceeding the limits of the Commerce Clause, upon which the government attempted to support its authority) and portions of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) are as well [the annual military budget continues, from the 2012 NDAA, to include a provision which allows for the indefinite detention of American citizens without a right to trial, undermining essential guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth and Fifth (Due Process) amendments, and as well as the guarantees provided to an “accused”]. The mass surveillance and collection of ordinary citizen’s phone data is an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, as well as other federal grant-related legislation, which seek to do an end-run around the Constitution by funding state projects with federal conditions and strings attached, are probably unconstitutional as being without a proper grant of authority under Article I, Section 8 (“to provide for the General Welfare” is not in and of itself a separate grant of power and hence also not legitimate under the taxing and spending power). The Reconstruction Acts were unconstitutional and the Depression-era programs created by Congress during FDR’s administration were unconstitutional. Any proposed gun control law raising the age to 21 for the purchase of handguns would be unconstitutional. President Obama’s executive department weaponized the IRS to target Tea Party and other conservative groups only and prevent them from organizing and thus minimizing their effect in the 2012 election. His Justice Department weaponized the FISA program to go after the Trump campaign in an attempt to effect the outcome of the 2016 presidential election and then (when Hillary didn’t win), to fabricate a false claim of collusion with the Russians to poison his presidency.

In all these instances, the legislative and executive branches have exceeded or are exceeding the power to govern delegated to them by the States in the US Constitution.

But what no one talks about is the abuses by the third brand of government, and perhaps the most powerful one – the judicial branch. Everyone assumes that its opinions are legitimate exercises of judicial power. We so often hear the line: “Well there’s nothing we can do about it now. The Supreme Court has spoken.” The men and women in black robes who sit on the federal benches have immense power. And all too often, they abuse it.  We’ve all heard of judicial activism – the making of law from the bench, which is unconstitutional as violating the Separation of Powers doctrine, or the ruling on “political matters” which is unconstitutional under the Political Question doctrine, or the ruling on matters not addressed in the Constitution which is unconstitutional since the courts only have legal jurisdiction on the interpretation of the Constitution and laws made in furtherance of its legitimate powers. The problem is that no one can do anything about it.  Or they just aren’t willing to.

Some Supreme Court cases which are likely unconstitutional are as follows:  Flemming v. Nestor (1960, in which the Court substituted its judgement for the Congress and recharacterized Social Security deductions, declaring that amounts taken out of an employee’s paycheck for the Social Security program are no longer personal property but property of the federal government so that Congress can have flexibility to use the money as it believes is necessary), Everson v. Board of Education (1947, in which the Court erected the “Wall of Separation” between Church and government to set a boundary on the Establishment Clause; the “wall of separation” is a legal fiction and has no basis in law or commentary on the meaning or intent of the Constitution), Roe v. Wade (1973, in which the Court not only usurped a rightful reserved power of the individual States, in violation of the tenth amendment, to regulate on abortion, but also found a fundamental right to an abortion on demand in the Constitution, thus denying the right to life to an unborn even up to the very moment prior to its delivery), Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971, in which the Court not only made law from the bench but also usurped a rightful reserved power of the individual States, in violation of the tenth amendment, to regulate on education; there is NO constitutional basis to force states to bus its children arbitrarily to schools out of their residential area to meet racial quotas), Miranda v. Arizona (1966, in which the Court ruled, without any basis to do so, that special guarantees – in the form of the Miranda Warning – are needed to protect the constitutional rights in the 5th, 6th, and 7th amendments of a criminally-accused; again the Court established constitutional policy and guidelines for law based on a legal fiction), National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012, the “Obamacare” decision, in which the Court substituted its judgement for the Congress re-characterizing the mandate from a “penalty,” as Congress intended, to a “tax,” and in doing so saving the law from being struck down as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause to being supported by the Taxing power; note that the recharacterization was still an unconstitutional use of the taxing power because the mandate still “acts” like a penalty or punishment, which is an improper, and unconstitutional use of the taxing power), and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015, in which the Court usurped the legitimate reserved power of the individual States to regulate on marriage).  With respect to Circuit Court decisions, those striking down President Trump’s travel bans are unconstitutional (the president has the express and unlimited power to regulate on which persons or groups of persons can come into the country) and the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in 2016 (NC State Conference of the NAACP v. Pat McCrory) striking down the NC Voter ID law (not only substituting its judgement – an offensive and defamatory judgement by the way – for that of the state legislature and also ignoring the Supreme Court’s holding in Shelby v. Holder, in 2013, striking down the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but blatantly usurping the legitimate reserved power of the State of North Carolina under the tenth amendment to regulate its elections and violating Article IV, Section 4 of the US Constitution which assures that the federal government will guarantee each State a democratic form of government) is unconstitutional.

Addressing an audience at a Pew Forum Conference (themed: “A Call for Reckoning”), Justice Antonin Scalia spoke these words: “My difficulty with Roe v. Wade is a legal rather than a moral one. I do not believe – and no one believed for 200 years – that the Constitution contains a right to abortion. The Constitution gives the federal government and, hence, me, as a justice of the Supreme Court, no power over the matter.”  He continued: “The Constitution contains no right to abortion. It is not to be found in the longstanding traditions of our society, nor can it be logically deduced from the text of the Constitution – not, that is, without volunteering a judicial answer to the nonjusticiable question of when human life begins. Leaving this matter to the political process is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically so. That alone – and not lawyerly dissection of federal judicial precedents – can produce compromises satisfying a sufficient mass of the electorate. The Court should end its disruptive intrusion into this field as soon as possible.”

The Supreme Court may have given itself the final word on the meaning and intent of the Constitution and the laws made in furtherance of it (Marbury v. Madison, 1803; see below), but it was the ambitions of the progressive movement at the end of the 19th century which led to an even more expansive, and dangerous, view  of the judiciary. In this progressive expansive view, federal courts create policy that couldn’t pass the legislative branch or, if it did, would generate voter backlash. Since federal judges and justices are appointed for life, they can do what they like from the bench without voter backlash, including ignoring the legal meaning of the Constitution.

“What secret knowledge, one must wonder, is breathed into lawyers when they become Justices of this Court, wrote Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in the case Wabaunsee County, KS v. Umbehr (1996), ”that enables them to discern that a practice which the text of the Constitution does not clearly proscribe, and which our people have regarded as constitutional for 200 years, is in fact unconstitutional?”

The judiciary is truly an untouchable branch.

Again, the problem is that no one can, or is willing, to do anything about the abuse of constitutional powers with respect to the Supreme Court or lower federal court opinions that are final decisions. Yet there are rightful remedies that I have written about, including nullification and interposition.

 

THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

SUPREME COURT (2017)

The facts of the case are simple enough.  In the last days of President John Adams’ presidency, he nominated a number of people to serve as justices of the peace for the District of Columbia. The Senate confirmed the nominations, and the commissions were prepared. President Adams’ Secretary of State, John Marshall, did not deliver all of the commissions before President Thomas Jefferson took office on March 4 (because he was also acting as the newly-appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, being sworn in on Jan. 31). President Jefferson then ordered his Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the commissions. The plaintiffs, men who were appointed but whose commissions were not delivered, sued Madison in the Supreme Court and argued that, in refusing to deliver the commissions, the Secretary of State was neglecting his Constitutional duty. The important detail is that they sought relief in the Supreme Court, under its original jurisdiction (court of first review, not as an appeal), which was a remedy specifically provided in the Judiciary Act of 1789. They could have sought their commissions through other avenues but the particular remedy they pursued was through the Judiciary Act.

The Court, with Marshall as its new chief justice, dissected the case into three questions: (1) Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions?  (2) Can they sue for their commissions in court?  (3) Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their commissions?  The importance of the case is not in the answers to these questions but in the opportunity that Marshall used to articulate a critical role for the Supreme Court and in doing so, securing it as an omnipotent branch of the government.

In its answers to the above questions, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution grants the president the power to appoint and commission officers of the United States. Because the only evidence of the appointment is the commission, the two actions are tied together. Without the commission, the appointment is not complete, and so the president’s signature on the commission and its delivery are the final steps in the appointment process.  However, the Court held, once an appointment is made, the officers have acquired rights to their positions under the law. If those rights are denied, then they may seek redress in the courts. But the fatal decision that Marbury made, and the others as well, was to seek an original action for their commissions in the Supreme Court. As Marshall noted, the congressional act, the Judiciary Act of 1789, conferring that authority to the Court conflicts with Article III Section 2 of the Constitution. The judicial power in the United States extends to all cases under the Constitution and the Supreme Court is bound to decide cases according to the Constitution rather than the law when the two conflict. So, if a law is found to be in conflict with the Constitution, then the law is invalid (= “judicial review”).  In this case, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act ran counter to the Constitution and is therefore void. Thus, lacking authority, the Supreme Court canceled Marbury’s claim.

In other words, although Marbury was entitled to his commission, the Supreme Court was unable to grant it because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, assigning that power to the Court, conflicted with Article III Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and was therefore null and void. Marshall articulated that this analysis (judicial review) was the process by which to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. He was not the first to articulate or apply judicial review; the state courts were already applying such analysis for their own constitutions. But, he reasoned, one court must be responsible for interpreting the Constitution and saying what the law is and that court MUST be the US Supreme Court (ie, the federal courts). “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”  Marshall advanced a position not assigned in the Constitution nor articulated in the essays explaining the Constitution and its provisions, as well as the anticipated operation of the federal government.

The next assault on the design of the federal government, at the hands of the Supreme Court, came in 1819 with the case of McCulloch v. Maryland. In that case, Chief Justice Marshall considered the question of how to construe the government’s powers in Article I, Section 8 – namely thru the “Necessary & Proper” Clause (a common legal clause included in contracts to give force to the responsibilities listed in the contract; in Article 8, it gave force (but strict limits) to all the powers enumerated before it). In considering that question, he reviewed advice given to President George Washington by both Thomas Jefferson, his Secretary of State and a man devoted to a small government of limited powers, and Alexander Hamilton, his Treasury Secretary and a proponent of a large government of concentrated powers, as to whether his administration had the power to establish a national bank, as Hamilton requested. Jefferson, naturally, advised that the government’s powers in the Constitution must be construed exactly as written, and thus construed narrowly, while Hamilton advised that they need to be construed broadly. Washington sided with Hamilton. And so did Marshall. Writing for the Court in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the “Necessary & Proper” Clause (government can do whatever is “necessary and proper” to carry out its functions) to mean that the government can do anything it feels is “convenient” and makes it easier to carry out federal power. He articulated that Congress possesses unenumerated – or “implied” – powers not explicitly outlined in the Constitution, and thus, the government is one essentially of unlimited powers.

John Marshall, the fourth Chief Justice of the United States, appointed by President John Adams, presided over the Supreme Court longer than any other occupant of that chair – for 34 years (1801–1835). Because the Court was a relatively insignificant legal forum when he arrived but became the most powerful court in the land by the time he died, Marshall, for bad or good, is justly the most celebrated judge in our history.  The federal courts were a particular area of interest for outgoing President Adams in the wake of the presidential election of 1800. With the Federalists soundly defeated and about to lose both the executive and legislative branches to Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans, Adams and the lame duck Congress passed what came to be known as the Midnight Judges Act, which made sweeping changes to the federal judiciary, including a reduction in the number of Justices on the Supreme Court from six to five (upon the next vacancy in the court) so as to deny Jefferson an appointment until two vacancies occurred. As the incumbent Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth was in poor health, Adams wanted to replace him with a younger justice before he left office. He first offered the seat to ex-Chief Justice John Jay (one of the authors of the Federalist Papers essays), who declined on the grounds that the Court lacked “energy, weight, and dignity.” But because there was precious little time left, Adams nominated Marshall, then aged 45, who just happened to be his Secretary of State at the time. Marshall was confirmed by the Senate on January 27, 1801, and received his commission on January 31. While Marshall officially took office on February 4, he continued to also serve as Secretary of State until Adams’ term expired on March 4. President John Adam, who died a few hours after Thomas Jefferson on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1826, had this to say about his appointment of Marshall: “My gift of John Marshall to the people of the United States was the proudest act of my life.”

John Marshall’s legal training comprised three months of attending the law lectures of George Wythe at the College of William and Mary. In fact, these three months were his only formal education since grammar school. Nevertheless, he was admitted to the practice of law immediately after those lectures, in 1780.

Marshall’s legacy is indeed an enlargement of the powers of the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary in general.  (It should be noted that at the time, the Supreme Court met for only three months out of the year and during the other months would “ride circuit,” which meant they would serve on the lower federal courts, the federal courts of appeal or district courts, filling in wherever they could).

Ironically, it was Chief Justice John Marshall, the man who wrote: “We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs” who, in fact, forgot that it was a constitution he was expounding, intended to endure for ages to come.

So Jefferson was right about the potential of the Supreme Court after all. In a letter to his friend Edward Livingston in 1825, he lamented over what the judiciary had already become: “This member of the Government was at first considered as the most harmless and helpless of all its organs. But it has proved that the power of declaring what the law is, ad libitum, by sapping and mining slyly and without alarm the foundations of the Constitution, can do what open force would not dare to attempt.”

In 1821, Jefferson wrote to his friend Charles Hammond: “It has long been my opinion, and I have never shrunk from its expression,… that the germ of dissolution of our Federal Government is in the constitution of the Federal Judiciary–an irresponsible body (for impeachment is scarcely a scare-crow), working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief over the field of jurisdiction until all shall be usurped from the States and the government be consolidated into one. To this I am opposed…..  When all government, domestic and foreign, in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another, and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated.”

In 1820, he wrote to William Jarvis: “To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions [is] a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men and not more so. They have with others the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. Their maxim is boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem [good justice is broad jurisdiction], and their power the more dangerous as they are in office for life and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves … . When the legislative or executive functionaries act unconstitutionally, they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity. The exemption of the judges from that is quite dangerous enough. I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society, but the people themselves.”

Also in 1820, he wrote to Thomas Ritchie: “The judiciary of the United States is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric. They are construing our Constitution from a co-ordination of a general and special government to a general and supreme one alone.’”

James Madison also warned of the dangers of a powerful federal judiciary.

In a letter James Madison wrote on October 15, 1788 to a former roommate of his, John Brown (of Kentucky), he wrote: “Refusing or not refusing to execute a law to stamp it with its final character . . . makes the Judiciary department paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can never be proper.” In his famous Report of 1800 (aka, “Committee Report on the Alien & Sedition Acts”), Madison warned: “On any other hypothesis, the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of this department with the others in usurped powers, might subvert forever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve.”

A limited and reserved judiciary was anticipated at the time the union was established, in 1788.

To convince the States of the limited nature of the federal government created by the new Constitution of 1787, and hence encourage them to ratify it in their conventions, Alexander Hamilton outlined exactly the position that the federal judiciary would occupy in the new government scheme in his Federalist Papers essays. Its role would be simply to offer an “opinion” on constitutional questions to the other branches and to the States. In his essay No. 78 (dated June 14, 1788), in which he articulated the role of the federal judiciary under the US Constitution, Alexander Hamilton articulated: “The Judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will.”  Further in that essay, he wrote: “And it proves, in the last place, that liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments.”  In his essay No. 81 (dated June 25, 1788), also addressing the federal judiciary, Hamilton wrote: “In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts of every State.”

The States relied on the commentary and explanations in the Federalist Papers in ratifying the Constitution, and also on the promise that a Bill of Rights would be added to further limit the power of the common government. They would not have agreed to leave all decisions as to the extend and scope of federal power completely and exclusively to the federal government itself.

The Supreme Court, and federal courts in general, are the most threatening branch of the federal government because they have the power to alter and re-interpret the Constitution, in effect, to “re-write” it without the legal requirement of going thru the Article V amendment process. The other branches merely ignore the Constitution or are ignorant to the authority it grants and the limitations it requires. They are also the most threatening branch to our democratic process because they can circumvent the democratic process on social issues without any repercussions at the ballot box.

In a speech he delivered to the class at Catholic University, Columbus School of Law, he said: “Robert F. Kennedy used to say, ‘Some men see things as they are and ask why. Others dream things that never were and ask why not?’  That outlook has become a far too common and destructive approach to interpreting the law.”

Before he passed, Justice Antonin Scalia was quoted from an interview he did with Bloomberg magazine: “It is difficult to maintain the illusion that we are interpreting a Constitution, rather than inventing one, when we amend its provisions so breezily.”

On February 24, 2002, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee member, let it slip on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that she would oppose appeals court nominee Charles Pickering because he had ‘right-wing views, both politically and personally.’

At least she admitted what we all knew – that judges to the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, are selected based on their political views.

In his article “The Judiciary: The Strongest and Most Dangerous Branch?”, Tom Jipping wrote: “Ask yourself this question: why are political or personal views a qualification to be a judge rather than, say, politician? What is it that Senator Feinstein thinks judges do that makes their political and personal views important?”

This is, at the core, why we have such a problem with the federal courts. This is why each president ambitiously appoints judges to the federal courts. This is what the debate over the power and appointment of judges is all about. Political and personal views should NEVER determine fitness to serve in the judiciary.

Jipping continued: “A judicial nominee’s political or personal views are relevant for only one reason; because one thinks those views determine judicial rulings. That is, judges are free to make decisions based not on the law, but on their own personal views. Stating that view is enough to expose its danger to our liberty. Government decisions based on political or personal views are political decisions, made by those we elect to make our laws and over whom we have electoral control. Judicial decisions must be based on law, not on political or personal views. Our liberty depends on them separating law from politics.  You are no doubt familiar with the phrase “a government of laws, and not of men.” But how many know where it comes from? It appears at the end of Article 487 of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. Article 487 says that “the judicial [branch] shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.”

If judges base their decisions on their political or personal views, they are not interpreting. They are making law or transforming the Constitution or the law they are reviewing. They are bending or conforming the Constitution or law to their political or personal views. This is what is meant by a government of men and not a government of laws.  We have no security for our liberty with a government of men.

Justice Scalia confirmed the sake in his remarks before the Philadelphia Bar Association on April 29, 2004: “As long as judges tinker with the Constitution to ‘do what the people want,’ instead of what the document actually commands, politicians who pick and confirm new federal judges will naturally want only those who agree with them politically.”

Our current Supreme Court has a split nature. Four of the justices base their decisions on political and/or personal views; these are the liberal justices. The Constitution has no firm meaning to them. Another four justices strictly construe the Constitution, just as they would a contract, believing the document means what it says and continues to mean the same thing until properly amended; these are the conservative justices. So, apparently we have a hybrid government – partly a government of men and partly a government of laws. It is the ninth justice, the swing-voter, who has the last word on the matter.

Law Professor Robert E. Riggs wrote, in his 1993 Hofstra Law Review article “When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the Supreme Court, 1900-1990”:

“The word of the Supreme Court is the law of the land. From the decision of its nine appointed Justices there is no appeal and, for most disappointed suitors, no legal redress at all. The losers in a case of wide public interest might hope someday to seek a legislative remedy, but the process of legislative redress is slow, cumbersome, and uncertain. When the issue turns on the meaning and application of the US Constitution, the decision is truly final, subject to modification only by constitutional amendment or by a subsequent Supreme Court. The exercise of such awesome lawmaking power by so few nonelected public servants is a paradox in a democratic society, and the paradox is heightened when the issue is close. In a nine-member court, five votes are sufficient to determine the outcome, even if four strongly dissent. In the early decades of this century, when 5-4 decisions were few and unanimity was the rule, critics of the Court often suggested that decisions by a single vote – especially when voiding a statute – were somehow illegitimate. Today, Supreme Court decisions still give rise to criticism and protest and, in extreme cases, public agitation to overturn them. Criticisms of such decisions are primarily substantive, however, and the procedure that gives the same legal weight to a 5-4 as to a 9-0 decision is seldom challenged.

The 5-4 decisions of the United States Supreme Court highlight the essentially political nature of the body. The ideal of nine jurists collectively resolving disputes according to the dictates of the law and the Constitution is superseded by an image of nine Justices voting individual preferences in situations where substantive rules seem to provide little guidance. Both the ideal and the image are caricatures-the unanimous decisions tending toward one extreme and the 5-4 decisions toward the other-but each reflects elements of the complex underlying reality of Supreme Court decision-making. Until well into this century, unanimity was the dominant image. Published dissent was limited to a small fraction of decided cases, with 5-4 decisions still less frequent. This frequency does not necessarily portray a Court governed more by principle than by personal preference.”

The inability for 9 justices to be able to see eye-to-eye on the meaning and intent of the Constitution, including all its provisions limitations, should be exceedingly troublesome to every American, especially when there is ample commentary, explanations, warnings, discussions, debates on the merits, and direct instructions by the drafter himself (James Madison), the delegates who – through robust debate and discussion – worked together to put it in its final form, the men who wrote the Federalist Papers (the greatest authority as to the meaning and intent of the Constitution; written by Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay), the Founding Fathers who helped guide its ratification in the State conventions, and the Congressional record.  No Supreme Court opinion should ever include any interpretation of the Constitution or its provisions/limitations that differs in any way, shape, or form from any of the authorities just mentioned. Yet we see it all the time, especially after the turn of the century (post 1900).  5-4 opinions, which account for about 30% or more of the total opinions of the more recent Supreme Court, should call into question the ability of the Court to be able to effectively, objectively, and responsibly maintain the integrity of our great document. And if the highest court of the land cannot do so, then it should cease to be the final arbiter on constitutional matters. Otherwise, our Constitution is in grave danger and our constitutional republic is as well.  There is no confidence in a court decision that is 5-4.  Because there is no consensus by court members in such a split opinion, there is no comfort among the people that the Constitution was faithfully, diligently, ethically, and dutifully interpreted. They know that the Court is a highly politicized tribunal. It’s nature has become political. They know that one half of the Court truly understands what the Constitution says and requires and the other side intentionally rejects that position. The approval or disapproval of the opinion rests with the vote of the swing voter. The 5-4 decisions of the United States Supreme Court highlight the essentially political nature of the body.

There are many federal court opinions which represent an abuse of judicial power – a political opinion rather than a constitutional one. Some are clear abuses and some are subtle. I have mentioned a few of the more blatant ones above.

To the trained constitutionalist – again, this being the goal of my writings – each and every violation is – and would be – apparent. One simply needs to be well-educated or well-versed on the Constitution and its history.

 

THE DISSENTING OPINION IN THE OBERGEFELL OPINION

SUPREME COURT - conservative members (2017) - minus Kennedy

In some cases, the dissenting justices accuse the majority of reaching an unconstitutional opinion, and often explain why. One such case is the Obergefell case. The Obergefell opinion is clearly an unconstitutional decision – one of obvious over-reach, motivated by a desire to advance a social agenda. The opinion was a 5-4 decision in which the liberal justices (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan) were joined by the swing voter Anthony Kennedy, to outnumber the opinion of the conservative justices (Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Samuel Alito). But the conservative justices refused to remain quiet regarding the majority opinion. Each wrote a separate dissenting opinion accusing the majority of ignoring their role as a member of the federal bench, of twisting the meaning of the Constitution, of enlarging the meaning of the term “Due Process” (blatantly ignoring the Supreme Court’s own definition and precedent), of ignoring the Tenth Amendment, of committing judicial activism, etc etc.

I want to emphasis the point I am trying to make in this article – which is that the federal courts are guilty, perhaps even more than the other branches, of unconstitutional abuses – by focusing on the Obergefell case and examining the dissenting opinions. I have highlighted key excerpts from the dissenting opinions by Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito, which are all very strong, but have included the entire dissenting opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts.

A.  JUSTICE SCALIA

SCALIA (#7)

The late Justice Antonin Scalia wrote:

I join The Chief Justice’s opinion in full. I write separately to call attention to this Court’s threat to American democracy.

The substance of today’s decree is not of immense personal importance to me. The law can recognize as marriage whatever sexual attachments and living arrangements it wishes, and can accord them favorable civil consequences, from tax treatment to rights of inheritance. Those civil consequences—and the public approval that conferring the name of marriage evidences—can perhaps have adverse social effects, but no more adverse than the effects of many other controversial laws. So it is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage. It is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me. Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is the furthest extension in fact—and the furthest extension one can even imagine—of the Court’s claimed power to create “liberties” that the Constitution and its Amendments neglect to mention. This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.

Until the courts put a stop to it, public debate over same-sex marriage displayed American democracy at its best. Individuals on both sides of the issue passionately, but respectfully, attempted to persuade their fellow citizens to accept their views. Americans considered the arguments and put the question to a vote. The electorates of 11 States, either directly or through their representatives, chose to expand the traditional definition of marriage. Many more decided not to. Win or lose, advocates for both sides continued pressing their cases, secure in the knowledge that an electoral loss can be negated by a later electoral win. That is exactly how our system of government is supposed to work.

The Constitution places some constraints on self-rule—constraints adopted by the People themselves when they ratified the Constitution and its Amendments. Forbidden are laws “impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” denying “Full Faith and Credit” to the “public Acts” of other States, prohibiting the free exercise of religion, abridging the freedom of speech, infringing the right to keep and bear arms, authorizing unreasonable searches and seizures, and so forth. Aside from these limitations, those powers “reserved to the States respectively, or to the people” can be exercised as the States or the People desire. These cases ask us to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment contains a limitation that requires the States to license and recognize marriages between two people of the same sex. Does it remove that issue from the political process?

Of course not. It would be surprising to find a prescription regarding marriage in the Federal Constitution since, as the author of today’s opinion reminded us only two years ago (in an opinion joined by the same Justices who join him today):

“Regulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”

“The Federal Government, through our history, has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations.”

But we need not speculate. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these cases. When it comes to determining the meaning of a vague constitutional provision—such as “due process of law” or “equal protection of the laws” — it is unquestionable that the People who ratified that provision did not understand it to prohibit a practice that remained both universal and uncontroversial in the years after ratification. We have no basis for striking down a practice that is not expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, and that bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use dating back to the Amendment’s ratification. Since there is no doubt whatever that the People never decided to prohibit the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples, the public debate over same-sex marriage must be allowed to continue.

But the Court ends this debate, in an opinion lacking even a thin veneer of law. Buried beneath the mummeries and straining-to-be-memorable passages of the opinion is a candid and startling assertion: No matter what it was the People ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment protects those rights that the Judiciary, in its “reasoned judgment,” thinks the Fourteenth Amendment ought to protect. That is so because “the generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions . . . . ”One would think that sentence would continue: “. . . and therefore they provided for a means by which the People could amend the Constitution,” or perhaps “. . . and therefore they left the creation of additional liberties, such as the freedom to marry someone of the same sex, to the People, through the never-ending process of legislation.” But no. What logically follows, in the majority’s judge-empowering estimation, is: “and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.” The “we,” needless to say, is the nine of us. “History and tradition guide and discipline [our] inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.” Thus, rather than focusing on the People’s understanding of “liberty”—at the time of ratification or even today—the majority focuses on four “principles and traditions” that, in the majority’s view, prohibit States from defining marriage as an institution consisting of one man and one woman.

This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government. Except as limited by a constitutional prohibition agreed to by the People, the States are free to adopt whatever laws they like, even those that offend the esteemed Justices’ “reasoned judgment.” A system of government that makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy.

Judges are selected precisely for their skill as lawyers; whether they reflect the policy views of a particular constituency is not (or should not be) relevant. Not surprisingly then, the Federal Judiciary is hardly a cross-section of America. Take, for example, this Court, which consists of only nine men and women, all of them successful lawyers who studied at Harvard or Yale Law School. Four of the nine are natives of New York City. Eight of them grew up in east- and west-coast States. Only one hails from the vast expanse in-between. Not a single Southwesterner or even, to tell the truth, a genuine Westerner (California does not count). Not a single evangelical Christian (a group that comprises about one quarter of Americans[19]), or even a Protestant of any denomination. The strikingly unrepresentative character of the body voting on today’s social upheaval would be irrelevant if they were functioning as judges, answering the legal question whether the American people had ever ratified a constitutional provision that was understood to proscribe the traditional definition of marriage. But of course the Justices in today’s majority are not voting on that basis; they say they are not. And to allow the policy question of same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social transformation without representation.

But what really astounds is the hubris reflected in today’s judicial Putsch. The five Justices who compose today’s majority are entirely comfortable concluding that every State violated the Constitution for all of the 135 years between the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification and Massachusetts’ permitting of same-sex marriages in 2003. They have discovered in the Fourteenth Amendment a “fundamental right” overlooked by every person alive at the time of ratification, and almost everyone else in the time since. They see what lesser legal minds—minds like Thomas Cooley, John Marshall Harlan, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Learned Hand, Louis Brandeis, William Howard Taft, Benjamin Cardozo, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, and Henry Friendly—could not. They are certain that the People ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to bestow on them the power to remove questions from the democratic process when that is called for by their “reasoned judgment.” These Justices know that limiting marriage to one man and one woman is contrary to reason; they know that an institution as old as government itself, and accepted by every nation in history until 15 years ago, cannot possibly be supported by anything other than ignorance or bigotry. And they are willing to say that any citizen who does not agree with that, who adheres to what was, until 15 years ago, the unanimous judgment of all generations and all societies, stands against the Constitution.

The opinion is couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic. It is one thing for separate concurring or dissenting opinions to contain extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and expression; it is something else for the official opinion of the Court to do so. Of course the opinion’s showy profundities are often profoundly incoherent. “The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.” (Really? Who ever thought that intimacy and spirituality [whatever that means] were freedoms? And if intimacy is, one would think Freedom of Intimacy is abridged rather than expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest hippie. Expression, sure enough, is a freedom, but anyone in a long-lasting marriage will attest that that happy state constricts, rather than expands, what one can prudently say.) Rights, we are told, can “rise . . . from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” (Huh? How can a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives [whatever that means] define [whatever that means] an urgent liberty [never mind], give birth to a right?) And we are told that, “in any particular case,” either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause “may be thought to capture the essence of[a right in a more accurate and comprehensive way,” than the other, “even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.” (What say? What possible “essence” does substantive due process “capture” in an “accurate and comprehensive way”? It stands for nothing whatever, except those freedoms and entitlements that this Court really likes. And the Equal Protection Clause, as employed today, identifies nothing except a difference in treatment that this Court really dislikes. Hardly a distillation of essence. If the opinion is correct that the two clauses “converge in the identification and definition of [a] right,” that is only because the majority’s likes and dislikes are predictably compatible.) I could go on. The world does not expect logic and precision in poetry or inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them in the law. The stuff contained in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis.

*  *  *

Hubris is sometimes defined as o’erweening pride; and pride, we know, goeth before a fall. The Judiciary is the “least dangerous” of the federal branches because it has “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm” and the States, “even for the efficacy of its judgments.”[26] With each decision of ours that takes from the People a question properly left to them—with each decision that is unabashedly based not on law, but on the “reasoned judgment” of a bare majority of this Court—we move one step closer to being reminded of our impotence.

 

B.  JUSTICE THOMAS

JUSTICE THOMAS

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote:

The Court’s decision today is at odds not only with the Constitution, but with the principles upon which our Nation was built. Since well before 1787, liberty has been understood as freedom from government action, not entitlement to government benefits. The Framers created our Constitution to preserve that understanding of liberty. Yet the majority invokes our Constitution in the name of a “liberty” that the Framers would not have recognized, to the detriment of the liberty they sought to protect. Along the way, it rejects the idea—captured in our Declaration of Independence—that human dignity is innate and suggests instead that it comes from the Government. This distortion of our Constitution not only ignores the text, it inverts the relationship between the individual and the state in our Republic. I cannot agree with it.

The majority’s decision today will require States to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize same-sex marriages entered in other States largely based on a constitutional provision guaranteeing “due process” before a person is deprived of his “life, liberty, or property.” I have elsewhere explained the dangerous fiction of treating the Due Process Clause as a font of substantive rights. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 –812 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It distorts the constitutional text, which guarantees only whatever “process” is “due” before a person is deprived of life, liberty, and property. Worse, it invites judges to do exactly what the majority has done here – “roam at large in the constitutional field guided only by their personal views as to what fundamental rights are protected by that document”. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 953, 965 (1992) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)).

By straying from the text of the Constitution, substantive due process exalts judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their authority. Petitioners argue that by enshrining the traditional definition of marriage in their State Constitutions through voter-approved amendments, the States have put the issue “beyond the reach of the normal democratic process.” But the result petitioners seek is far less democratic. They ask nine judges on this Court to enshrine their definition of marriage in the Federal Constitution and thus put it beyond the reach of the normal democratic process for the entire Nation. That a “bare majority” of this Court is able to grant this wish, wiping out with a stroke of the keyboard the results of the political process in over 30 States, based on a provision that guarantees only “due process” is but further evidence of the danger of substantive due process.

Even if the doctrine of substantive due process were somehow defensible—it is not—petitioners still would not have a claim. To invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause at all—whether under a theory of “substantive” or “procedural” due process—a party must first identify a deprivation of “life, liberty, or property.” The majority claims these state laws deprive petitioners of “liberty,” but the concept of “liberty” it conjures up bears no resemblance to any plausible meaning of that word as it is used in the Due Process Clauses….

The majority’s inversion of the original meaning of liberty will likely cause collateral damage to other aspects of our constitutional order that protect liberty……

Justice Thomas then went on to explain the history behind the Due Process Clause, including its roots in the Magna Carta, in Blackstone’s Commentaries, and in the government philosophy of John Locke.

In yet another part of his dissent, Justice Thomas wrote: “Aside from undermining the political processes that protect our liberty, the majority’s decision threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect,” and then went on to explain the history of our religious liberty.

Finally, he concluded:

Perhaps recognizing that these cases do not actually involve liberty as it has been understood, the majority goes to great lengths to assert that its decision will advance the “dignity” of same-sex couples. The flaw in that reasoning, of course, is that the Constitution contains no “dignity” Clause, and even if it did, the government would be incapable of bestowing dignity.

Human dignity has long been understood in this country to be innate. When the Framers proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal” and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” they referred to a vision of mankind in which all humans are created in the image of God and therefore of inherent worth. That vision is the foundation upon which this Nation was built.

The corollary of that principle is that human dignity cannot be taken away by the government. Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their humanity) because the government allowed them to be enslaved. Those held in internment camps did not lose their dignity because the government confined them. And those denied governmental benefits certainly do not lose their dignity because the government denies them those benefits. The government cannot bestow dignity, and it cannot take it away.

The majority’s musings are thus deeply misguided, but at least those musings can have no effect on the dignity of the persons the majority demeans. Its mischaracterization of the arguments presented by the States and their amici can have no effect on the dignity of those litigants. Its rejection of laws preserving the traditional definition of marriage can have no effect on the dignity of the people who voted for them. Its invalidation of those laws can have no effect on the dignity of the people who continue to adhere to the traditional definition of marriage. And its disdain for the understandings of liberty and dignity upon which this Nation was founded can have no effect on the dignity of Americans who continue to believe in them.

Our Constitution—like the Declaration of Independence before it—was predicated on a simple truth: One’s liberty, not to mention one’s dignity, was something to be shielded from—not provided by—the State. Today’s decision casts that truth aside. In its haste to reach a desired result, the majority misapplies a clause focused on “due process” to afford substantive rights, disregards the most plausible understanding of the “liberty” protected by that clause, and distorts the principles on which this Nation was founded. Its decision will have inestimable consequences for our Constitution and our society. I respectfully dissent.

 

C.  JUSTICE ALITO

JUSTICE ALITO

Justice Samuel Alito wrote:

Until the federal courts intervened, the American people were engaged in a debate about whether their States should recognize same-sex marriage. The question in these cases, however, is not what States should do about same-sex marriage but whether the Constitution answers that question for them. It does not. The Constitution leaves that question to be decided by the people of each State.

The Constitution says nothing about a right to same-sex marriage, but the Court holds that the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses this right. Our Nation was founded upon the principle that every person has the unalienable right to liberty, but liberty is a term of many meanings. For classical liberals, it may include economic rights now limited by government regulation. For social democrats, it may include the right to a variety of government benefits. For today’s majority, it has a distinctively postmodern meaning.

To prevent five unelected Justices from imposing their personal vision of liberty upon the American people, the Court has held that “liberty” under the Due Process Clause should be understood to protect only those rights that are “ ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 701 –721 (1997). And it is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not among those rights. See United States v. Windsor (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). Indeed: “In this country, no State permitted same-sex marriage until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in 2003 that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the State Constitution. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941. Nor is the right to same-sex marriage deeply rooted in the traditions of other nations. No country allowed same-sex couples to marry until the Netherlands did so in 2000.

“What [those arguing in favor of a constitutional right to same sex marriage] seek, therefore, is not the protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new right, and they seek this innovation not from a legislative body elected by the people, but from unelected judges. Faced with such a request, judges have cause for both caution and humility.” Id.

For today’s majority, it does not matter that the right to same-sex marriage lacks deep roots or even that it is contrary to long-established tradition. The Justices in the majority claim the authority to confer constitutional protection upon that right simply because they believe that it is fundamental.

Attempting to circumvent the problem presented by the newness of the right found in these cases, the majority claims that the issue is the right to equal treatment. Noting that marriage is a fundamental right, the majority argues that a State has no valid reason for denying that right to same-sex couples. This reasoning is dependent upon a particular understanding of the purpose of civil marriage. Although the Court expresses the point in loftier terms, its argument is that the fundamental purpose of marriage is to promote the well-being of those who choose to marry. Marriage provides emotional fulfillment and the promise of support in times of need. And by benefiting persons who choose to wed, marriage indirectly benefits society because persons who live in stable, fulfilling, and supportive relationships make better citizens. It is for these reasons, the argument goes, that States encourage and formalize marriage, confer special benefits on married persons, and also impose some special obligations. This understanding of the States’ reasons for recognizing marriage enables the majority to argue that same-sex marriage serves the States’ objectives in the same way as opposite-sex marriage.

This understanding of marriage, which focuses almost entirely on the happiness of persons who choose to marry, is shared by many people today, but it is not the traditional one. For millennia, marriage was inextricably linked to the one thing that only an opposite-sex couple can do: procreate.

Adherents to different schools of philosophy use different terms to explain why society should formalize marriage and attach special benefits and obligations to persons who marry. Here, the States defending their adherence to the traditional understanding of marriage have explained their position using the pragmatic vocabulary that characterizes most American political discourse. Their basic argument is that States formalize and promote marriage, unlike other fulfilling human relationships, in order to encourage potentially procreative conduct to take place within a lasting unit that has long been thought to provide the best atmosphere for raising children. They thus argue that there are reasonable secular grounds for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.

If this traditional understanding of the purpose of marriage does not ring true to all ears today, that is probably because the tie between marriage and procreation has frayed. Today, for instance, more than 40% of all children in this country are born to unmarried women. This development undoubtedly is both a cause and a result of changes in our society’s understanding of marriage.

While, for many, the attributes of marriage in 21st-century America have changed, those States that do not want to recognize same-sex marriage have not yet given up on the traditional understanding. They worry that by officially abandoning the older understanding, they may contribute to marriage’s further decay. It is far beyond the outer reaches of this Court’s authority to say that a State may not adhere to the understanding of marriage that has long prevailed, not just in this country and others with similar cultural roots, but also in a great variety of countries and cultures all around the globe.

If the Constitution contained a provision guaranteeing the right to marry a person of the same sex, it would be our duty to enforce that right. But the Constitution simply does not speak to the issue of same-sex marriage. In our system of government, ultimate sovereignty rests with the people, and the people have the right to control their own destiny. Any change on a question so fundamental should be made by the people through their elected officials.”

Today’s decision usurps the constitutional right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional understanding of marriage. The decision will also have other important consequences.

It will be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy. In the course of its opinion, the majority compares traditional marriage laws to laws that denied equal treatment for African-Americans and women. The implications of this analogy will be exploited by those who are determined to stamp out every vestige of dissent.

Perhaps recognizing how its reasoning may be used, the majority attempts, toward the end of its opinion, to reassure those who oppose same-sex marriage that their rights of conscience will be protected. Ante, at 26–27. We will soon see whether this proves to be true. I assume that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.

The system of federalism established by our Constitution provides a way for people with different beliefs to live together in a single nation. If the issue of same-sex marriage had been left to the people of the States, it is likely that some States would recognize same-sex marriage and others would not. It is also possible that some States would tie recognition to protection for conscience rights. The majority today makes that impossible. By imposing its own views on the entire country, the majority facilitates the marginalization of the many Americans who have traditional ideas. Recalling the harsh treatment of gays and lesbians in the past, some may think that turnabout is fair play. But if that sentiment prevails, the Nation will experience bitter and lasting wounds.

Today’s decision will also have a fundamental effect on this Court and its ability to uphold the rule of law. If a bare majority of Justices can invent a new right and impose that right on the rest of the country, the only real limit on what future majorities will be able to do is their own sense of what those with political power and cultural influence are willing to tolerate. Even enthusiastic supporters of same-sex marriage should worry about the scope of the power that today’s majority claims.

Today’s decision shows that decades of attempts to restrain this Court’s abuse of its authority have failed. A lesson that some will take from today’s decision is that preaching about the proper method of interpreting the Constitution or the virtues of judicial self-restraint and humility cannot compete with the temptation to achieve what is viewed as a noble end by any practicable means. I do not doubt that my colleagues in the majority sincerely see in the Constitution a vision of liberty that happens to coincide with their own. But this sincerity is cause for concern, not comfort. What it evidences is the deep and perhaps irremediable corruption of our legal culture’s conception of constitutional interpretation.

Most Americans—understandably—will cheer or lament today’s decision because of their views on the issue of same-sex marriage. But all Americans, whatever their thinking on that issue, should worry about what the majority’s claim of power portends.

 

D.  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS

 JUSTICE ROBERTS

JAMES OBERGEFELL, et al., PETITIONERS

14–556v.

RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.;

Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.

Petitioners make strong arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of fairness. They contend that same-sex couples should be allowed to affirm their love and commitment through marriage, just like opposite-sex couples. That position has undeniable appeal; over the past six years, voters and legislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia have revised their laws to allow marriage between two people of the same sex.

But this Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be. The people who ratified the Constitution authorized courts to exercise “neither force nor will but merely judgment.” The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)

Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition.

Today, however, the Court takes the extraordinary step of ordering every State to license and recognize same-sex marriage. Many people will rejoice at this decision, and I begrudge none their celebration. But for those who believe in a government of laws, not of men, the majority’s approach is deeply disheartening. Supporters of same-sex marriage have achieved considerable success persuading their fellow citizens—through the democratic process—to adopt their view. That ends today. Five lawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law. Stealing this issue from the people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept.

The majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment. The right it announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent. The majority expressly disclaims judicial “caution” and omits even a pretense of humility, openly relying on its desire to remake society according to its own “new insight” into the “nature of injustice.” Ante, at 11, 23. As a result, the Court invalidates the marriage laws of more than half the States and orders the transformation of a social institution that has formed the basis of human society for millennia, for the Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who do we think we are?

It can be tempting for judges to confuse our own preferences with the requirements of the law. But as this Court has been reminded throughout our history, the Constitution “is made for people of fundamentally differing views.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Accordingly, “courts are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation.” Id., at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority today neglects that restrained conception of the judicial role. It seizes for itself a question the Constitution leaves to the people, at a time when the people are engaged in a vibrant debate on that question. And it answers that question based not on neutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own “understanding of what freedom is and must become.” (majority opinion, at 19). I have no choice but to dissent.

Understand well what this dissent is about: It is not about whether, in my judgment, the institution of marriage should be changed to include same-sex couples. It is instead about whether, in our democratic republic, that decision should rest with the people acting through their elected representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold commissions authorizing them to resolve legal disputes according to law. The Constitution leaves no doubt about the answer.

I

Petitioners and their amici base their arguments on the “right to marry” and the imperative of “marriage equality.” There is no serious dispute that, under our precedents, the Constitution protects a right to marry and requires States to apply their marriage laws equally. The real question in these cases is what constitutes “marriage,” or—more precisely—who decides what constitutes “marriage”?

The majority largely ignores these questions, relegating ages of human experience with marriage to a paragraph or two. Even if history and precedent are not “the end” of these cases, ante, at 4, I would not “sweep away what has so long been settled” without showing greater respect for all that preceded us. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 2013.

A.

As the majority acknowledges, marriage “has existed for millennia and across civilizations.” (majority opinion, at 3). For all those millennia, across all those civilizations, “marriage” referred to only one relationship: the union of a man and a woman. Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, p. 12 (petitioners conceding that they are not aware of any society that permitted same-sex marriage before 2001). As the Court explained two Terms ago, “until recent years, . . . marriage between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and function throughout the history of civilization.” United States v. Windsor, 2013.

This universal definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman is no historical coincidence. Marriage did not come about as a result of a political movement, discovery, disease, war, religious doctrine, or any other moving force of world history—and certainly not as a result of a prehistoric decision to exclude gays and lesbians. It arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need: ensuring that children are conceived by a mother and father committed to raising them in the stable conditions of a lifelong relationship. See G. Quale, A History of Marriage Systems 2 (1988) (“For since the reproductive instinct is by nature’s gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common.”).

The premises supporting this concept of marriage are so fundamental that they rarely require articulation. The human race must procreate to survive. Procreation occurs through sexual relations between a man and a woman. When sexual relations result in the conception of a child, that child’s prospects are generally better if the mother and father stay together rather than going their separate ways. Therefore, for the good of children and society, sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occur only between a man and a woman committed to a lasting bond.

Society has recognized that bond as marriage. And by bestowing a respected status and material benefits on married couples, society encourages men and women to conduct sexual relations within marriage rather than without. As one prominent scholar put it, “Marriage is a socially arranged solution for the problem of getting people to stay together and care for children that the mere desire for children, and the sex that makes children possible, does not solve.” J. Q. Wilson, The Marriage Problem 41 (2002).

This singular understanding of marriage has prevailed in the United States throughout our history. The majority accepts that at “the time of the Nation’s founding [marriage] was understood to be a voluntary contract between a man and a woman.” Ante, at 6. Early Americans drew heavily on legal scholars like William Blackstone, who regarded marriage between “husband and wife” as one of the “great relations in private life,” and philosophers like John Locke, who described marriage as “a voluntary compact between man and woman” centered on “its chief end, procreation” and the “nourishment and support” of children. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *410; J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government §§78–79, p. 39 (J. Gough ed. 1947). To those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, this conception of marriage and family “was a given: its structure, its stability, roles, and values accepted by all.” Forte, The Framers’ Idea of Marriage and Family, in The Meaning of Marriage 100, 102 (R. George & J. Elshtain eds. 2006).

The Constitution itself says nothing about marriage, and the Framers thereby entrusted the States with “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife.” Windsor, (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586 –594 (1890)). There is no dispute that every State at the founding—and every State throughout our history until a dozen years ago—defined marriage in the traditional, biologically rooted way. The four States in these cases are typical. Their laws, before and after statehood, have treated marriage as the union of a man and a woman. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388, 396–399 (CA6 2014). Even when state laws did not specify this definition expressly, no one doubted what they meant. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S. W. 2d 588, 589 (Ky. App. 1973). The meaning of “marriage” went without saying.

Of course, many did say it. In his first American dictionary, Noah Webster defined marriage as “the legal union of a man and woman for life,” which served the purposes of “preventing the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, . . . promoting domestic felicity, and . . . securing the maintenance and education of children.” 1 An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). An influential 19th-century treatise defined marriage as “a civil status, existing in one man and one woman legally united for life for those civil and social purposes which are based in the distinction of sex.” J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce 25 (1852). The first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defined marriage as “the civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life.” Black’s Law Dictionary 756 (1891) (emphasis deleted). The dictionary maintained essentially that same definition for the next century.

This Court’s precedents have repeatedly described marriage in ways that are consistent only with its traditional meaning. Early cases on the subject referred to marriage as “the union for life of one man and one woman,” Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15, 45 (1885) , which forms “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress,” Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211 (1888) . We later described marriage as “fundamental to our very existence and survival,” an understanding that necessarily implies a procreative component. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) ; see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942) . More recent cases have directly connected the right to marry with the “right to procreate.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386 (1978) .

As the majority notes, some aspects of marriage have changed over time. Arranged marriages have largely given way to pairings based on romantic love. States have replaced coverture, the doctrine by which a married man and woman became a single legal entity, with laws that respect each participant’s separate status. Racial restrictions on marriage, which “arose as an incident to slavery” to promote “White Supremacy,” were repealed by many States and ultimately struck down by this Court. Loving, 388 U. S., at 6–7.

The majority observes that these developments “were not mere superficial changes” in marriage, but rather “worked deep transformations in its structure.” (majority opinion, at 6–7). They did not, however, work any transformation in the core structure of marriage as the union between a man and a woman. If you had asked a person on the street how marriage was defined, no one would ever have said, “Marriage is the union of a man and a woman, where the woman is subject to coverture.” The majority may be right that the “history of marriage is one of both continuity and change,” but the core meaning of marriage has endured. Ante, at 6.

B

Shortly after this Court struck down racial restrictions on marriage in Loving, a gay couple in Minnesota sought a marriage license. They argued that the Constitution required States to allow marriage between people of the same sex for the same reasons that it requires States to allow marriage between people of different races. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected their analogy to Loving, and this Court summarily dismissed an appeal. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972) .

In the decades after Baker, greater numbers of gays and lesbians began living openly, and many expressed a desire to have their relationships recognized as marriages. Over time, more people came to see marriage in a way that could be extended to such couples. Until recently, this new view of marriage remained a minority position. After the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 interpreted its State Constitution to require recognition of same-sex marriage, many States—including the four at issue here—enacted constitutional amendments formally adopting the longstanding definition of marriage.

Over the last few years, public opinion on marriage has shifted rapidly. In 2009, the legislatures of Vermont, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia became the first in the Nation to enact laws that revised the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples, while also providing accommodations for religious believers. In 2011, the New York Legislature enacted a similar law. In 2012, voters in Maine did the same, reversing the result of a referendum just three years earlier in which they had upheld the traditional definition of marriage.

In all, voters and legislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia have changed their definitions of marriage to include same-sex couples. The highest courts of five States have decreed that same result under their own Constitutions. The remainder of the States retain the traditional definition of marriage.

Petitioners brought lawsuits contending that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment compel their States to license and recognize marriages between same-sex couples. In a carefully reasoned decision, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the democratic “momentum” in favor of “expanding the definition of marriage to include gay couples,” but concluded that petitioners had not made “the case for constitutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the founding: in the hands of state voters.” 772 F. 3d, at 396, 403. That decision interpreted the Constitution correctly, and I would affirm.

II

Petitioners first contend that the marriage laws of their States violate the Due Process Clause. The Solicitor General of the United States, appearing in support of petitioners, expressly disowned that position before this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 38–39. The majority nevertheless resolves these cases for petitioners based almost entirely on the Due Process Clause.

The majority purports to identify four “principles and traditions” in this Court’s due process precedents that support a fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry. (majority opinion, at 12). In reality, however, the majority’s approach has no basis in principle or tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 . Stripped of its shiny rhetorical gloss, the majority’s argument is that the Due Process Clause gives same-sex couples a fundamental right to marry because it will be good for them and for society. If I were a legislator, I would certainly consider that view as a matter of social policy. But as a judge, I find the majority’s position indefensible as a matter of constitutional law.

A

Petitioners’ “fundamental right” claim falls into the most sensitive category of constitutional adjudication. Petitioners do not contend that their States’ marriage laws violate an enumerated constitutional right, such as the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. There is, after all, no “Companionship and Understanding” or “Nobility and Dignity” Clause in the Constitution. (See majority opinion, at 3, 14). They argue instead that the laws violate a right implied by the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that “liberty” may not be deprived without “due process of law.”

This Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to include a “substantive” component that protects certain liberty interests against state deprivation “no matter what process is provided.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302 (1993) . The theory is that some liberties are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” and therefore cannot be deprived without compelling justification. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).

Allowing unelected federal judges to select which unenumerated rights rank as “fundamental”—and to strike down state laws on the basis of that determination—raises obvious concerns about the judicial role. Our precedents have accordingly insisted that judges “exercise the utmost care” in identifying implied fundamental rights, “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Kennedy, Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of Judicial Restraint 13 (1986) (Address at Stanford) (“One can conclude that certain essential, or fundamental, rights should exist in any just society. It does not follow that each of those essential rights is one that we as judges can enforce under the written Constitution. The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.”).

The need for restraint in administering the strong medicine of substantive due process is a lesson this Court has learned the hard way. The Court first applied substantive due process to strike down a statute in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). There the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise on the ground that legislation restricting the institution of slavery violated the implied rights of slaveholders. The Court relied on its own conception of liberty and property in doing so. It asserted that “an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States . . . could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.” Id., at 450. In a dissent that has outlasted the majority opinion, Justice Curtis explained that when the “fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws [are] abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control” the Constitution’s meaning, “we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to mean.” Id., at 621.

Dred Scott’s holding was overruled on the battlefields of the Civil War and by constitutional amendment after Appomattox, but its approach to the Due Process Clause reappeared. In a series of early 20th-century cases, most prominently Lochner v. New York, this Court invalidated state statutes that presented “meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual,” and “undue interference with liberty of person and freedom of contract.” 198 U. S., at 60, 61. In Lochner itself, the Court struck down a New York law setting maximum hours for bakery employees, because there was “in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law.” Id., at 58.

The dissenting Justices in Lochner explained that the New York law could be viewed as a reasonable response to legislative concern about the health of bakery employees, an issue on which there was at least “room for debate and for an honest difference of opinion.” Id., at 72 (opinion of Harlan, J.). The majority’s contrary conclusion required adopting as constitutional law “an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.” Id., at 75 (opinion of Holmes, J.). As Justice Holmes memorably put it, “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” a leading work on the philosophy of Social Darwinism. Ibid. The Constitution “is not intended to embody a particular economic theory . . . . It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution.” Id., at 75–76.

In the decades after Lochner, the Court struck down nearly 200 laws as violations of individual liberty, often over strong dissents contending that “[t]he criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good.” Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525, 570 (1923) (opinion of Holmes, J.). By empowering judges to elevate their own policy judgments to the status of constitutionally protected “liberty,” the Lochner line of cases left “no alternative to regarding the court as a . . . legislative chamber.” L. Hand, The Bill of Rights 42 (1958).

Eventually, the Court recognized its error and vowed not to repeat it. “The doctrine that . . . due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely,” we later explained, “has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730 (1963) ; see Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952) (“we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation”). Thus, it has become an accepted rule that the Court will not hold laws unconstitutional simply because we find them “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955) .

Rejecting Lochner does not require disavowing the doctrine of implied fundamental rights, and this Court has not done so. But to avoid repeating Lochner’s error of converting personal preferences into constitutional mandates, our modern substantive due process cases have stressed the need for “judicial self-restraint.” Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992) . Our precedents have required that implied fundamental rights be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 720–721 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the Court articulated the importance of history and tradition to the fundamental rights inquiry most precisely in Glucksberg, many other cases both before and after have adopted the same approach. See, e.g., District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52, 72 (2009) ; Flores, 507 U. S., at 303; United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 751 (1987); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also id., at 544 (White, J., dissenting) (“The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U. S. 57 –101 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (consulting “ ‘our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices’ ” and concluding that “we owe it to the Nation’s domestic relations legal structure . . . to proceed with caution” (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721)).

Proper reliance on history and tradition of course requires looking beyond the individual law being challenged, so that every restriction on liberty does not supply its own constitutional justification. The Court is right about that. Ante, at 18. But given the few “guideposts for responsible decision-making in this unchartered area,” Collins, 503 U. S., at 125, “an approach grounded in history imposes limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based on an abstract formula,” Moore, 431 U. S., at 504, n. 12 (plurality opinion). Expanding a right suddenly and dramatically is likely to require tearing it up from its roots. Even a sincere profession of “discipline” in identifying fundamental rights, (majority opinion, at 10–11), does not provide a meaningful constraint on a judge, for “what he is really likely to be ‘discovering,’ whether or not he is fully aware of it, are his own values,” J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 44 (1980). The only way to ensure restraint in this delicate enterprise is “continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles [of] the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).

B

The majority acknowledges none of this doctrinal background, and it is easy to see why: Its aggressive application of substantive due process breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner.

1

The majority’s driving themes are that marriage is desirable and petitioners desire it. The opinion describes the “transcendent importance” of marriage and repeatedly insists that petitioners do not seek to “demean,” “devalue,” “denigrate,” or “disrespect” the institution. (majority opinion, at 3, 4, 6, 28). Nobody disputes those points.

Indeed, the compelling personal accounts of petitioners and others like them are likely a primary reason why many Americans have changed their minds about whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry. As a matter of constitutional law, however, the sincerity of petitioners’ wishes is not relevant.

When the majority turns to the law, it relies primarily on precedents discussing the fundamental “right to marry.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987) ; Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 383; see Loving, 388 U. S., at 12. These cases do not hold, of course, that anyone who wants to get married has a constitutional right to do so. They instead require a State to justify barriers to marriage as that institution has always been understood. In Loving, the Court held that racial restrictions on the right to marry lacked a compelling justification. In Zablocki, restrictions based on child support debts did not suffice. In Turner, restrictions based on status as a prisoner were deemed impermissible.

None of the laws at issue in those cases purported to change the core definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman. The laws challenged in Zablocki and Turner did not define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman, where neither party owes child support or is in prison.” Nor did the interracial marriage ban at issue in Loving define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman of the same race.” See Tragen, Comment, Statutory Prohibitions Against Interracial Marriage, 32 Cal. L. Rev. 269 (1944) (“at common law there was no ban on interracial marriage”); (see Justice Thomas’ dissent, at 11–12). Removing racial barriers to marriage therefore did not change what a marriage was any more than integrating schools changed what a school was. As the majority admits, the institution of “marriage” discussed in every one of these cases “presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners.” (majority opinion, at 11).

In short, the “right to marry” cases stand for the important but limited proposition that particular restrictions on access to marriage as traditionally defined violate due process. These precedents say nothing at all about a right to make a State change its definition of marriage, which is the right petitioners actually seek here. See Windsor, (Alito, J., dissenting) (“What Windsor and the United States seek . . . is not the protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new right.”). Neither petitioners nor the majority cites a single case or other legal source providing any basis for such a constitutional right. None exists, and that is enough to foreclose their claim.

2

The majority suggests that “there are other, more instructive precedents” informing the right to marry. Ante, at 12. Although not entirely clear, this reference seems to correspond to a line of cases discussing an implied fundamental “right of privacy.” Griswold, 381 U. S., at 486. In the first of those cases, the Court invalidated a criminal law that banned the use of contraceptives. Id., at 485–486. The Court stressed the invasive nature of the ban, which threatened the intrusion of “the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.” Id., at 485. In the Court’s view, such laws infringed the right to privacy in its most basic sense: the “right to be let alone.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 –454, n. 10 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted); citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

The Court also invoked the right to privacy in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) , which struck down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy. Lawrence relied on the position that criminal sodomy laws, like bans on contraceptives, invaded privacy by inviting “unwarranted government intrusions” that “touch upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior . . . in the most private of places, the home.” Id., at 562, 567.

Neither Lawrence nor any other precedent in the privacy line of cases supports the right that petitioners assert here. Unlike criminal laws banning contraceptives and sodomy, the marriage laws at issue here involve no government intrusion. They create no crime and impose no punishment. Same-sex couples remain free to live together, to engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their families as they see fit. No one is “condemned to live in loneliness” by the laws challenged in these cases—no one. (majority opinion, at 28). At the same time, the laws in no way interfere with the “right to be let alone.”

The majority also relies on Justice Harlan’s influential dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961) . As the majority recounts, that opinion states that “due process has not been reduced to any formula.” Id., at 542. But far from conferring the broad interpretive discretion that the majority discerns, Justice Harlan’s opinion makes clear that courts implying fundamental rights are not “free to roam where unguided speculation might take them.” Ibid. They must instead have “regard to what history teaches” and exercise not only “judgment” but “restraint.” Ibid. Of particular relevance, Justice Harlan explained that “laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up . . . form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.” Id., at 546.

In sum, the privacy cases provide no support for the majority’s position, because petitioners do not seek privacy. Quite the opposite, they seek public recognition of their relationships, along with corresponding government benefits. Our cases have consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements from the State. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189, 196 (1989) ; San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 –37 (1973); (See Justice Thomas’ dissent, at 9-13). Thus, although the right to privacy recognized by our precedents certainly plays a role in protecting the intimate conduct of same-sex couples, it provides no affirmative right to redefine marriage and no basis for striking down the laws at issue here.

3

Perhaps recognizing how little support it can derive from precedent, the majority goes out of its way to jettison the “careful” approach to implied fundamental rights taken by this Court in Glucksberg. (majority opinion, at 18) (quoting 521 U. S., at 721). It is revealing that the majority’s position requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of substantive due process. At least this part of the majority opinion has the virtue of candor. Nobody could rightly accuse the majority of taking a careful approach.

Ultimately, only one precedent offers any support for the majority’s methodology: Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 . The majority opens its opinion by announcing petitioners’ right to “define and express their identity.” (majority opinion, at 1–2). The majority later explains that “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.” (majority opinion, at 12). This freewheeling notion of individual autonomy echoes nothing so much as “the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.” Lochner, 198 U. S., at 58 (emphasis added).

To be fair, the majority does not suggest that its individual autonomy right is entirely unconstrained. The constraints it sets are precisely those that accord with its own “reasoned judgment,” informed by its “new insight” into the “nature of injustice,” which was invisible to all who came before but has become clear “as we learn [the] meaning” of liberty. (majority opinion, at 10, 11). The truth is that today’s decision rests on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that “it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.” Ante, at 19. Whatever force that belief may have as a matter of moral philosophy, it has no more basis in the Constitution than did the naked policy preferences adopted in Lochner. See 198 U. S., at 61 (“We do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this law,” which “is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals . . . to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best”).

The majority recognizes that today’s cases do not mark “the first time the Court has been asked to adopt a cautious approach to recognizing and protecting fundamental rights.” (majority opinion, at 25). On that much, we agree. The Court was “asked”—and it agreed—to “adopt a cautious approach” to implying fundamental rights after the debacle of the Lochner era. Today, the majority casts caution aside and revives the grave errors of that period.

One immediate question invited by the majority’s position is whether States may retain the definition of marriage as a union of two people. Cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (Utah 2013), appeal pending, No. 14-4117 (CA10). Although the majority randomly inserts the adjective “two” in various places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core definition of marriage may be preserved while the man-woman element may not. Indeed, from the standpoint of history and tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in some cultures around the world. If the majority is willing to take the big leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the shorter one.

It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental right to plural marriage. If “there is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices,” (majority opinion, at 13), why would there be any less dignity in the bond between three people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to make the profound choice to marry? If a same-sex couple has the constitutional right to marry because their children would otherwise “suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser,” (majority opinion, at 15), why wouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three or more persons raising children? If not having the opportunity to marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay and lesbian couples, why wouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” (majority opinion, at 22), serve to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous relationships? See Bennett, Polyamory: The Next Sexual Revolution? Newsweek, July 28, 2009 (estimating 500,000 polyamorous families in the United States); Li, Married Lesbian “Throuple” Expecting First Child, N. Y. Post, Apr. 23, 2014; Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 Emory L. J. 1977 (2015).

I do not mean to equate marriage between same-sex couples with plural marriages in all respects. There may well be relevant differences that compel different legal analysis. But if there are, petitioners have not pointed to any. When asked about a plural marital union at oral argument, petitioners asserted that a State “doesn’t have such an institution.” Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 2, p. 6. But that is exactly the point: the States at issue here do not have an institution of same-sex marriage, either.

4

Near the end of its opinion, the majority offers perhaps the clearest insight into its decision. Expanding marriage to include same-sex couples, the majority insists, would “pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.” (majority opinion, at 27). This argument again echoes Lochner, which relied on its assessment that “we think that a law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act.” 198 U. S., at 57.

Then and now, this assertion of the “harm principle” sounds more in philosophy than law. The elevation of the fullest individual self-realization over the constraints that society has expressed in law may or may not be attractive moral philosophy. But a Justice’s commission does not confer any special moral, philosophical, or social insight sufficient to justify imposing those perceptions on fellow citizens under the pretense of “due process.” There is indeed a process due the people on issues of this sort—the democratic process. Respecting that understanding requires the Court to be guided by law, not any particular school of social thought. As Judge Henry Friendly once put it, echoing Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner, the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty any more than it enacts Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics. See Randolph, Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft Abortion Opinion, 29 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1035, 1036–1037, 1058 (2006). And it certainly does not enact any one concept of marriage.

The majority’s understanding of due process lays out a tantalizing vision of the future for Members of this Court: If an unvarying social institution enduring over all of recorded history cannot inhibit judicial policymaking, what can? But this approach is dangerous for the rule of law. The purpose of insisting that implied fundamental rights have roots in the history and tradition of our people is to ensure that when unelected judges strike down democratically enacted laws, they do so based on something more than their own beliefs. The Court today not only overlooks our country’s entire history and tradition but actively repudiates it, preferring to live only in the heady days of the here and now. I agree with the majority that the “nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.” (majority opinion, at 11). As petitioners put it, “times can blind.” Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 9, 10. But to blind yourself to history is both prideful and unwise. “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” W. Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun 92 (1951).

III

In addition to their due process argument, petitioners contend that the Equal Protection Clause requires their States to license and recognize same-sex marriages. The majority does not seriously engage with this claim. Its discussion is, quite frankly, difficult to follow. The central point seems to be that there is a “synergy between” the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, and that some precedents relying on one Clause have also relied on the other. (majority opinion, at 20). Absent from this portion of the opinion, however, is anything resembling our usual framework for deciding equal protection cases. It is casebook doctrine that the “modern Supreme Court’s treatment of equal protection claims has used a means-ends methodology in which judges ask whether the classification the government is using is sufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing.” G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein, M. Tushnet, & P. Karlan, Constitutional Law 453 (7th ed. 2013). The majority’s approach today is different:

“Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.” (majority opinion, at 19).

The majority goes on to assert in conclusory fashion that the Equal Protection Clause provides an alternative basis for its holding. (majority opinion, at 22). Yet the majority fails to provide even a single sentence explaining how the Equal Protection Clause supplies independent weight for its position, nor does it attempt to justify its gratuitous violation of the canon against unnecessarily resolving constitutional questions. See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 197 (2009) . In any event, the marriage laws at issue here do not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-sex couples is rationally related to the States’ “legitimate state interest” in “preserving the traditional institution of marriage.” Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

It is important to note with precision which laws petitioners have challenged. Although they discuss some of the ancillary legal benefits that accompany marriage, such as hospital visitation rights and recognition of spousal status on official documents, petitioners’ lawsuits target the laws defining marriage generally rather than those allocating benefits specifically. The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. Of course, those more selective claims will not arise now that the Court has taken the drastic step of requiring every State to license and recognize marriages between same-sex couples.

IV

The legitimacy of this Court ultimately rests “upon the respect accorded to its judgments.” Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U. S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). That respect flows from the perception—and reality—that we exercise humility and restraint in deciding cases according to the Constitution and law. The role of the Court envisioned by the majority today, however, is anything but humble or restrained. Over and over, the majority exalts the role of the judiciary in delivering social change. In the majority’s telling, it is the courts, not the people, who are responsible for making “new dimensions of freedom . . . apparent to new generations,” for providing “formal discourse” on social issues, and for ensuring “neutral discussions, without scornful or disparaging commentary.” (majority opinion, at 7-9).

Nowhere is the majority’s extravagant conception of judicial supremacy more evident than in its description—and dismissal—of the public debate regarding same-sex marriage. Yes, the majority concedes, on one side are thousands of years of human history in every society known to have populated the planet. But on the other side, there has been “extensive litigation,” “many thoughtful District Court decisions,” “countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings,” and “more than 100” amicus briefs in these cases alone. (majority opinion, at 9, 10, 23). What would be the point of allowing the democratic process to go on? It is high time for the Court to decide the meaning of marriage, based on five lawyers’ “better informed understanding” of “a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” (majority opinion, at 19). The answer is surely there in one of those amicus briefs or studies.

Those who founded our country would not recognize the majority’s conception of the judicial role. They after all risked their lives and fortunes for the precious right to govern themselves. They would never have imagined yielding that right on a question of social policy to unaccountable and unelected judges. And they certainly would not have been satisfied by a system empowering judges to override policy judgments so long as they do so after “a quite extensive discussion.” (majority opinion, at 8). In our democracy, debate about the content of the law is not an exhaustion requirement to be checked off before courts can impose their will. “Surely the Constitution does not put either the legislative branch or the executive branch in the position of a television quiz show contestant so that when a given period of time has elapsed and a problem remains unresolved by them, the federal judiciary may press a buzzer and take its turn at fashioning a solution.” Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas L. Rev. 693, 700 (1976). As a plurality of this Court explained just last year, “It is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.” Schuette v. BAMN, 2014.

The Court’s accumulation of power does not occur in a vacuum. It comes at the expense of the people. And they know it. Here and abroad, people are in the midst of a serious and thoughtful public debate on the issue of same-sex marriage. They see voters carefully considering same-sex marriage, casting ballots in favor or opposed, and sometimes changing their minds. They see political leaders similarly reexamining their positions, and either reversing course or explaining adherence to old convictions confirmed anew. They see governments and businesses modifying policies and practices with respect to same-sex couples, and participating actively in the civic discourse. They see countries overseas democratically accepting profound social change, or declining to do so. This deliberative process is making people take seriously questions that they may not have even regarded as questions before.

When decisions are reached through democratic means, some people will inevitably be disappointed with the results. But those whose views do not prevail at least know that they have had their say, and accordingly are—in the tradition of our political culture—reconciled to the result of a fair and honest debate. In addition, they can gear up to raise the issue later, hoping to persuade enough on the winning side to think again. “That is exactly how our system of government is supposed to work.” (Justice Scalia’s dissent, at 2-3).

But today the Court puts a stop to all that. By deciding this question under the Constitution, the Court removes it from the realm of democratic decision. There will be consequences to shutting down the political process on an issue of such profound public significance. Closing debate tends to close minds. People denied a voice are less likely to accept the ruling of a court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort of thing courts usually decide. As a thoughtful commentator observed about another issue, “The political process was moving . . . , not swiftly enough for advocates of quick, complete change, but majoritarian institutions were listening and acting. Heavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict.” Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N. C. L. Rev. 375, 385–386 (1985). Indeed, however heartened the proponents of same-sex marriage might be on this day, it is worth acknowledging what they have lost, and lost forever: the opportunity to win the true acceptance that comes from persuading their fellow citizens of the justice of their cause. And they lose this just when the winds of change were freshening at their backs.

Federal courts are blunt instruments when it comes to creating rights. They have constitutional power only to resolve concrete cases or controversies; they do not have the flexibility of legislatures to address concerns of parties not before the court or to anticipate problems that may arise from the exercise of a new right. Today’s decision, for example, creates serious questions about religious liberty. Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and their freedom to exercise religion is—unlike the right imagined by the majority—actually spelled out in the Constitution. (First Amendment)

Respect for sincere religious conviction has led voters and legislators in every State that has adopted same-sex marriage democratically to include accommodations for religious practice. The majority’s decision imposing same-sex marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommodations. The majority graciously suggests that religious believers may continue to “advocate” and “teach” their views of marriage. (majority opinion, at 27). The First Amendment guarantees, however, the freedom to “exercise” religion. Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.

Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage—when, for example, a religious college provides married student housing only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption agency declines to place children with same-sex married couples. Indeed, the Solicitor General candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some religious institutions would be in question if they opposed same-sex marriage. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 36–38. There is little doubt that these and similar questions will soon be before this Court. Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today.

Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’s decision is the extent to which the majority feels compelled to sully those on the other side of the debate. The majority offers a cursory assurance that it does not intend to disparage people who, as a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-sex marriage. (majority opinion, at 19). That disclaimer is hard to square with the very next sentence, in which the majority explains that “the necessary consequence” of laws codifying the traditional definition of marriage is to “demean or stigmatize” same-sex couples. (majority opinion, at 19). The majority reiterates such characterizations over and over. By the majority’s account, Americans who did nothing more than follow the understanding of marriage that has existed for our entire history—in particular, the tens of millions of people who voted to reaffirm their States’ enduring definition of marriage—have acted to “lock . . . out,” “disparage,” “disrespect and subordinate,” and inflict “dignitary wounds” upon their gay and lesbian neighbors. (majority opinion, at 17, 19, 22, 25). These apparent assaults on the character of fair-minded people will have an effect, in society and in court. (See Justice Alito’s dissent, at 6-7). Moreover, they are entirely gratuitous. It is one thing for the majority to conclude that the Constitution protects a right to same-sex marriage; it is something else to portray everyone who does not share the majority’s “better informed understanding” as bigoted. (majority opinion, at 19).

In the face of all this, a much different view of the Court’s role is possible. That view is more modest and restrained. It is more skeptical that the legal abilities of judges also reflect insight into moral and philosophical issues. It is more sensitive to the fact that judges are unelected and unaccountable, and that the legitimacy of their power depends on confining it to the exercise of legal judgment. It is more attuned to the lessons of history, and what it has meant for the country and Court when Justices have exceeded their proper bounds. And it is less pretentious than to suppose that while people around the world have viewed an institution in a particular way for thousands of years, the present generation and the present Court are the ones chosen to burst the bonds of that history and tradition.

*  *  *

If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.

I respectfully dissent.

 

CONCLUSION

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES - Supreme Court pic with rainbow-colored wedding rings

The Constitution is a set of core principles, delegated authority, and limits according to which We the People, established in state conventions, decided to have our country governed. Sure, these principles gradually change over time, as well the need for government to adapt to changing times. For example, in 1815, the federal government was expected to stay in DC, run its strictly enumerated programs (post office, patent office, etc), conduct foreign policy, and otherwise stay out of everyone’s hair. Americans enjoyed the fundamental right “to be left alone” by the federal government [“The makers of the Constitution: conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Olmstead v. United States, 1928]. Today we accept the notion that the government should take care of us and expect it to do more and more for our well-being and quality of life.  Our Founding Fathers understood that our understanding of government might change over time. They also understood that the Constitution shouldn’t be changed lightly and without sufficient time and opportunity to consider and reflect on the proposed changes. That is why they included Article V, which prescribes the precise processes to alter and amend the Constitution.

There are essentially two ways of dealing with gradual changes: (1) The legal path – thru the amendment process, which is a long deliberate process, and (2) The illegal path – the way that’s been used at least since FDR – which is to give judges great latitude and freedom to reinterpret ambiguous (and crystal clear ones!) parts of the Constitution; this is the quick process.  For progressives, the latter is the preferred process and for conservatives, the first process is what is preferred. For conservatives, the path to take when confronting a shift in prevailing attitudes in our country, such as social change in recognizing gay marriage, is to first require judges to interpret the Constitution literally (“strict constructionism”), and if the change is not addressed clearly in the Constitution, to introduce or address that change by passing a constitutional amendment. That’s the option preferred by conservatives, because conservatives are, by definition, opposed to change, and, in this approach, the Constitution will always be a product responsive to the wishes of the people as a whole and not a product created by judges.

While this may sound insufficient or insurmountable to certain minority groups because of the potential time it may take to gain a majority opinion in their favor, it serves the democratic process and makes sure that change is truly made wisely. The Constitution always protects the fundamental and essential rights of all persons, including all minority groups. It’s the “new rights” that we are talking about here.

I’m not saying that gay marriage should be banned. It may very well be the will of the people in their States and even in the United States as a whole, in support of a constitutional amendment removing the traditional definition of marriage. That is not the question for this article. What I am saying is that the Supreme Court should not have made that decision. It was beyond their authority to do so (just as it was beyond their authority to determine that the unborn have no constitutional rights and therefore can be killed).

Years before his passing, Justice Scalia did an interview in which he explained that “originalism” and “strict construction” as an approach to interpreting the Constitution is a dying position. He said that our youth is being taught, expressly, that the Constitution is “a living, breathing document.” He said that day after day when school systems bring their students to the Supreme Court building, he hears the teacher ask the kids: “What is the Constitution?” To which they would answer, in unison, “a living, breathing document.”  Our children, our youth, are being indoctrinated that the Constitution allows the country to be run not necessarily by an established rule of law but by the rule, or whim, of man.

The progressive and political nature of the Supreme Court poses a grave danger to the longevity and the integrity of the foundations that were agreed upon in the years when the States, and the people acting in convention in those States, debated, deliberated, and labored over the decision to delegate some of its power to a common government establish a federal union. Their deliberations and decisions were directly related to the meaning and intent of the Constitution; its meaning and operation were paramount to their decision. The Supreme Court, through many years of opinions, has reassigned new meaning and powers to the government, not by recognizing what it says but by ignoring what it says.

Indeed, little by little, the foundations of our Constitution have been eroded by the federal judiciary and over the course of its history (ever since the Marshall Court), its men in black robes have enlarged the powers of the federal government, have stripped reserved powers of the States, have secured for the government the unlimited right to the property and finances of the American people, have put the American people in a state of limbo as to the security of their fundamental rights under the First Amendment (religious rights, in particular) and Second Amendment, and have used the bench as an alternate forum to make laws. The result has been an erosion of the American system of checks and balances, especially in the ability of the States to check the federal government. A government without effective checks is a danger to the freedom of the people.

“At the establishment of our Constitutions,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Adamantios Coray in 1823, “the judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and harmless members of the government. Experience, however, soon showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office; that their decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors only, pass silent and unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions nevertheless become law by precedent, sapping by little and little the foundations of the Constitution and working its change by construction before any one has perceived that that invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its substance. In truth, man is not made to be trusted for life if secured against all liability to account.”

We inherently know when the executive and legislative branches overstep their constitutional (and in pursuance to it, statutory) authority. Anyone who has read the Constitution and takes the time to read our federal laws can tell when their limits have been exceeded. And the people and the States can decide how to respond to such unconstitutional action. But how do you challenge the judicial branch when they alone determine what the Constitution means (or now means) and the laws mean.

No doubt many will never be convinced that decisions of the Supreme Court should be opposed or ignored. No doubt that many will never believe that its opinions can be characterized as “unconstitutional.” If you are one of those individuals, consider how the Supreme Court, starting with the Marbury v. Madison decision has affected the delicate balance of government envisioned by our Founders and drafters and established in the Constitution:  The Constitution intended to, and did, establish three departments, coordinate and independent, capable of checking and balancing one another, with the officials of the most important branches (the legislative and the executive) being elected in a democratic process. And then the intended weakest branch, with its members appointed and thus outside the reach of the electorate, reserved to itself the power over the other branches and over the will of the people.

Yes, the Supreme Court and the other courts of the federal judiciary often abuse their power, put politics and agenda over a duty to impartially interpret the Constitution and its laws, make law from the bench, direct social change from the bench, and usurp powers reserved to the States or the People whenever it feels like in order that the federal government can exert the powers it wants and for the reasons it wants. Yes, its opinions are often unconstitutional. I hope this article has convinced you of that. I have used the very words, the explanations, of our esteemed Supreme Court justices to make my point as clear and as strong as possible.

I also hope that you find it unacceptable that it happens and that because “no one watches the watchers” we have accepted the notion that whatever the Court decides must become the law of the land.

I hope your next step will be to believe that such unconstitutional decisions, like unconstitutional laws and executive orders, must be called out for what they are and be prevented from being enforced. The enforcement of unconstitutional laws and policies, AND unconstitutional judicial opinions, is the very definition of TYRANNY.

Ultimately, my hope is that you will begin to research and read up on the remedies to prevent the enforcement of unconstitutional judicial opinions, share the knowledge with friends, and get involved with your local and state government (thru its officials) to educate them as well.

 

References:

Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015 (dissenting opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts) –    https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-556/dissent4.html

Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015 (dissenting opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas) –  https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-556/dissent6.html   [Read Justice Thomas’ explanation of the history and meaning of both the Due Process Clause (of the 5th amendment) and the history of Religious Liberty]

Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015 (dissenting opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia) –  https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-556/dissent5.html

Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015 (dissenting opinion by Justice Samuel Alito) –  https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-556/dissent7.html

Robert E. Riggs, “When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the Supreme Court, 1900-1990,” Hofstra Law Review, Volume 21,|Issue 3, Article 3 (1993).  Referenced at:  https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1867&context=hlr

Robert E. Riggs (1993) “When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 1900-90,” Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 21: Iss. 3, Article 3.  Referenced at:  http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss3/3

Tom Jippimg, “The Judiciary: The Strongest and Most Dangerous Branch?”, Enter Stage Right, March 4, 2002.  Referenced at:  http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0302/0302judiciary.htm   [Tom Jipping is the director of the Free Congress Foundation’s Center for Law and Democracy]

Thomas Jefferson: Leave His Legacy Alone

THOMAS JEFFERSON - with sunglasses

by Diane Rufino, Feb. 22, 2018

Thomas Jefferson is probably one of our greatest Founding Fathers, if not the greatest of them all. I think I’m going to be triggered if one other person demonizes him and demeans his legacy because of the fact that he owned slaves. Slavery was not only legal at that time, even constitutionally-protected, but it was a way of life all over the globe.

Jefferson’s presidency lasted from 1801-1808; he was only our young nation’s third president. His two terms were marked by discord with Great Britain, threats of secession by the New England states, an overly-ambitious Supreme Court, and he passed away on July 4, 1826. During that time, slavery was used by the great world powers in their island colonies. In 1815, we see that a gradual abolition of the slave trade began, mostly thru treaty agreement. In 1834, Great Britain, the Slavery Abolition Act went into effect, abolishing slavery throughout its kingdom (the British Empire) – not outright, but on a gradual basis over the following six years. Jefferson had been dead many years before the countries of the world took action to end the abdominal institution.

The sins of the entire world shouldn’t become Jefferson’s original.

Jefferson gave us something extraordinary. He wrote the Declaration of Independence, outlining a system of government for our newly-independent states that expressly rejected the British model. Under the British model, Kings have the absolute right to govern their subjects because of a divine right.  In the American States, and then the united States, according to Jefferson, the People have an absolute right to govern themselves because of a natural right.

And yes, when he wrote “All Men are created equal” he meant it to be without regard to race. Jefferson had hoped the new Union created by the Constitution would not recognize slavery as a legal institution.

Yet his contributions went far beyond the Declaration. He convinced James Madison that a Bill of Rights was absolutely necessary and that every freedom-loving individual is entitled to a Bill of Rights to set limits on the exercise of government. He fought long and hard for Freedom of Religion, for States’ Rights, and for a limited federal government.

People who don’t understand the significance of the words of the Declaration and who don’t see that Jefferson gave us something profoundly transformational, should simply thank him and say nothing else. The only reason we still have our freedoms and liberties is because every once and awhile our country has a moment of clarity and tries to get back to the principles Jefferson devoted his life to.

Jefferson has earned our unquestioned and undying gratitude. Monuments to him remind us of that great gems he gave us. Only the ignorant and the dissenters among us see only a slaveholder. We visit Monticello to learn more about him and his life and what inspired his lifelong commitment to service and to the direction of the great American experiment; we go there to see his vast book collection and the great volumes of his correspondence. We don’t go there to learn where his housekeepers slept or how meals were prepared or laundry done for him by his slaves.

I am not trying to demean anyone or demean anyone’s position, and I’m certainly not trying to insinuate that Jefferson was a God or a flawless individual. My point is that great men should be celebrated for their meaningful contributions. Our lives today are better for them and the lives of millions around the world are uplifted because of them. We don’t demonize Abraham Lincoln and demean the role he played in re-uniting the Union, even though we know the reason he pledged to stop the spread of slavery into the West was because he wanted those states to be a land for whites only. We don’t demonize President LBJ and demean his contribution to African-Americans when he signed the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act into law, even though we know he was the most vile of racists and routinely referred to African-Americans using the “N” word.  We don’t demonize Mohammed Ali and demean his title as history’s greatest boxer, even though for the first half of his life he was an unabashed bigot and racial separatist. We don’t demonize Dr. Martin Luther King Jr because he cheated on his wife yet claiming the title of ‘reverend.’ We don’t demonize George Washington or demean his role as the Father of our County even though he owned slaves. And we don’t demonize Albert Einstein and reject his theory of relativity because he married his cousin.

Almost every human being is flawed in one way or another. And every important Founding Father can certainly be accused of owning slaves; My goodness… Presidents of the United States owned slaves up until the year 1849.

The insanity needs to stop. What we need to do is take MORE time to learn about this great men and their lives and contributions and NOT vilify them so that we end up spending less time studying them.